1 LOW CARBON ENERGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST …
13
For Al-Sulayman in Chapter 4, rentier states in the Gulf have expanded
their traditional dominance to include the renewable energy sector, partly
because of the latter’s promise of job creation (the latter being a hot
button issue in MENA). 28 The significant share by Acwa Power in the
region’s renewable energy projects seems an apt metaphor; it is a privatelyowned Saudi company that now counts the kingdom’s Public Investment
Fund as a major shareholder. Bayulgen concurs that the Turkish state
has been increasingly centralized and strengthened by the simultaneous
pursuit of low carbon and fossil fuel energies. A less pessimistic view is
expressed by Mahdavi and Uddin in Chapter 9. For them, the decline
of hydrocarbon rents will necessitate the shift to taxation—VAT, tourism
taxes, and municipality fees have already been introduced—and with it,
a renegotiation by the state in favor of greater institutionalized societal
influence over public expenditure. The impact of low carbon energy on
the evolution of the state in the UAE is also a theme explored in the
chapter by Krane; the deployment of coal, the most polluting fossil fuel,
in Dubai’s energy mix appears to run counter to the low carbon narrative
in the neighboring emirate of Abu Dhabi which includes a ‘gold standard’ non-proliferation civilian nuclear program, yet both emirates are
also regional leaders in large, centralized solar projects.
Social pressure and environmental concerns among domestic
constituents play an insignificant role in shaping the MENA region’s low
carbon energy agenda. There were episodic protests against coal in Turkey
a decade ago but, as Bayulgen explains, coal—because it provides cheap
baseload power and employment—continues to be central in supporting
economic modernization in Turkey. Moore and Sim note that there have
also been protests around solar siting and gas stations in Morocco and
plans for nuclear energy in Jordan, respectively; these grievances were,
however, more to do with concerns about lack of consultation with
local communities or compensation or government corruption than with
objections to low carbon energy per se. Hydropower and its relation to
water has been a complex local and regional problem in Iran, Iraq, and
Egypt. Domestic conflicts over siting of solar and wind projects are likely
to proliferate in tandem with their share in renewable energy targets 29 ;
their relatively low power density compared to fossil fuel plants means
they will be more numerous and visible as sites of contestation particularly
in North Africa, with a larger unsettled population than the Gulf.
13
For Al-Sulayman in Chapter 4, rentier states in the Gulf have expanded
their traditional dominance to include the renewable energy sector, partly
because of the latter’s promise of job creation (the latter being a hot
button issue in MENA). 28 The significant share by Acwa Power in the
region’s renewable energy projects seems an apt metaphor; it is a privatelyowned Saudi company that now counts the kingdom’s Public Investment
Fund as a major shareholder. Bayulgen concurs that the Turkish state
has been increasingly centralized and strengthened by the simultaneous
pursuit of low carbon and fossil fuel energies. A less pessimistic view is
expressed by Mahdavi and Uddin in Chapter 9. For them, the decline
of hydrocarbon rents will necessitate the shift to taxation—VAT, tourism
taxes, and municipality fees have already been introduced—and with it,
a renegotiation by the state in favor of greater institutionalized societal
influence over public expenditure. The impact of low carbon energy on
the evolution of the state in the UAE is also a theme explored in the
chapter by Krane; the deployment of coal, the most polluting fossil fuel,
in Dubai’s energy mix appears to run counter to the low carbon narrative
in the neighboring emirate of Abu Dhabi which includes a ‘gold standard’ non-proliferation civilian nuclear program, yet both emirates are
also regional leaders in large, centralized solar projects.
Social pressure and environmental concerns among domestic
constituents play an insignificant role in shaping the MENA region’s low
carbon energy agenda. There were episodic protests against coal in Turkey
a decade ago but, as Bayulgen explains, coal—because it provides cheap
baseload power and employment—continues to be central in supporting
economic modernization in Turkey. Moore and Sim note that there have
also been protests around solar siting and gas stations in Morocco and
plans for nuclear energy in Jordan, respectively; these grievances were,
however, more to do with concerns about lack of consultation with
local communities or compensation or government corruption than with
objections to low carbon energy per se. Hydropower and its relation to
water has been a complex local and regional problem in Iran, Iraq, and
Egypt. Domestic conflicts over siting of solar and wind projects are likely
to proliferate in tandem with their share in renewable energy targets 29 ;
their relatively low power density compared to fossil fuel plants means
they will be more numerous and visible as sites of contestation particularly
in North Africa, with a larger unsettled population than the Gulf.