6 BYZANTINE ENERGY POLITICS: THE COMPLEX TALE …
159
Yet, despite success in growing the installed capacity of certain renewables in recent years, there have been significant regulatory and administrative hurdles and delays in project development, licensing, and grid
connection that make further promotion of renewable energy sources
difficult and unsustainable. Even though the support mechanisms have
become more competitive in recent years when compared to alternative
markets in Europe and elsewhere, there is a lot of uncertainty regarding
what incentives will be offered when YEKDEM mechanism ends after
2020. 20 A common criticism by investors and industry experts is that
the Turkish government has not been genuinely prioritizing renewables
and lacks long-term planning and sound implementation roadmap to
increase their share in the energy mix. 21 The technology-specific targets
it sets out for itself in numerous strategy papers and action plans do not
always align and do not go far beyond 2023, the centennial celebration
of the founding of the Turkish Republic. 22 Even though the government
committed to a target of reducing its GHG emissions by 21% by 2030 in
the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), it has not yet
ratified the Paris Climate Change Agreement. 23 Moreover, there are no
legally binding renewable energy targets fixed in legislation. Progress in
electricity generation has not yet been accompanied by large-scale efforts
to deploy renewables for transportation, heating, and cooling. There is
also very little effort put into monitoring and evaluating the plans that are
set out. 24 Finally, by making domestically sourced coal the preferred fuel
for expanding its electricity capacity and setting a goal to reach 30 GW
by 2023, the Turkish government has made plans that are contradictory
to achieving a clean energy transition and decarbonization. 25
What explains this partial progress in clean energy transition in Turkey?
What are the external and internal pressures that played a role in jumpstarting the renewable energy sector legislation and regulations in the
early 2000s? Why didn’t those pressures continue to propel the sector
to a competitive status vis-à-vis the conventional energy sources? What
are the countervailing forces that explain government’s interest in prioritizing investments in natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy even though
these non-renewable energy sources exacerbate supply insecurity, increase
economic and foreign policy vulnerabilities and environmental pollution?
The government’s contradictory strategy of cultivating renewables while
at the same time enthusiastically promoting the dirtier and unsustainable forms of energy is the central puzzle addressed in this chapter.
Drawing upon existing literature, government and nongovernmental
159
Yet, despite success in growing the installed capacity of certain renewables in recent years, there have been significant regulatory and administrative hurdles and delays in project development, licensing, and grid
connection that make further promotion of renewable energy sources
difficult and unsustainable. Even though the support mechanisms have
become more competitive in recent years when compared to alternative
markets in Europe and elsewhere, there is a lot of uncertainty regarding
what incentives will be offered when YEKDEM mechanism ends after
2020. 20 A common criticism by investors and industry experts is that
the Turkish government has not been genuinely prioritizing renewables
and lacks long-term planning and sound implementation roadmap to
increase their share in the energy mix. 21 The technology-specific targets
it sets out for itself in numerous strategy papers and action plans do not
always align and do not go far beyond 2023, the centennial celebration
of the founding of the Turkish Republic. 22 Even though the government
committed to a target of reducing its GHG emissions by 21% by 2030 in
the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), it has not yet
ratified the Paris Climate Change Agreement. 23 Moreover, there are no
legally binding renewable energy targets fixed in legislation. Progress in
electricity generation has not yet been accompanied by large-scale efforts
to deploy renewables for transportation, heating, and cooling. There is
also very little effort put into monitoring and evaluating the plans that are
set out. 24 Finally, by making domestically sourced coal the preferred fuel
for expanding its electricity capacity and setting a goal to reach 30 GW
by 2023, the Turkish government has made plans that are contradictory
to achieving a clean energy transition and decarbonization. 25
What explains this partial progress in clean energy transition in Turkey?
What are the external and internal pressures that played a role in jumpstarting the renewable energy sector legislation and regulations in the
early 2000s? Why didn’t those pressures continue to propel the sector
to a competitive status vis-à-vis the conventional energy sources? What
are the countervailing forces that explain government’s interest in prioritizing investments in natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy even though
these non-renewable energy sources exacerbate supply insecurity, increase
economic and foreign policy vulnerabilities and environmental pollution?
The government’s contradictory strategy of cultivating renewables while
at the same time enthusiastically promoting the dirtier and unsustainable forms of energy is the central puzzle addressed in this chapter.
Drawing upon existing literature, government and nongovernmental