252 P. MAHDAVI AND N. UDDIN
Summary of Theoretical Expectations for Variation in the Renewable
Energy Transition
The theoretical approaches sketched above imply two relevant variables—
fiscal reliance on oil exports and government time horizons—that help to
explain variation in renewable energy policies in the MENA. While not
a formally articulated set of theoretical expectations, these two generally
map onto current country experiences with the transition to renewable
energy.
At one end are the oil-importing, long-time-horizon governments that
have the greatest incentives and capacity to invest in renewable energy.
This would include the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, along with
the stable parliamentary republic of Israel. Similarly incentivized are the
oil-exporting, long-time-horizon Gulf monarchies. But here we find some
variation based on differences in the urgency with which each government
sees the coming transition. The UAE, on the one hand, views the transition as inevitable, and has been a leader in renewables investments among
the oil-exporters. On the other hand, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments
have been slower to pivot to renewable energy. This could stem in part
from the relatively lower climate vulnerability of these states’ low-carbonintensive oil production, though it could also be the result of both states’
low costs of oil extraction and hence less fiscal vulnerability as oil markets
become more constrained. 60
At the other end of the spectrum are states that have shorter political
time horizons, either due to conflict or post-conflict dynamics or due
to increasing domestic political turmoil. Within the net oil importers,
namely Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia, recent transitions and
political turmoil have stymied development plans that are sufficiently
forward-looking. This political instability notwithstanding, all four states
still recognize the inherent value in transitioning to renewable energy in
terms of labor and energy security; as such, these four are roughly in the
middle in terms of existing and future commitments to renewable energy
policies. 61
The current laggards in the transition are the oil-exporters with short
horizons. Governments in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq carry little
political and economic incentives to make long-term adjustments to
existing energy policies, given existing challenges to governance in light
of ongoing conflict and post-conflict environments. Likewise, current
uncertainties in the long-run political survival of regimes in Algeria
Summary of Theoretical Expectations for Variation in the Renewable
Energy Transition
The theoretical approaches sketched above imply two relevant variables—
fiscal reliance on oil exports and government time horizons—that help to
explain variation in renewable energy policies in the MENA. While not
a formally articulated set of theoretical expectations, these two generally
map onto current country experiences with the transition to renewable
energy.
At one end are the oil-importing, long-time-horizon governments that
have the greatest incentives and capacity to invest in renewable energy.
This would include the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, along with
the stable parliamentary republic of Israel. Similarly incentivized are the
oil-exporting, long-time-horizon Gulf monarchies. But here we find some
variation based on differences in the urgency with which each government
sees the coming transition. The UAE, on the one hand, views the transition as inevitable, and has been a leader in renewables investments among
the oil-exporters. On the other hand, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments
have been slower to pivot to renewable energy. This could stem in part
from the relatively lower climate vulnerability of these states’ low-carbonintensive oil production, though it could also be the result of both states’
low costs of oil extraction and hence less fiscal vulnerability as oil markets
become more constrained. 60
At the other end of the spectrum are states that have shorter political
time horizons, either due to conflict or post-conflict dynamics or due
to increasing domestic political turmoil. Within the net oil importers,
namely Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia, recent transitions and
political turmoil have stymied development plans that are sufficiently
forward-looking. This political instability notwithstanding, all four states
still recognize the inherent value in transitioning to renewable energy in
terms of labor and energy security; as such, these four are roughly in the
middle in terms of existing and future commitments to renewable energy
policies. 61
The current laggards in the transition are the oil-exporters with short
horizons. Governments in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq carry little
political and economic incentives to make long-term adjustments to
existing energy policies, given existing challenges to governance in light
of ongoing conflict and post-conflict environments. Likewise, current
uncertainties in the long-run political survival of regimes in Algeria