162
M. U. Ukponu et al.
does not have automatic effect as a Federal Act
101 can only be invoked
on this doctrine where the tenets, intendments or purposes of both laws
are exactly the same and not merely alike.
102
From the foregoing, which legislative authority between the National
and State Houses of Assembly has the legal superiority to regulate electricity in Nigeria? A good answer would be that the National Assembly’s
powers are of general application and the State Houses of Assembly’s
powers to regulate off-grid electricity is an exception to the general
rule with regard to the National Assembly’s powers. The CFRN has
covered the field with respect to electricity regulation on and off the grid.
Thus, LEPSRL
103 cannot be inferior to EPSRA because the law regulates
captive and embedded electricity generation,
104 which are essentially offgrid power systems contemplated by the CFRN. In addition, as stated
in Sect. 5.2 above, s 62 (1) (a) of the EPSRA expressly excludes NERC
from regulating captive generation. Thus, as far as EPSRA purports to
regulate off-grid electricity, particularly within rural areas not covered by
the grid, it remains a conflict and an unconstitutionality.
5.3.4 Conflict of Electricity Laws: Implications
for Off-Grid Renewable Energy Development
The fundamental implication of the conflict of electricity laws is that
they ultimately defeat the purpose of achieving rapid access to clean,
affordable and efficient energy through the simultaneous efforts of
both Federal and State Governments. Since the military intervention
101 The CFRN is also a Federal Act of the National Assembly. See (n 11).
102 Chikelue v Ifemeludike (1997) NWLR (pt 529) 390 at 403 (CA) (Tobi JCA).
103 The LEPSRL requires that a licensee obtains a license from both NERC and LESB: LEPSRL,
s 17 (s). Considering the provisions of the CFRN, this requirement is superfluous at best
because there is no such requirement under the CFRN. This bureaucracy amounts to double
regulation and is a major disincentive to would-be investors.
104 LEPSRL, s 17. See also EPSRA, s 62 (1)(a) and (2).
M. U. Ukponu et al.
does not have automatic effect as a Federal Act
101 can only be invoked
on this doctrine where the tenets, intendments or purposes of both laws
are exactly the same and not merely alike.
102
From the foregoing, which legislative authority between the National
and State Houses of Assembly has the legal superiority to regulate electricity in Nigeria? A good answer would be that the National Assembly’s
powers are of general application and the State Houses of Assembly’s
powers to regulate off-grid electricity is an exception to the general
rule with regard to the National Assembly’s powers. The CFRN has
covered the field with respect to electricity regulation on and off the grid.
Thus, LEPSRL
103 cannot be inferior to EPSRA because the law regulates
captive and embedded electricity generation,
104 which are essentially offgrid power systems contemplated by the CFRN. In addition, as stated
in Sect. 5.2 above, s 62 (1) (a) of the EPSRA expressly excludes NERC
from regulating captive generation. Thus, as far as EPSRA purports to
regulate off-grid electricity, particularly within rural areas not covered by
the grid, it remains a conflict and an unconstitutionality.
5.3.4 Conflict of Electricity Laws: Implications
for Off-Grid Renewable Energy Development
The fundamental implication of the conflict of electricity laws is that
they ultimately defeat the purpose of achieving rapid access to clean,
affordable and efficient energy through the simultaneous efforts of
both Federal and State Governments. Since the military intervention
101 The CFRN is also a Federal Act of the National Assembly. See (n 11).
102 Chikelue v Ifemeludike (1997) NWLR (pt 529) 390 at 403 (CA) (Tobi JCA).
103 The LEPSRL requires that a licensee obtains a license from both NERC and LESB: LEPSRL,
s 17 (s). Considering the provisions of the CFRN, this requirement is superfluous at best
because there is no such requirement under the CFRN. This bureaucracy amounts to double
regulation and is a major disincentive to would-be investors.
104 LEPSRL, s 17. See also EPSRA, s 62 (1)(a) and (2).