4 THE RISE OF RENEWABLES IN THE GULF STATES …
107
rhetorical shift. This narrative, unlike earlier and more isolated attempts
in 2011–2013, has now been uniformly adopted by all the institutions of
the state. The plan is to build a lot of solar, mostly at the utility scale.
Just how much is to be built, and by whom, has been the subject of more
debate.
The Credibility Gap
At the utility scale, Saudi Arabia’s plans include two headline figures:
$200 Billion—the figure the PIF and Softbank have said they are looking
to spend on developing solar, storage, and solar related manufacturing
in the Kingdom—and 57.8 GWp by 2030—the amount of renewables
capacity the state is planning to develop over the coming decade. Both
these figures were released before the first utility-scale project in the
Kingdom was completed. In fact, as mentioned in the previous section,
the 57.8 GWp figure and the closer target of 27.3 GWp by 2024 are
figures that have been revised up from more modest targets set in 2018.
For reference, the total power generation capacity in the Kingdom in
2019 is 75 GW. The $200 billion figure also took the renewables world
by surprise and was met with a fair amount of incredulity and skepticism,
with observers highlighting that that figure would be sufficient to build
more than twice as much capacity as is available in the Kingdom in 2019
(75 GW). 32
The lofty ambitions are commendable, considering the scale of the
climate crisis and the ground Saudi Arabia has to cover to make up for
lost time. These plans do not exist in a vacuum, however, and come at
a time when the Kingdom has struggled to bridge a credibility gap, left
over from older institutions and plans that made similar claims earlier in
the decade. As discussed in section “Renewables Development Over the
Last Decade in the GCC” of this chapter, both KACARE and the SEC
had made plans to develop utility-scale solar installations; the latter institution going as far as issuing an RFP and prequalifying companies for a
specific set of projects at Rafha and Al Jouf. 33
A remnant of clientelistic fiefdoms discussed by Hertog and others, 34
these developments mirror the rise and fall of other institutions in the
Kingdom. KACARE, for example, an institution named after a former
king, clearly fell out of favor once new leadership assumed power in
2015. A similar battle for part of the renewables deployment mandate has
played out more recently between the PIF and the Ministry of Energy,
107
rhetorical shift. This narrative, unlike earlier and more isolated attempts
in 2011–2013, has now been uniformly adopted by all the institutions of
the state. The plan is to build a lot of solar, mostly at the utility scale.
Just how much is to be built, and by whom, has been the subject of more
debate.
The Credibility Gap
At the utility scale, Saudi Arabia’s plans include two headline figures:
$200 Billion—the figure the PIF and Softbank have said they are looking
to spend on developing solar, storage, and solar related manufacturing
in the Kingdom—and 57.8 GWp by 2030—the amount of renewables
capacity the state is planning to develop over the coming decade. Both
these figures were released before the first utility-scale project in the
Kingdom was completed. In fact, as mentioned in the previous section,
the 57.8 GWp figure and the closer target of 27.3 GWp by 2024 are
figures that have been revised up from more modest targets set in 2018.
For reference, the total power generation capacity in the Kingdom in
2019 is 75 GW. The $200 billion figure also took the renewables world
by surprise and was met with a fair amount of incredulity and skepticism,
with observers highlighting that that figure would be sufficient to build
more than twice as much capacity as is available in the Kingdom in 2019
(75 GW). 32
The lofty ambitions are commendable, considering the scale of the
climate crisis and the ground Saudi Arabia has to cover to make up for
lost time. These plans do not exist in a vacuum, however, and come at
a time when the Kingdom has struggled to bridge a credibility gap, left
over from older institutions and plans that made similar claims earlier in
the decade. As discussed in section “Renewables Development Over the
Last Decade in the GCC” of this chapter, both KACARE and the SEC
had made plans to develop utility-scale solar installations; the latter institution going as far as issuing an RFP and prequalifying companies for a
specific set of projects at Rafha and Al Jouf. 33
A remnant of clientelistic fiefdoms discussed by Hertog and others, 34
these developments mirror the rise and fall of other institutions in the
Kingdom. KACARE, for example, an institution named after a former
king, clearly fell out of favor once new leadership assumed power in
2015. A similar battle for part of the renewables deployment mandate has
played out more recently between the PIF and the Ministry of Energy,