136 S. MOORE
Energy Forum, and the Union for the Mediterranean/the Mediterranean
Solar Plan. 97
Germany has been the most active in promoting renewable energy
through its foreign policy. The country aims to spread its Energiewende,
or energy transition, and climate mitigation policies to developing countries. The German government travels to renewable energy expositions,
including in Morocco, to advertise its renewable energy know-how,
consulting services, and technology. It also places development officials in
positions related to renewable energy within the Moroccan government.
Several private EU-based initiatives have focused on integrating the
grids of the North and South Mediterranean and developing renewable
energy in North Africa for export. The German-led Desertec Industrial
Initiative (Dii)—a consortium of private companies—sought to develop a
solar pilot project in Morocco for electricity export to the EU. Elsewhere,
I discuss the geopolitics of this plan using the concept of ‘renewable
energy terroir,’ or the politics of the uneven distribution of land most
advantageous for CSP generation. 98 Dii’s plan to develop an integrated
Mediterranean supergrid to achieve 90% renewable energy consumption
in Europe and North Africa largely failed for a variety of reasons. These
reasons included obstruction from Spain, which was hesitant to become
a conduit for renewable energy from Morocco to Germany; accusations
in the media that exporting solar electricity from North Africa to Europe
was neocolonial; the Eurozone crisis, which reduced the availability of
surplus capital for energy investment; and infighting among European
project promoters. The realization that electricity demand was rapidly
growing in North Africa also affected project planning. The project was
originally envisioned to export electricity from North Africa to supposed
demand centers in Europe when, in fact, the MENA region’s demand is
on track to exceed Europe’s demand. While demand could be simultaneously met in both MENA and the EU, stakeholders’ perceived lack of
emphasis on meeting North Africa’s demand resulted in negative publicity
for the Desertec vision. 99
Morocco is already connected to Algeria and Spain through transmission interconnection. Algeria and Morocco share three single-circuit
220 kV transmission lines—with one double-circuit 400 kV line potentially under construction. 100 This seems to represent electricity cooperation in the absence of political accord. However, this situation likely
stems from a historical trajectory starting under the French Protectorate,
which laid the groundwork in the 1940s for Morocco to begin exporting
Energy Forum, and the Union for the Mediterranean/the Mediterranean
Solar Plan. 97
Germany has been the most active in promoting renewable energy
through its foreign policy. The country aims to spread its Energiewende,
or energy transition, and climate mitigation policies to developing countries. The German government travels to renewable energy expositions,
including in Morocco, to advertise its renewable energy know-how,
consulting services, and technology. It also places development officials in
positions related to renewable energy within the Moroccan government.
Several private EU-based initiatives have focused on integrating the
grids of the North and South Mediterranean and developing renewable
energy in North Africa for export. The German-led Desertec Industrial
Initiative (Dii)—a consortium of private companies—sought to develop a
solar pilot project in Morocco for electricity export to the EU. Elsewhere,
I discuss the geopolitics of this plan using the concept of ‘renewable
energy terroir,’ or the politics of the uneven distribution of land most
advantageous for CSP generation. 98 Dii’s plan to develop an integrated
Mediterranean supergrid to achieve 90% renewable energy consumption
in Europe and North Africa largely failed for a variety of reasons. These
reasons included obstruction from Spain, which was hesitant to become
a conduit for renewable energy from Morocco to Germany; accusations
in the media that exporting solar electricity from North Africa to Europe
was neocolonial; the Eurozone crisis, which reduced the availability of
surplus capital for energy investment; and infighting among European
project promoters. The realization that electricity demand was rapidly
growing in North Africa also affected project planning. The project was
originally envisioned to export electricity from North Africa to supposed
demand centers in Europe when, in fact, the MENA region’s demand is
on track to exceed Europe’s demand. While demand could be simultaneously met in both MENA and the EU, stakeholders’ perceived lack of
emphasis on meeting North Africa’s demand resulted in negative publicity
for the Desertec vision. 99
Morocco is already connected to Algeria and Spain through transmission interconnection. Algeria and Morocco share three single-circuit
220 kV transmission lines—with one double-circuit 400 kV line potentially under construction. 100 This seems to represent electricity cooperation in the absence of political accord. However, this situation likely
stems from a historical trajectory starting under the French Protectorate,
which laid the groundwork in the 1940s for Morocco to begin exporting