5 FROM FUEL-POOR TO RADIANT: MOROCCO’S ENERGY …
131
The Algerian government views the Western Saharan dispute as an issue of
decolonization and self-determination for the Sahrawi people. The border
is closed, and the governments are building a wall. In 2013, many interviewees noted that Morocco and Algeria cooperate well on energy. Since
then, Morocco has rejoined the African Union despite opposition from
Algeria. Additionally, in December 2018, Morocco held the first peace
talks with the parties involved in the Western Sahara conflict since 2012,
after which the UN peacekeeping mission was again extended.
While it is unclear whether the pipeline contract will be extended
past 2021, it is in the energy security interest of the European Union
(EU) to support the pipeline’s continued operation. Increasing imports
of natural gas from countries other than Russia is an EU energy security goal. Algeria provides 10.7% of Europe’s natural gas. 55 Algeria and
Spain are also connected via the MEDGAZ pipeline, and the countries are discussing increasing its capacity. 56 In 2018, Abdelmoumen
Ould Kaddour, CEO of Algeria’s state-owned oil company Sonatrach,
expressed that Algeria had no interest in cutting off exports through the
Maghreb-Europe pipeline. 57
However, in April 2019, Algeria’s interim president replaced Ould
Kaddour with Rachid Hachichi as Sonatrach’s CEO. 58 Large protests
in early 2019 had led the president to step down, and the country’s
political situation is uncertain. 59 Moreover, Algerian natural gas production is declining while domestic consumption is increasing, constraining
supply. 60 The government has been slow to approve new projects, and
shale gas resources lie in remote areas with low water availability. Furthermore, in 2013, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb orchestrated a terrorist
attack on a large natural gas facility in Tiguentourine, Algeria. 61 While
security measures have been increased, the risk of future terrorist attacks
remains high given the security situation in the region and the importance
of oil and natural gas to the regional and international economy. 62
Amid this uncertainty and these risks, the Moroccan energy ministry
has developed a plan for a Gas-to-Power megaproject that would double
or even triple gas consumption. 63 It calls for developing an onshore liquified natural gas (or LNG) terminal at Jorf Lasfar, building two new CCGT
plants by 2030 (1,200 MW each), and later potentially building an additional 3,500 MW of CCGT capacity. 64 A new project roadmap is under
development. 65 While there is no evidence that Morocco’s renewable
energy strategy was enacted to gain energy independence from Algeria, it
131
The Algerian government views the Western Saharan dispute as an issue of
decolonization and self-determination for the Sahrawi people. The border
is closed, and the governments are building a wall. In 2013, many interviewees noted that Morocco and Algeria cooperate well on energy. Since
then, Morocco has rejoined the African Union despite opposition from
Algeria. Additionally, in December 2018, Morocco held the first peace
talks with the parties involved in the Western Sahara conflict since 2012,
after which the UN peacekeeping mission was again extended.
While it is unclear whether the pipeline contract will be extended
past 2021, it is in the energy security interest of the European Union
(EU) to support the pipeline’s continued operation. Increasing imports
of natural gas from countries other than Russia is an EU energy security goal. Algeria provides 10.7% of Europe’s natural gas. 55 Algeria and
Spain are also connected via the MEDGAZ pipeline, and the countries are discussing increasing its capacity. 56 In 2018, Abdelmoumen
Ould Kaddour, CEO of Algeria’s state-owned oil company Sonatrach,
expressed that Algeria had no interest in cutting off exports through the
Maghreb-Europe pipeline. 57
However, in April 2019, Algeria’s interim president replaced Ould
Kaddour with Rachid Hachichi as Sonatrach’s CEO. 58 Large protests
in early 2019 had led the president to step down, and the country’s
political situation is uncertain. 59 Moreover, Algerian natural gas production is declining while domestic consumption is increasing, constraining
supply. 60 The government has been slow to approve new projects, and
shale gas resources lie in remote areas with low water availability. Furthermore, in 2013, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb orchestrated a terrorist
attack on a large natural gas facility in Tiguentourine, Algeria. 61 While
security measures have been increased, the risk of future terrorist attacks
remains high given the security situation in the region and the importance
of oil and natural gas to the regional and international economy. 62
Amid this uncertainty and these risks, the Moroccan energy ministry
has developed a plan for a Gas-to-Power megaproject that would double
or even triple gas consumption. 63 It calls for developing an onshore liquified natural gas (or LNG) terminal at Jorf Lasfar, building two new CCGT
plants by 2030 (1,200 MW each), and later potentially building an additional 3,500 MW of CCGT capacity. 64 A new project roadmap is under
development. 65 While there is no evidence that Morocco’s renewable
energy strategy was enacted to gain energy independence from Algeria, it