135
There are two, basically alternative, answers to this question (see Orilia &
Swoyer, 2020).
33
• According to one position, no matter how similar P[a i ] and P[a j ] are, they are
still distinct entities, as the objects a i and a j are distinct, because any property of
an object is by definition a property that only that object has and can have. In this
sense, the equality P[a i ] = P[a j ] is simply a convenient notation for an equivalence P[a i ] ≅ P[a j ]: while the objects a i and a j have indistinguishable modes of
interaction with the environment, their properties remain different because they
are of different objects. A plausibly unavoidable consequence of this position is
that an object a at the time instant t i and the same object a at any other time
instant t j —as introduced in Sect. 5.2.5—cannot have the same property, i.e., P[a,
t i ] and P[a, t j ] must be distinct entities.
Under this assumption, the ontology of properties is then straightforward, given
that it may include only properties of objects at time instants as fundamental
entities,
34
and it assumes their relation of indistinguishability as primitive. Thus,
there are no individual properties independent of objects at time instants, and
what we consider lengths, given reading comprehension abilities, and so forth
are no more than concepts that we create to help organize our experience of and
communication about the world. However, this position assumes that each property of each object at each time instant is a distinct entity, and therefore that at
each new instant a bunch of properties is created, so that an ever increasingly
growing multitude of properties exists. This is an instance of a position that in the
philosophical tradition is often called nominalism.
• According to another position, properties of objects are such that distinct objects
can have one and the same property. Hence the indistinguishability of P[a i ] and
P[a j ] suggests that they could be indeed the same property. In this sense,
P[a i ] = P[a j ] is the theoretical counterpart of P[a i ] ≈ P[a j ]: the fact that the objects
a i and a j have indistinguishable modes of interaction with the environment supports the hypothesis that they have the same property. In the lexicon of ontology,
properties of objects are then universals: each property is a universal, which can
be instantiated in, i.e., exemplified by, one or more objects.
The ontology of properties in this case might be considered then more complex
than in the previous case, given that it includes universal entities, such as any
given length and any given reading comprehension ability, together with particulars such as the length of any given rod and the reading comprehension ability of
any given individual. However, this position avoids assuming that each property
of each object in each instant is a distinct entity, and accounts for the relation of
33 Note that this alternative is presented with no reference to values of properties, which are instead
discussed in Chap. 6.
34 With or possibly even without objects: in an extreme position, objects could be just considered
as the bundles of their properties—see Maurin (2018) (and since properties change as time passes,
this also means that objects have no persistence: I am not the same person as I was one second ago,
but we are only equivalent, according to a more or less complex criterion of equivalence; this might
be an interpretation of the radical impermanence mentioned in Footnote 26 about Buddhism).
5.3 A philosophical interlude
There are two, basically alternative, answers to this question (see Orilia &
Swoyer, 2020).
33
• According to one position, no matter how similar P[a i ] and P[a j ] are, they are
still distinct entities, as the objects a i and a j are distinct, because any property of
an object is by definition a property that only that object has and can have. In this
sense, the equality P[a i ] = P[a j ] is simply a convenient notation for an equivalence P[a i ] ≅ P[a j ]: while the objects a i and a j have indistinguishable modes of
interaction with the environment, their properties remain different because they
are of different objects. A plausibly unavoidable consequence of this position is
that an object a at the time instant t i and the same object a at any other time
instant t j —as introduced in Sect. 5.2.5—cannot have the same property, i.e., P[a,
t i ] and P[a, t j ] must be distinct entities.
Under this assumption, the ontology of properties is then straightforward, given
that it may include only properties of objects at time instants as fundamental
entities,
34
and it assumes their relation of indistinguishability as primitive. Thus,
there are no individual properties independent of objects at time instants, and
what we consider lengths, given reading comprehension abilities, and so forth
are no more than concepts that we create to help organize our experience of and
communication about the world. However, this position assumes that each property of each object at each time instant is a distinct entity, and therefore that at
each new instant a bunch of properties is created, so that an ever increasingly
growing multitude of properties exists. This is an instance of a position that in the
philosophical tradition is often called nominalism.
• According to another position, properties of objects are such that distinct objects
can have one and the same property. Hence the indistinguishability of P[a i ] and
P[a j ] suggests that they could be indeed the same property. In this sense,
P[a i ] = P[a j ] is the theoretical counterpart of P[a i ] ≈ P[a j ]: the fact that the objects
a i and a j have indistinguishable modes of interaction with the environment supports the hypothesis that they have the same property. In the lexicon of ontology,
properties of objects are then universals: each property is a universal, which can
be instantiated in, i.e., exemplified by, one or more objects.
The ontology of properties in this case might be considered then more complex
than in the previous case, given that it includes universal entities, such as any
given length and any given reading comprehension ability, together with particulars such as the length of any given rod and the reading comprehension ability of
any given individual. However, this position avoids assuming that each property
of each object in each instant is a distinct entity, and accounts for the relation of
33 Note that this alternative is presented with no reference to values of properties, which are instead
discussed in Chap. 6.
34 With or possibly even without objects: in an extreme position, objects could be just considered
as the bundles of their properties—see Maurin (2018) (and since properties change as time passes,
this also means that objects have no persistence: I am not the same person as I was one second ago,
but we are only equivalent, according to a more or less complex criterion of equivalence; this might
be an interpretation of the radical impermanence mentioned in Footnote 26 about Buddhism).
5.3 A philosophical interlude