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4.1.1 Measurement between objectivity and subjectivity
The increasing interest in the measurement of psychosocial properties, and the
accompanying widening of the scope of activities referred to as instances of measurement, has precipitated a new wave of interest in the philosophical foundations
of measurement, starting with the basic question of what measurement actually is,
or, more operationally, what conditions have to be fulfilled for a process to be
accepted as a measurement.
We take here as a premise that there is no single, inherent meaning of “measurement” which exists independently of practice and context, and that some amount of
convention is unavoidable. The common observation that there are multiple and
sometimes incompatible definitions of what measurement is throughout the scientific, technical, and philosophical literatures might be simply interpreted as evidence that measurement is a many-faceted activity, and that this multiplicity is
somehow irreducible. However, as already noted, an “anything goes” relativism or
conventionalism—which might assert that any process of property evaluation could
be considered a measurement if it is agreed to be so by a relevant community—
would not justify the epistemic authority attributed to measurement.
The issue is sometimes cast in terms of the issue of objectivity: in brief, scientific
inquiry is generally expected to provide knowledge that is independent of the particular perspective(s) of individuals involved in its acquisition. While a radically
subjectivistic (or relativistic) position might claim that any human evaluation is by
definition a measurement, the scientific, technological, and social history of measurement has, in contrast, emphasized an objectivist view. For many centuries,
indeed, measurement has been primarily understood as applicable only to physical
quantities, which are generally believed to exist independently of human perception
or thought—i.e., objectively. Hence objectivist presuppositions have accompanied
the development of scholarship on measurement, concomitant with the presumption
that measurement is the ground on which scientific and technical developments are
based whenever dependable data is required, a “protocol of truth” in the classical
terminology of philosophy (Margenau, 1958). In the nineteenth century, the possibility of measuring properties of human beings—and, in particular, properties of the
mind and of conscious experience, which of course (and indeed, tautologically) do
not exist independently of human perception or thought—finally became a topic of
research and development, first about psychophysical events (i.e., the effects of
physical phenomena on human perception), and then about psychological properties such as, notoriously, intelligence. More recently, a wide range of human attributes have become the targets of measurement, including domains of knowledge
and skill, cognitive and physical abilities, aspects of personality, affective and motivational characteristics, psychological conditions, attitudes, values, and preferences. In particular, this raises the issue of whether properties must exist
independently of human thought—i.e., be ontologically objective, in the terminology of John Searle (e.g., 1992; see also Maul, 2013)—in order to be proper objects
4 Philosophical perspectives on measurement
4.1.1 Measurement between objectivity and subjectivity
The increasing interest in the measurement of psychosocial properties, and the
accompanying widening of the scope of activities referred to as instances of measurement, has precipitated a new wave of interest in the philosophical foundations
of measurement, starting with the basic question of what measurement actually is,
or, more operationally, what conditions have to be fulfilled for a process to be
accepted as a measurement.
We take here as a premise that there is no single, inherent meaning of “measurement” which exists independently of practice and context, and that some amount of
convention is unavoidable. The common observation that there are multiple and
sometimes incompatible definitions of what measurement is throughout the scientific, technical, and philosophical literatures might be simply interpreted as evidence that measurement is a many-faceted activity, and that this multiplicity is
somehow irreducible. However, as already noted, an “anything goes” relativism or
conventionalism—which might assert that any process of property evaluation could
be considered a measurement if it is agreed to be so by a relevant community—
would not justify the epistemic authority attributed to measurement.
The issue is sometimes cast in terms of the issue of objectivity: in brief, scientific
inquiry is generally expected to provide knowledge that is independent of the particular perspective(s) of individuals involved in its acquisition. While a radically
subjectivistic (or relativistic) position might claim that any human evaluation is by
definition a measurement, the scientific, technological, and social history of measurement has, in contrast, emphasized an objectivist view. For many centuries,
indeed, measurement has been primarily understood as applicable only to physical
quantities, which are generally believed to exist independently of human perception
or thought—i.e., objectively. Hence objectivist presuppositions have accompanied
the development of scholarship on measurement, concomitant with the presumption
that measurement is the ground on which scientific and technical developments are
based whenever dependable data is required, a “protocol of truth” in the classical
terminology of philosophy (Margenau, 1958). In the nineteenth century, the possibility of measuring properties of human beings—and, in particular, properties of the
mind and of conscious experience, which of course (and indeed, tautologically) do
not exist independently of human perception or thought—finally became a topic of
research and development, first about psychophysical events (i.e., the effects of
physical phenomena on human perception), and then about psychological properties such as, notoriously, intelligence. More recently, a wide range of human attributes have become the targets of measurement, including domains of knowledge
and skill, cognitive and physical abilities, aspects of personality, affective and motivational characteristics, psychological conditions, attitudes, values, and preferences. In particular, this raises the issue of whether properties must exist
independently of human thought—i.e., be ontologically objective, in the terminology of John Searle (e.g., 1992; see also Maul, 2013)—in order to be proper objects
4 Philosophical perspectives on measurement