9 GOVERNANCE AMID THE TRANSITION TO RENEWABLE …
247
this loss of revenues will threaten to break the rentier social contract if
leaders are no longer able to provide goods and services. Following the
logic of the resource curse theory, acquiescence will turn into engaged
protest—and the oil-producing countries will likely be unable to weather
the storms they escaped during the Arab Spring. Even modest declines in
petroleum revenue will result in giving up subsidies, which are known to
spark protests even for marginal increases. 36
However, this will depend largely on the time horizons of leaders and
regimes in power in the oil-producing states. 37 Most of the dynastic
Gulf monarchies—the Houses of Saud, Nahyan, Khalifa, and Sabah—
perceive long and lasting rule and therefore see the inherent value of the
transition to renewable energy to ensure future survival. 38 By contrast,
conflict-plagued regimes in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen face shorter
odds of durable survival and will not place the same political value on
potential revenues in 2050, let alone in 2030. And in between these
extremes, rulers in Algeria, Egypt, and Iran all strive toward longevity
but realize immediate challenges to their rule by either internal opposition parties or external forces. By this logic—and again, from a strictly
fiscal perspective—we would expect the greatest political incentives for
renewable investment and decarbonization in the Gulf monarchies and
the least incentives for leaders in the conflict- and post-conflict regimes.
For the non-oil-exporting states in the MENA—particularly the nonproducing states of Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco—the transition
to renewable energy has more straightforward fiscal gains. The costs
of petroleum imports are substantial, especially in Egypt and Tunisia,
whether directly through the market or indirectly through subsidized
imports by the oil producers in exchange for international political
support. Renewable energy investments can also reduce volatility in
energy prices by decoupling these states from their reliance on imported
oil, gas, and (to a lesser extent) coal.
What Is the Impact of Decarbonization on Governance? Will
Renewable Energy Provide the Means to ‘Escape’ the Resource Curse?
In contrast to the economic concentration of conventional energy systems
such as oil and gas, we argue that decarbonized energy systems foster
diversified economies that mobilize demands for inclusive governance
and democratic institutions. This is due to four important characteristics of renewable energy as compared with non-renewable energy systems:
247
this loss of revenues will threaten to break the rentier social contract if
leaders are no longer able to provide goods and services. Following the
logic of the resource curse theory, acquiescence will turn into engaged
protest—and the oil-producing countries will likely be unable to weather
the storms they escaped during the Arab Spring. Even modest declines in
petroleum revenue will result in giving up subsidies, which are known to
spark protests even for marginal increases. 36
However, this will depend largely on the time horizons of leaders and
regimes in power in the oil-producing states. 37 Most of the dynastic
Gulf monarchies—the Houses of Saud, Nahyan, Khalifa, and Sabah—
perceive long and lasting rule and therefore see the inherent value of the
transition to renewable energy to ensure future survival. 38 By contrast,
conflict-plagued regimes in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen face shorter
odds of durable survival and will not place the same political value on
potential revenues in 2050, let alone in 2030. And in between these
extremes, rulers in Algeria, Egypt, and Iran all strive toward longevity
but realize immediate challenges to their rule by either internal opposition parties or external forces. By this logic—and again, from a strictly
fiscal perspective—we would expect the greatest political incentives for
renewable investment and decarbonization in the Gulf monarchies and
the least incentives for leaders in the conflict- and post-conflict regimes.
For the non-oil-exporting states in the MENA—particularly the nonproducing states of Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco—the transition
to renewable energy has more straightforward fiscal gains. The costs
of petroleum imports are substantial, especially in Egypt and Tunisia,
whether directly through the market or indirectly through subsidized
imports by the oil producers in exchange for international political
support. Renewable energy investments can also reduce volatility in
energy prices by decoupling these states from their reliance on imported
oil, gas, and (to a lesser extent) coal.
What Is the Impact of Decarbonization on Governance? Will
Renewable Energy Provide the Means to ‘Escape’ the Resource Curse?
In contrast to the economic concentration of conventional energy systems
such as oil and gas, we argue that decarbonized energy systems foster
diversified economies that mobilize demands for inclusive governance
and democratic institutions. This is due to four important characteristics of renewable energy as compared with non-renewable energy systems: