178 O. BAYULGEN
7. IEA (2019).
8. Saygin et al. (2018). Annex I countries are the industrialized countries
that are members of OECD and economies in transition in Russia and
Eastern and Central Europe.
9. “Akkuyu: Turkey’s Nuclear Dream Overshadowed by Safety Fears,”
The National (August 13, 2019), https://www.thenational.ae/world/
europe/akkuyu-turkey-s-nuclear-dream-overshadowed-by-safety-fears-1.
897761.
10. Jewell and Ates (2015) and author’s interview on May 27, 2019. The
nuclear proponents claim that these agreements are economically beneficial for Turkey considering that the risks and the costs associated with
construction, operation, fuel provision and waste disposal matters are
sub-contracted to foreign governments (Kumbaroglu 2012).
11. Sahin (2011).
12. IEA (2019).
13. “Twelve Reasons to Exclude Large Hydro from Renewables Initiatives,”
International Rivers Network, November 2003, at http://www.rivernet.
org/general/hydropower/12reasons.pdf.
14. Erensu (2016).
15. IEA (2019).
16. IEA (2019).
17. Author’s interviews on November 15 and 25, 2011 and June 1, 2013.
18. Waheed et al. (2009).
19. Saygin et al. (2018).
20. “Yenilenebilir enerji fiyatları yatırımcıları tatmin etmedi,” Referansgazetesi.com/Gundem, April 20, 2009. Also, author’s interviews on
January 12, 2015 and January 23, 2019.
21. Author’s interviews on July 2 and 11, 2012, July 2, 2013 and May 28,
2019.
22. OECD (2019).
23. Livingston (2018).
24. IEA (2019).
25. Timperley (2018).
26. Coal supply in Turkey increased by 93% from 2005 to 2018 compared to
the 27% growth in world coal supply during the same period. IEA (2019).
27. Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Calder (2012), Karapin (2016), and
Baumgartner et al. (2014).
28. Bakir and Onis (2010).
29. Atiyas et al. (2012).
30. In May 2009, the World Bank provided US$600 million from its Clean
Technology Fund Financing for the renewable energy investments in
Turkey.
31. Onis (2012).
7. IEA (2019).
8. Saygin et al. (2018). Annex I countries are the industrialized countries
that are members of OECD and economies in transition in Russia and
Eastern and Central Europe.
9. “Akkuyu: Turkey’s Nuclear Dream Overshadowed by Safety Fears,”
The National (August 13, 2019), https://www.thenational.ae/world/
europe/akkuyu-turkey-s-nuclear-dream-overshadowed-by-safety-fears-1.
897761.
10. Jewell and Ates (2015) and author’s interview on May 27, 2019. The
nuclear proponents claim that these agreements are economically beneficial for Turkey considering that the risks and the costs associated with
construction, operation, fuel provision and waste disposal matters are
sub-contracted to foreign governments (Kumbaroglu 2012).
11. Sahin (2011).
12. IEA (2019).
13. “Twelve Reasons to Exclude Large Hydro from Renewables Initiatives,”
International Rivers Network, November 2003, at http://www.rivernet.
org/general/hydropower/12reasons.pdf.
14. Erensu (2016).
15. IEA (2019).
16. IEA (2019).
17. Author’s interviews on November 15 and 25, 2011 and June 1, 2013.
18. Waheed et al. (2009).
19. Saygin et al. (2018).
20. “Yenilenebilir enerji fiyatları yatırımcıları tatmin etmedi,” Referansgazetesi.com/Gundem, April 20, 2009. Also, author’s interviews on
January 12, 2015 and January 23, 2019.
21. Author’s interviews on July 2 and 11, 2012, July 2, 2013 and May 28,
2019.
22. OECD (2019).
23. Livingston (2018).
24. IEA (2019).
25. Timperley (2018).
26. Coal supply in Turkey increased by 93% from 2005 to 2018 compared to
the 27% growth in world coal supply during the same period. IEA (2019).
27. Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Calder (2012), Karapin (2016), and
Baumgartner et al. (2014).
28. Bakir and Onis (2010).
29. Atiyas et al. (2012).
30. In May 2009, the World Bank provided US$600 million from its Clean
Technology Fund Financing for the renewable energy investments in
Turkey.
31. Onis (2012).