19
This requires us to depart from the VIM, and actually from a long-standing tradition in measurement, for two structural reasons:
• We discuss measurement in terms of properties,
4
whereas the VIM assumes that
only quantities are measurable.
• We include psychosocial properties in the system, whereas the VIM assumes that
only physical quantities are measurable.
Both of these differences imply a generalization, whose justification is a core task
of this book. A summary characterization of the fundamental concepts introduced in
this chapter and used through the whole book is in Appendix A.
We distinguish the contents of this and the following chapter from the rest of the
book by noting that we believe the points and positions adopted here should be
generally and broadly acceptable to measurement experts of many types. Thus,
these two chapters are intended to set up the background for the remaining chapters.
This chapter aims at presenting the general context of a measurement system and
introducing some basic concepts of measurement and the related terms (Box 2.1).
measurement may not be human (e.g., behavior of dogs), and some human measurement may be
entirely physical (e.g., height), but we are not concerned with such cases here. A discussion on the
compatibility of reductionism with the acknowledgment of the possibility of multiple layers of
description is in Philip Warren Anderson’s (1972) paper More is Different, whose main thesis is
twofold. On the one hand, “the reductionist hypothesis [is that] the workings of our minds and
bodies, and of all the animate or inanimate matter […], are assumed to be controlled by the same
set of fundamental laws”. On the other hand, “the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means
imply a ‘constructionist’ one: the ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not
imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe” (p. 393). In other terms, a
principled reductionism can be maintained together with the acknowledgment that effective
descriptions of parts of the world are given in reference to non-reduced parts. Daniel Dennett has
proposed a high-level interpretation of this subject in terms of physical vs. design vs. intentional
stance (Dennett, 1987).
4 The concept is so fundamental that, not surprisingly, together with “property” several other terms
are used to designate it, with meanings more or less analogous, like “attribute”, “feature”, “characteristic”, “quality”, “observable”, and “parameter”. The differences in standpoints about properties
are not only lexical: some approaches to measurement avoid discussion of properties, by dealing
only with empirical objects, represented by means of informational entities (usually but not necessarily numbers) through procedures. Whether properties do exist in the world or are just conceptual
tools we adopt to organize our knowledge of empirical objects is a core topic for a fundamental
ontology (see, e.g., Orilia & Swoyer, 2020) and deeply affects any measurement-related concept
system (for example, do we measure objects or properties of objects?). In this book we maintain
the usual position that what is measured are properties of objects, like the mass of solid bodies and
the reading comprehension ability of individuals, and therefore that properties of objects exist, and
are therefore not concepts. This position is developed further and defended in Chap. 5. See also the
summary in Table 2.1.
2.1 Introduction
This requires us to depart from the VIM, and actually from a long-standing tradition in measurement, for two structural reasons:
• We discuss measurement in terms of properties,
4
whereas the VIM assumes that
only quantities are measurable.
• We include psychosocial properties in the system, whereas the VIM assumes that
only physical quantities are measurable.
Both of these differences imply a generalization, whose justification is a core task
of this book. A summary characterization of the fundamental concepts introduced in
this chapter and used through the whole book is in Appendix A.
We distinguish the contents of this and the following chapter from the rest of the
book by noting that we believe the points and positions adopted here should be
generally and broadly acceptable to measurement experts of many types. Thus,
these two chapters are intended to set up the background for the remaining chapters.
This chapter aims at presenting the general context of a measurement system and
introducing some basic concepts of measurement and the related terms (Box 2.1).
measurement may not be human (e.g., behavior of dogs), and some human measurement may be
entirely physical (e.g., height), but we are not concerned with such cases here. A discussion on the
compatibility of reductionism with the acknowledgment of the possibility of multiple layers of
description is in Philip Warren Anderson’s (1972) paper More is Different, whose main thesis is
twofold. On the one hand, “the reductionist hypothesis [is that] the workings of our minds and
bodies, and of all the animate or inanimate matter […], are assumed to be controlled by the same
set of fundamental laws”. On the other hand, “the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means
imply a ‘constructionist’ one: the ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not
imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe” (p. 393). In other terms, a
principled reductionism can be maintained together with the acknowledgment that effective
descriptions of parts of the world are given in reference to non-reduced parts. Daniel Dennett has
proposed a high-level interpretation of this subject in terms of physical vs. design vs. intentional
stance (Dennett, 1987).
4 The concept is so fundamental that, not surprisingly, together with “property” several other terms
are used to designate it, with meanings more or less analogous, like “attribute”, “feature”, “characteristic”, “quality”, “observable”, and “parameter”. The differences in standpoints about properties
are not only lexical: some approaches to measurement avoid discussion of properties, by dealing
only with empirical objects, represented by means of informational entities (usually but not necessarily numbers) through procedures. Whether properties do exist in the world or are just conceptual
tools we adopt to organize our knowledge of empirical objects is a core topic for a fundamental
ontology (see, e.g., Orilia & Swoyer, 2020) and deeply affects any measurement-related concept
system (for example, do we measure objects or properties of objects?). In this book we maintain
the usual position that what is measured are properties of objects, like the mass of solid bodies and
the reading comprehension ability of individuals, and therefore that properties of objects exist, and
are therefore not concepts. This position is developed further and defended in Chap. 5. See also the
summary in Table 2.1.
2.1 Introduction