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2. Information interpretable in the same way by different users in different places
and times: This corresponds to guaranteeing that measurement results are
expressed in a form independent of the specific context and only referring to
entities which are universally accessible, so that the meaning of a measurement
result is unambiguous and can be easily reconstructed in principle by anyone,
possibly on the basis of suitable conventions: hence, it is a requirement of subject independence, or intersubjectivity for short.
According to this characterization, objectivity and intersubjectivity are independent
features—something can be objective but not intersubjective, and vice versa—that
identify the two dimensions of measurement: the claim of the possibility of obtaining information about empirical properties, and the claim of the possibility of
socially reporting such information. It is thus through their objectivity and intersubjectivity that measurement results are considered trustworthy.
On the other hand, as intended here, objectivity and intersubjectivity are not
Boolean (i.e., yes–no) conditions: something can be more or less objective and more
or less intersubjective. Hence for objectivity and intersubjectivity to be the sufficient conditions we are seeking to characterize measurement as a specific kind of
evaluation, a threshold of minimum objectivity and intersubjectivity should be set.
Thus the term “reasonable” in the VIM’s definition of once again
does the heavy lifting: a given attribution of values would be considered reasonable,
and therefore would be considered a measurement, if both its objectivity and intersubjectivity were sufficient for the intended purpose for which the instrument was
designed and performed. This highlights the pragmatic nature of measurement: a
given measurement may be considered good for some purposes and bad for
some others.
Emphasis on sufficient objectivity and intersubjectivity for a given purpose is
then operationally useful, for the general guidelines it provides regarding the design
and performance of measurements (e.g., in Petri, Mari, & Carbone, 2015)—though
more work should be done to develop better guidelines—but it is still too specific at
least in one respect: it would assume that measurement is always good measurement. While pragmatically this is sound—we would avoid knowingly performing a
bad measurement (e.g., with measurement uncertainty greater than target uncertainty)—as discussed in Sect. 7.4.4 the concept as such is not
contradictory, and bad measurements do not fulfill the condition of sufficient objectivity and intersubjectivity. In other words, in order to maintain the VIM’s characterization of reasonableness, objectivity and intersubjectivity are useful but still not
sufficient: some other condition has to be identified.
8.3 Can there be one meaning of “measurement” across the sciences?
2. Information interpretable in the same way by different users in different places
and times: This corresponds to guaranteeing that measurement results are
expressed in a form independent of the specific context and only referring to
entities which are universally accessible, so that the meaning of a measurement
result is unambiguous and can be easily reconstructed in principle by anyone,
possibly on the basis of suitable conventions: hence, it is a requirement of subject independence, or intersubjectivity for short.
According to this characterization, objectivity and intersubjectivity are independent
features—something can be objective but not intersubjective, and vice versa—that
identify the two dimensions of measurement: the claim of the possibility of obtaining information about empirical properties, and the claim of the possibility of
socially reporting such information. It is thus through their objectivity and intersubjectivity that measurement results are considered trustworthy.
On the other hand, as intended here, objectivity and intersubjectivity are not
Boolean (i.e., yes–no) conditions: something can be more or less objective and more
or less intersubjective. Hence for objectivity and intersubjectivity to be the sufficient conditions we are seeking to characterize measurement as a specific kind of
evaluation, a threshold of minimum objectivity and intersubjectivity should be set.
Thus the term “reasonable” in the VIM’s definition of
does the heavy lifting: a given attribution of values would be considered reasonable,
and therefore would be considered a measurement, if both its objectivity and intersubjectivity were sufficient for the intended purpose for which the instrument was
designed and performed. This highlights the pragmatic nature of measurement: a
given measurement may be considered good for some purposes and bad for
some others.
Emphasis on sufficient objectivity and intersubjectivity for a given purpose is
then operationally useful, for the general guidelines it provides regarding the design
and performance of measurements (e.g., in Petri, Mari, & Carbone, 2015)—though
more work should be done to develop better guidelines—but it is still too specific at
least in one respect: it would assume that measurement is always good measurement. While pragmatically this is sound—we would avoid knowingly performing a
bad measurement (e.g., with measurement uncertainty greater than target uncertainty)—as discussed in Sect. 7.4.4 the concept
contradictory, and bad measurements do not fulfill the condition of sufficient objectivity and intersubjectivity. In other words, in order to maintain the VIM’s characterization of reasonableness, objectivity and intersubjectivity are useful but still not
sufficient: some other condition has to be identified.
8.3 Can there be one meaning of “measurement” across the sciences?