117
that they are not individual entities but sets (or possibly mereological sums:
Varzi, 2019): a given mass would then just be a set of masses of objects, and
mass the set of all given masses, and therefore a set of sets.
The answer to such a problem depends on whether one’s ontology has
room for abstract entities or only for concrete entities, a distinction that is
sometimes presented in terms of universals and particulars (the possible differences between and and between and
are beyond the scope of our purposes here), and grounds the
opposition between realism and nominalism: “The realist’s ontology represents a two-category ontology; it postulates entities of two irreducibly different types: particulars and universals. According to the nominalist, however, all
the theoretical work done by the two-category ontology of the realist can be
done by an ontological theory that commits us to the existence of entities of
just one category, particulars” (Loux & Crisp, 2017: p. 50).
In what follows we try to remain as neutral as possible about the alternative
between realism and nominalism.
5.1.1 The meaning of the Basic Evaluation Equation
The Basic Evaluation Equation
property of an object value of a property
=
conveys the core information obtained by measurement (neglecting measurement
uncertainty, for the moment). Despite the fact that information of this sort is commonly produced and used, the apparent simplicity of the relation hides the question:
Is the relation an actual equality, or is the “=” sign just a placeholder for a different
relation?
The problem is mostly immaterial in day-to-day practice and is thus usually left
in the background, so that one sometimes encounters claims such as Gary Price’s
(2001: p. 294) that the relation “‘equals’ means ‘is expressed, modeled, or represented by’”. Since, , and are distinct
concepts, such a statement only informs us of a lack of interest in understanding
what kind of information a Basic Evaluation Equation actually conveys. In distinction to this vagueness, it is our position that an answer to this problem is indeed
critical for a measurement-related ontology and epistemology of properties. Note
that different positions are possible (Mari, 1997), the two extremes being
• a strong ontology, which assumes that properties of objects inherently have values, so that if they are known it is because they have been discovered by means
of experimental activities, and
5.1 Introduction
that they are not individual entities but sets (or possibly mereological sums:
Varzi, 2019): a given mass would then just be a set of masses of objects, and
mass the set of all given masses, and therefore a set of sets.
The answer to such a problem depends on whether one’s ontology has
room for abstract entities or only for concrete entities, a distinction that is
sometimes presented in terms of universals and particulars (the possible differences between
opposition between realism and nominalism: “The realist’s ontology represents a two-category ontology; it postulates entities of two irreducibly different types: particulars and universals. According to the nominalist, however, all
the theoretical work done by the two-category ontology of the realist can be
done by an ontological theory that commits us to the existence of entities of
just one category, particulars” (Loux & Crisp, 2017: p. 50).
In what follows we try to remain as neutral as possible about the alternative
between realism and nominalism.
5.1.1 The meaning of the Basic Evaluation Equation
The Basic Evaluation Equation
property of an object value of a property
=
conveys the core information obtained by measurement (neglecting measurement
uncertainty, for the moment). Despite the fact that information of this sort is commonly produced and used, the apparent simplicity of the relation hides the question:
Is the relation an actual equality, or is the “=” sign just a placeholder for a different
relation?
The problem is mostly immaterial in day-to-day practice and is thus usually left
in the background, so that one sometimes encounters claims such as Gary Price’s
(2001: p. 294) that the relation “‘equals’ means ‘is expressed, modeled, or represented by’”. Since
concepts, such a statement only informs us of a lack of interest in understanding
what kind of information a Basic Evaluation Equation actually conveys. In distinction to this vagueness, it is our position that an answer to this problem is indeed
critical for a measurement-related ontology and epistemology of properties. Note
that different positions are possible (Mari, 1997), the two extremes being
• a strong ontology, which assumes that properties of objects inherently have values, so that if they are known it is because they have been discovered by means
of experimental activities, and
5.1 Introduction