242
with a meaning, e.g., negation in English, and thus made a semantic entity, may
have very different values (compare receiving a “no” to “have you already read
my draft?” and “is all quiet on the western front?”: quite a critical difference
for most persons, though the syntax and semantics are exactly the same). Such
an encompassing perspective is then about “the relations of signs to the interpreters” (Morris, 1946: p. 217), and it refers to what is called pragmatic information. From the perspective of this book, this encompasses questions about
how measurements of the measurand can be used for particular purposes.
The fact that this is a layered structure explains why “any limitations discovered in
the theory at Level A necessarily apply to levels B and C [… and] the analysis at
Level A discloses that this level overlaps the other levels more than one could possibly naively suspect” (Shannon & Weaver, 1949: p. 6). And similarly, one can note
how limitations at Level B apply to Level C. Along the same lines but in more
explicit reference to language, Rudolf Carnap noted that “if in an investigation
explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the
user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. If we abstract from
the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we
are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also and
analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax”
(1942: p. 9).
4
The parallel is then manifest:
• Syntax is about data, i.e., signs that are distinguishable and that may stand for
something, though this relation is still not included in the analysis.
• Semantics is about data equipped with meaning due to its being related to objects.
• Pragmatics is about information in a context due to its being related to persons
with purposes.
Three strategic clarifications are in order. First, this framework does not require us
to accept that semantic information is always based on data or that pragmatic information is always based on semantic information, but only that these (possible)
restrictions apply to measurement-related information. Second, information relevant to measurement is only descriptive, though possibly the basis for explanatory,
predictive, or prescriptive purposes. Third, this framework does not imply that data
is linguistic: what data is and how data can have or be provided with meaning are
questions admitting multiple answers. This third point deserves a few more words.
In commenting on Peirce’s definition of as “anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a
than of which we have been concerned throughout the entire book and which
is explored particularly in Chap. 6.
4 In the last few decades semiotics has had important developments (see, e.g., the overview by
Wolf, n.d.) but—as with philosophy of language in Chap. 5—a reference to some key founders and
some of their main themes is sufficient for our purposes here. Its context is provided by the “semiotic triangle” that we introduced in Box 2.1.
8 Conclusion
with a meaning, e.g., negation in English, and thus made a semantic entity, may
have very different values (compare receiving a “no” to “have you already read
my draft?” and “is all quiet on the western front?”: quite a critical difference
for most persons, though the syntax and semantics are exactly the same). Such
an encompassing perspective is then about “the relations of signs to the interpreters” (Morris, 1946: p. 217), and it refers to what is called pragmatic information. From the perspective of this book, this encompasses questions about
how measurements of the measurand can be used for particular purposes.
The fact that this is a layered structure explains why “any limitations discovered in
the theory at Level A necessarily apply to levels B and C [… and] the analysis at
Level A discloses that this level overlaps the other levels more than one could possibly naively suspect” (Shannon & Weaver, 1949: p. 6). And similarly, one can note
how limitations at Level B apply to Level C. Along the same lines but in more
explicit reference to language, Rudolf Carnap noted that “if in an investigation
explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the
user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. If we abstract from
the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we
are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also and
analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax”
(1942: p. 9).
4
The parallel is then manifest:
• Syntax is about data, i.e., signs that are distinguishable and that may stand for
something, though this relation is still not included in the analysis.
• Semantics is about data equipped with meaning due to its being related to objects.
• Pragmatics is about information in a context due to its being related to persons
with purposes.
Three strategic clarifications are in order. First, this framework does not require us
to accept that semantic information is always based on data or that pragmatic information is always based on semantic information, but only that these (possible)
restrictions apply to measurement-related information. Second, information relevant to measurement is only descriptive, though possibly the basis for explanatory,
predictive, or prescriptive purposes. Third, this framework does not imply that data
is linguistic: what data is and how data can have or be provided with meaning are
questions admitting multiple answers. This third point deserves a few more words.
In commenting on Peirce’s definition of
than
is explored particularly in Chap. 6.
4 In the last few decades semiotics has had important developments (see, e.g., the overview by
Wolf, n.d.) but—as with philosophy of language in Chap. 5—a reference to some key founders and
some of their main themes is sufficient for our purposes here. Its context is provided by the “semiotic triangle” that we introduced in Box 2.1.
8 Conclusion