185
ties have ever been measured, what was measured was a property (of an individual
or a group), rather than a concept of (or term for) that property.
Thus, whether a given property is defined in purely physical terms or not, the
critical question is how we know that a property exists, and therefore that it meets at
least the most basic criterion for measurability. What, in other words, justifies one’s
belief in the existence of a property?
6.6.2 Justifications for the existence of properties
There are many ways in which a claim about the existence of an empirical property
could be justified, but given the empirical nature of the properties in question, they
must share some form of observational evidentiary basis. Here we propose what we
take to be a minimal, pragmatic approach to the justification of the existence of
properties, based on our ability to identify their modes of interaction with their
environments.
49
A core aspect of the justification for a claim about the existence of a property is,
simply, the observation that an object interacts with its environment in particular
ways. The term “interaction” can itself be interpreted in a variety of ways, but in the
context of measurement science (see in particular Sects. 2.3, 3.1, and 4.3.4), a starting point is the observation of what we have referred to as a transduction effect, i.e.,
an empirical process that produces variations of a (response, effect, output) property
as effects of variations of one or more (stimulus, cause, input) properties.
One could argue that an even earlier starting point is simply the observation of
variation in some empirical phenomenon (event, process, etc.). If we may help ourselves to the assumption that there are no uncaused events (at least not on a sufficiently broad conception of causality; for general discussions, see, e.g., Beebee,
Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009; see also Markus & Borsboom, 2013), then from the
observation of an event one may infer the existence of causal influences, though of
course one may initially know little or nothing about the nature of these influences.
50
Kim, 1998; Searle, 1992), and perhaps also on social groups and the actions thereof (with all the
ontological challenges this entails; see, e.g., Searle, 2010). However, the key point remains: none
of these differences imply that psychosocial properties are not part of the empirical world, any less
so than physical properties.
49 To be clear, we do not aim to provide a sufficient set of criteria for the justification of a claim
about the existence of any given property, as this will surely involve issues specific to that
property.
50 Our stance here is broadly consistent with Ian Hacking’s (1983) perspective on entity realism,
which entails that a claim about the existence of an entity is justified if it can be used to create
effects that can be investigated and understood independently of their cause. As Hacking famously
put it, in reference to experiments involving the spraying of electrons and positrons onto a superconducting metal sphere: “if you can spray them, then they are real” (p. 24). To this we would add
a friendly amendment: if you can spray them, something is real, though it remains an open question
to what extent the actual causal forces at work are well described by our current best theories and
6.6 About the existence of general properties
ties have ever been measured, what was measured was a property (of an individual
or a group), rather than a concept of (or term for) that property.
Thus, whether a given property is defined in purely physical terms or not, the
critical question is how we know that a property exists, and therefore that it meets at
least the most basic criterion for measurability. What, in other words, justifies one’s
belief in the existence of a property?
6.6.2 Justifications for the existence of properties
There are many ways in which a claim about the existence of an empirical property
could be justified, but given the empirical nature of the properties in question, they
must share some form of observational evidentiary basis. Here we propose what we
take to be a minimal, pragmatic approach to the justification of the existence of
properties, based on our ability to identify their modes of interaction with their
environments.
49
A core aspect of the justification for a claim about the existence of a property is,
simply, the observation that an object interacts with its environment in particular
ways. The term “interaction” can itself be interpreted in a variety of ways, but in the
context of measurement science (see in particular Sects. 2.3, 3.1, and 4.3.4), a starting point is the observation of what we have referred to as a transduction effect, i.e.,
an empirical process that produces variations of a (response, effect, output) property
as effects of variations of one or more (stimulus, cause, input) properties.
One could argue that an even earlier starting point is simply the observation of
variation in some empirical phenomenon (event, process, etc.). If we may help ourselves to the assumption that there are no uncaused events (at least not on a sufficiently broad conception of causality; for general discussions, see, e.g., Beebee,
Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009; see also Markus & Borsboom, 2013), then from the
observation of an event one may infer the existence of causal influences, though of
course one may initially know little or nothing about the nature of these influences.
50
Kim, 1998; Searle, 1992), and perhaps also on social groups and the actions thereof (with all the
ontological challenges this entails; see, e.g., Searle, 2010). However, the key point remains: none
of these differences imply that psychosocial properties are not part of the empirical world, any less
so than physical properties.
49 To be clear, we do not aim to provide a sufficient set of criteria for the justification of a claim
about the existence of any given property, as this will surely involve issues specific to that
property.
50 Our stance here is broadly consistent with Ian Hacking’s (1983) perspective on entity realism,
which entails that a claim about the existence of an entity is justified if it can be used to create
effects that can be investigated and understood independently of their cause. As Hacking famously
put it, in reference to experiments involving the spraying of electrons and positrons onto a superconducting metal sphere: “if you can spray them, then they are real” (p. 24). To this we would add
a friendly amendment: if you can spray them, something is real, though it remains an open question
to what extent the actual causal forces at work are well described by our current best theories and
6.6 About the existence of general properties