93
this chapter), moving from an early form of realism (“whether a test measures what
it claims to measure”) to antirealist or non-realist stances influenced by logical positivism (nomological networks) and pragmatism (adequacy and appropriateness for
an intended purpose), and now possibly back to a form of realism, albeit one that
acknowledges the role of models both of and in the measurement process. This last
shift helps point the way towards the philosophical perspective that grounds the
theories and models of measurement developed in the balance of this volume, which
we discuss further in Sect. 4.5. Prior to this, however, we will explore some of the
key consequences of the various philosophical perspectives we have discussed so
far as a way of highlighting what is at stake with respect to characterizing measurement in terms of its sufficient conditions.
4.4 An interpretive framework
As described in the previous sections, the stereotyped versions of naïve realism,
operationalism, and representationalism share a common presupposition: measurement can be understood as a black box that somehow transforms inputs into outputs.
In Chap. 2 we adopted a top-down strategy for progressively characterizing measurement in terms of more and more specific necessary conditions, which allowed
us to leave the box closed. But, as previously discussed (particularly in Sect. 2.2.1)
measurement is an empirical process, and complementary sufficient conditions
should be able to explain the epistemic role customarily attributed to measurement
and its results. It seems plausible, then, that these sufficient conditions should be
characterized in terms of the structure of the process, thus by “opening the box”,
and with the desirable meta-condition that such a structural characterization should
apply to the measurement of both physical and psychosocial properties. While we
leave a thorough exploration of what is “inside the box” to Chap. 7, it can already
be acknowledged that what we will seek “inside the box” is informed by an underlying philosophical standpoint, and therefore that the distinct positions on measurement described so far leave open that there can be more than one way to answer the
question of what measurement is even in the case of black box models. With the
purpose of offering a structured perspective about this multiplicity, we introduce
here a simple framework driven by two basic questions (Mari, 2013).
Q1. Are empirical constraints on the process relevant for the definition of measurement, i.e., should the definition include reference to any empirical conditions?
An affirmative response to this question means that only under some set of specific
conditions regarding the way the measurement process is performed
19
is an
evaluation to be considered a measurement; a negative response means that
empirical constraints are immaterial for characterizing measurement.
19 See for example the answer that is given to the question in Table 4.1: “Is measurement characterized by the structure of the process?”.
4.4 An interpretive framework
this chapter), moving from an early form of realism (“whether a test measures what
it claims to measure”) to antirealist or non-realist stances influenced by logical positivism (nomological networks) and pragmatism (adequacy and appropriateness for
an intended purpose), and now possibly back to a form of realism, albeit one that
acknowledges the role of models both of and in the measurement process. This last
shift helps point the way towards the philosophical perspective that grounds the
theories and models of measurement developed in the balance of this volume, which
we discuss further in Sect. 4.5. Prior to this, however, we will explore some of the
key consequences of the various philosophical perspectives we have discussed so
far as a way of highlighting what is at stake with respect to characterizing measurement in terms of its sufficient conditions.
4.4 An interpretive framework
As described in the previous sections, the stereotyped versions of naïve realism,
operationalism, and representationalism share a common presupposition: measurement can be understood as a black box that somehow transforms inputs into outputs.
In Chap. 2 we adopted a top-down strategy for progressively characterizing measurement in terms of more and more specific necessary conditions, which allowed
us to leave the box closed. But, as previously discussed (particularly in Sect. 2.2.1)
measurement is an empirical process, and complementary sufficient conditions
should be able to explain the epistemic role customarily attributed to measurement
and its results. It seems plausible, then, that these sufficient conditions should be
characterized in terms of the structure of the process, thus by “opening the box”,
and with the desirable meta-condition that such a structural characterization should
apply to the measurement of both physical and psychosocial properties. While we
leave a thorough exploration of what is “inside the box” to Chap. 7, it can already
be acknowledged that what we will seek “inside the box” is informed by an underlying philosophical standpoint, and therefore that the distinct positions on measurement described so far leave open that there can be more than one way to answer the
question of what measurement is even in the case of black box models. With the
purpose of offering a structured perspective about this multiplicity, we introduce
here a simple framework driven by two basic questions (Mari, 2013).
Q1. Are empirical constraints on the process relevant for the definition of measurement, i.e., should the definition include reference to any empirical conditions?
An affirmative response to this question means that only under some set of specific
conditions regarding the way the measurement process is performed
19
is an
evaluation to be considered a measurement; a negative response means that
empirical constraints are immaterial for characterizing measurement.
19 See for example the answer that is given to the question in Table 4.1: “Is measurement characterized by the structure of the process?”.
4.4 An interpretive framework