2
domain-related conventions and customs in the contexts in which measurement has
been developed and established. Given the aforementioned lack of common understanding of measurement across the scientific and technical literatures, one might
conclude that there is an irreducible multiplicity of measurement-related concepts
and terms; from this perspective, an endeavor aimed at exploring a possible shared
understanding of measurement across the sciences would seem to be pointless.
Obviously this is not our position. We believe, instead, that a transdisciplinary
understanding of the nature of measurement is a valuable target, for both theoretical
and practical reasons. As previously noted, measurement is commonly acknowledged to be a (or even the) basic process of acquiring and formally expressing information on empirical entities, which suggests the usefulness of a shared understanding
of basic and general concepts related to measurement (hence not only itself, but also , , , , etc.
2
). Information is routinely acquired and reported by means of values on
properties as diverse as reading comprehension ability, well-being, quality of industrial products, complexity of software systems, user satisfaction with social services, and political attitudes. But should these cases all be understood as instances
of measurement? Stated alternatively, are all such cases worthy of the trust commonly afforded to measurement, and if so, what do they share in common that
makes them so worthy? Or, at least in some cases, are such examples better understood as instances of something other than measurement—perhaps something less
trustworthy, such as statements of opinion or subjective evaluation? To restate the
issue as succinctly as possible: What justifies the perceived epistemic authority of
measurement?
We think that any attempt to answer such questions will require acknowledgment
that measurement is not something that can be isolated from scientific and technical
knowledge more generally. Characterizations of measurement found in different
fields and different historical periods relate in important ways to more general issues
in science, philosophy, and society, such as the nature of properties and the objects
that bear them, the relationship between experimentation and modeling, and the
relationships between data, information, and knowledge—and indeed, the very possibility of (true) knowledge. In particular, on this last point, a question of increasing
relevance to our data-saturated world is: Given the increasing trends of interest in
“big data” and “datafication”, under what conditions does data actually provide
information on the measurand? In the radically new context of “datafication” in
which we are now living, it is plausible that measurement science will maintain a
role in our society only by attaining a broadly shared fundamental basis, instead of
dissolving in a myriad of technical sub-disciplines.
2 We will carefully distinguish here objects, concepts for understanding objects, and terms for
designating objects, and some notation will support us in this: thus, for example, measurement (no
delimiters), as an object, is understood via a concept (angular brackets) and designated in English by the term “measurement” (double quotes). See Box 2.1 for a presentation of
our terminological assumptions.
1 Introduction
domain-related conventions and customs in the contexts in which measurement has
been developed and established. Given the aforementioned lack of common understanding of measurement across the scientific and technical literatures, one might
conclude that there is an irreducible multiplicity of measurement-related concepts
and terms; from this perspective, an endeavor aimed at exploring a possible shared
understanding of measurement across the sciences would seem to be pointless.
Obviously this is not our position. We believe, instead, that a transdisciplinary
understanding of the nature of measurement is a valuable target, for both theoretical
and practical reasons. As previously noted, measurement is commonly acknowledged to be a (or even the) basic process of acquiring and formally expressing information on empirical entities, which suggests the usefulness of a shared understanding
of basic and general concepts related to measurement (hence not only
2
). Information is routinely acquired and reported by means of values on
properties as diverse as reading comprehension ability, well-being, quality of industrial products, complexity of software systems, user satisfaction with social services, and political attitudes. But should these cases all be understood as instances
of measurement? Stated alternatively, are all such cases worthy of the trust commonly afforded to measurement, and if so, what do they share in common that
makes them so worthy? Or, at least in some cases, are such examples better understood as instances of something other than measurement—perhaps something less
trustworthy, such as statements of opinion or subjective evaluation? To restate the
issue as succinctly as possible: What justifies the perceived epistemic authority of
measurement?
We think that any attempt to answer such questions will require acknowledgment
that measurement is not something that can be isolated from scientific and technical
knowledge more generally. Characterizations of measurement found in different
fields and different historical periods relate in important ways to more general issues
in science, philosophy, and society, such as the nature of properties and the objects
that bear them, the relationship between experimentation and modeling, and the
relationships between data, information, and knowledge—and indeed, the very possibility of (true) knowledge. In particular, on this last point, a question of increasing
relevance to our data-saturated world is: Given the increasing trends of interest in
“big data” and “datafication”, under what conditions does data actually provide
information on the measurand? In the radically new context of “datafication” in
which we are now living, it is plausible that measurement science will maintain a
role in our society only by attaining a broadly shared fundamental basis, instead of
dissolving in a myriad of technical sub-disciplines.
2 We will carefully distinguish here objects, concepts for understanding objects, and terms for
designating objects, and some notation will support us in this: thus, for example, measurement (no
delimiters), as an object, is understood via a concept
our terminological assumptions.
1 Introduction