10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
271
global aspirations such as non-proliferation, security, transparency, and
multilateral cooperation. 30
In comparison, the weight of the Iran factor in Saudi Arabia’s decision to acquire nuclear civilian energy is more ambiguous and informs
an approach characterized as nuclear ‘hedging’. 31 On the one hand, the
weak economic rationale for nuclear energy, the country’s refusal to sign
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol to allow more intrusive verification of
its nuclear programme, and its close ties with nuclear-armed Pakistan
suggest that geopolitical calculations loom large. 32 Echoing his late father
and other senior princes, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman
famously declared in 2018 that the kingdom ‘does not want to acquire
any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb,
we will follow suit as soon as possible’. 33 On the other hand, bearing in
mind that the Crown Prince has staked his legitimacy on modernizing
the Saudi economy and society, the success of which is in part dependent on foreign investment and support, it is arguable that per Ethel
Solingen, ‘internationalizing’ domestic stakeholders in the kingdom may
have little incentive to use nuclear power as a cover for developing nuclear
weapons. 34 In any event, the point here is that landscape-level factors do
not have a homogenous effect on the regime level; Iran’s geopolitical
challenge resulted in the pursuit of distinct nuclear programmes by two
countries in the Gulf.
Nuclear at the Niche Level
For the UAE, it quickly became clear that nuclear as a niche technology
offered a partial yet innovative solution to the energy supply problem on
several counts—price volatility, political stability of suppliers in the fuel
cycle, and delivery schedule. The price of uranium is much less volatile
than oil or gas; in this regard, nuclear offers a ‘valuable tool in countering
the risk of price volatility inherent in use of fossil fuel-based technologies’. 35 Because of the cost structure of nuclear power generation, with
high upfront capital expenditure and comparatively low variable fuel costs,
the cost of generating electricity from a nuclear power plant is much more
predictable than that of gas or oil for baseload power generation. For
instance, fuel costs for nuclear and combine-cycle gas power stations are
around one-quarter and three-quarters of total costs or $0.85 per MMBtu
and $3.45 per MMBtu, respectively. 36 Consequently, unlike hydrocarbons subject to the vagaries of economic conditions, demand forecasts
271
global aspirations such as non-proliferation, security, transparency, and
multilateral cooperation. 30
In comparison, the weight of the Iran factor in Saudi Arabia’s decision to acquire nuclear civilian energy is more ambiguous and informs
an approach characterized as nuclear ‘hedging’. 31 On the one hand, the
weak economic rationale for nuclear energy, the country’s refusal to sign
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol to allow more intrusive verification of
its nuclear programme, and its close ties with nuclear-armed Pakistan
suggest that geopolitical calculations loom large. 32 Echoing his late father
and other senior princes, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman
famously declared in 2018 that the kingdom ‘does not want to acquire
any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb,
we will follow suit as soon as possible’. 33 On the other hand, bearing in
mind that the Crown Prince has staked his legitimacy on modernizing
the Saudi economy and society, the success of which is in part dependent on foreign investment and support, it is arguable that per Ethel
Solingen, ‘internationalizing’ domestic stakeholders in the kingdom may
have little incentive to use nuclear power as a cover for developing nuclear
weapons. 34 In any event, the point here is that landscape-level factors do
not have a homogenous effect on the regime level; Iran’s geopolitical
challenge resulted in the pursuit of distinct nuclear programmes by two
countries in the Gulf.
Nuclear at the Niche Level
For the UAE, it quickly became clear that nuclear as a niche technology
offered a partial yet innovative solution to the energy supply problem on
several counts—price volatility, political stability of suppliers in the fuel
cycle, and delivery schedule. The price of uranium is much less volatile
than oil or gas; in this regard, nuclear offers a ‘valuable tool in countering
the risk of price volatility inherent in use of fossil fuel-based technologies’. 35 Because of the cost structure of nuclear power generation, with
high upfront capital expenditure and comparatively low variable fuel costs,
the cost of generating electricity from a nuclear power plant is much more
predictable than that of gas or oil for baseload power generation. For
instance, fuel costs for nuclear and combine-cycle gas power stations are
around one-quarter and three-quarters of total costs or $0.85 per MMBtu
and $3.45 per MMBtu, respectively. 36 Consequently, unlike hydrocarbons subject to the vagaries of economic conditions, demand forecasts