11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
313
Alignment, Drivers and Future Prospects
Saudi Arabia has displayed a remarkable consistency in its international negotiating positions and tactics over the past decades. Its role is
perceived negatively by many players, including small island states, environmental NGOs and most Western countries. In recent years, Saudi
Arabia has taken some steps that seem to be aimed at softening its public
image in the UNFCCC context. These include sponsoring GCC pavilions
at UNFCCC conferences, which feature regular presentations showcasing
research and technological development and pilot projects undertaken
in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Energy also develops web content
featuring Saudi Arabia’s national actions and UNFCCC conference side
events. 39
In the domestic context, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated high levels of
interest in both energy efficiency and clean energy, but nevertheless seems
still reluctant to present these as elements of a national climate change
policy. Major question marks remain around why the Saudi government
displays such reluctance, but the centralisation of climate change-related
matters under the Ministry of Energy offers a plausible explanation: in
its strategic calculations the Ministry continues to place more emphasis
on the negative impacts of international climate change mitigation efforts
to Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues and economic competitiveness than on the
negative impacts of dangerous climate change on the global economy as
a whole.
Energy efficiency and increasingly also renewable energy (through its
increasing cost-effectiveness) are seen as sensible domestic policy options
from the perspectives of economic efficiency and energy supply security—
but not so much from a climate change mitigation perspective.
This separation of climate change from energy policy is reinforced by
the Ministry of Energy’s near-exclusive leadership of both international
climate change policy and domestic energy governance. Going forward,
the role of the ministry, in the absence of broader stakeholder inclusion
in policymaking, could therefore continue to hinder the development of
a cross-sectoral approach to climate change governance and policy. 40 The
plans and targets around energy efficiency and renewables are positive first
steps, given that the energy sector contributes 89% of Saudi Arabia’s CO 2
emissions. 41 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia still seems far from developing
a comprehensive domestic climate change policy, pledging transparent
313
Alignment, Drivers and Future Prospects
Saudi Arabia has displayed a remarkable consistency in its international negotiating positions and tactics over the past decades. Its role is
perceived negatively by many players, including small island states, environmental NGOs and most Western countries. In recent years, Saudi
Arabia has taken some steps that seem to be aimed at softening its public
image in the UNFCCC context. These include sponsoring GCC pavilions
at UNFCCC conferences, which feature regular presentations showcasing
research and technological development and pilot projects undertaken
in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Energy also develops web content
featuring Saudi Arabia’s national actions and UNFCCC conference side
events. 39
In the domestic context, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated high levels of
interest in both energy efficiency and clean energy, but nevertheless seems
still reluctant to present these as elements of a national climate change
policy. Major question marks remain around why the Saudi government
displays such reluctance, but the centralisation of climate change-related
matters under the Ministry of Energy offers a plausible explanation: in
its strategic calculations the Ministry continues to place more emphasis
on the negative impacts of international climate change mitigation efforts
to Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues and economic competitiveness than on the
negative impacts of dangerous climate change on the global economy as
a whole.
Energy efficiency and increasingly also renewable energy (through its
increasing cost-effectiveness) are seen as sensible domestic policy options
from the perspectives of economic efficiency and energy supply security—
but not so much from a climate change mitigation perspective.
This separation of climate change from energy policy is reinforced by
the Ministry of Energy’s near-exclusive leadership of both international
climate change policy and domestic energy governance. Going forward,
the role of the ministry, in the absence of broader stakeholder inclusion
in policymaking, could therefore continue to hinder the development of
a cross-sectoral approach to climate change governance and policy. 40 The
plans and targets around energy efficiency and renewables are positive first
steps, given that the energy sector contributes 89% of Saudi Arabia’s CO 2
emissions. 41 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia still seems far from developing
a comprehensive domestic climate change policy, pledging transparent