80
8 Societal Impact of a Radiological Attack
of radioactive waste that will be generated. In some cases, it might actually be more
cost-effective to demolish and replace a building that is so thoroughly contaminated.
Among the most significant decisions that must be made is that of decontamination
standards and this decision will be central in determining many aspects of the societal
and economic cost of a radiological attack. As a rough rule of thumb, the cost of
remediation increases as the square of the amount of risk reduction. For example,
reducing the contamination levels (and, thus, risk) by a factor of two will cause costs
to increase by a factor of four or greater; reducing contamination levels by a factor
of three will increase costs by a factor of nine. This is due to the increased time and
effort required for the additional cleanup as well as the additional volume of waste
generated [20].
But we must also factor in the societal cost of having buildings, parks, roads, and
infrastructure inaccessible or unavailable for use for a longer period of time. For
example, consider the impact on New York City from a major subway station and
associated train lines being closed for several years in order to permit decontamination to levels indistinguishable from background, versus taking only one year to
decontaminate to levels that would expose workers to as much as 1 mSv annually.
An analogous situation occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and
some train lines were re-routed or closed down for only a year—the total cost to
the Metropolitan Transit Authority exceeded $5 billion, including repairs to stations,
train lines, tunnels, and lost revenues [21]. The cost of these disruptions extended
beyond the money needed for repairs and lost fares, it also included the cost of
passengers’ time necessitated by the disruptions; as one example, the commuting
time from the author’s home in Brooklyn into Midtown Manhattan increased by
30–60 min depending on the day and time one was commuting.
Remediation will go more quickly if cleanup standards are based on risk rather
than on our technological ability to detect radiation. Using information provided in
Federal Guidance Report #12 [22] one can calculate that the radiation exposure from
an area contaminated to a level of 10 dpm cm
−2 (a common US limit to restore an
area to unrestricted use) is less than 20 nSv hr
−1 , which is only a small increase
over normal background radiation levels. Nevertheless, this level of contamination
is easily detected using handheld instruments and it is not unreasonable to think that
members of the public might refuse to return to areas contaminated to these levels to
work or to live. The fears of the public might well exacerbate the economic impact
of such an attack.
Additional economic impacts can be the result of peoples’ preferences and habits.
Becker and Rubinstein [23] address one aspect of this when they note the behavioral
impact of a terrorist attack, in particular the manner in which a person’s behavior can
change. For example, consider a person who becomes habituated to, say, stopping
for coffee and pastries at a particular coffee shop every morning, and then the coffee
shop is unavailable because it is within the Hot Zone. The person will find a new
coffee shop to visit each morning; if this continues long enough then the person will
develop a new habit that they are likely to continue even after access to their former
coffee shop is restored and it reopens; to this can be added places to which the person
went for lunch, coffee, dinner, and daytime shopping. The same amount of money
8 Societal Impact of a Radiological Attack
of radioactive waste that will be generated. In some cases, it might actually be more
cost-effective to demolish and replace a building that is so thoroughly contaminated.
Among the most significant decisions that must be made is that of decontamination
standards and this decision will be central in determining many aspects of the societal
and economic cost of a radiological attack. As a rough rule of thumb, the cost of
remediation increases as the square of the amount of risk reduction. For example,
reducing the contamination levels (and, thus, risk) by a factor of two will cause costs
to increase by a factor of four or greater; reducing contamination levels by a factor
of three will increase costs by a factor of nine. This is due to the increased time and
effort required for the additional cleanup as well as the additional volume of waste
generated [20].
But we must also factor in the societal cost of having buildings, parks, roads, and
infrastructure inaccessible or unavailable for use for a longer period of time. For
example, consider the impact on New York City from a major subway station and
associated train lines being closed for several years in order to permit decontamination to levels indistinguishable from background, versus taking only one year to
decontaminate to levels that would expose workers to as much as 1 mSv annually.
An analogous situation occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and
some train lines were re-routed or closed down for only a year—the total cost to
the Metropolitan Transit Authority exceeded $5 billion, including repairs to stations,
train lines, tunnels, and lost revenues [21]. The cost of these disruptions extended
beyond the money needed for repairs and lost fares, it also included the cost of
passengers’ time necessitated by the disruptions; as one example, the commuting
time from the author’s home in Brooklyn into Midtown Manhattan increased by
30–60 min depending on the day and time one was commuting.
Remediation will go more quickly if cleanup standards are based on risk rather
than on our technological ability to detect radiation. Using information provided in
Federal Guidance Report #12 [22] one can calculate that the radiation exposure from
an area contaminated to a level of 10 dpm cm
−2 (a common US limit to restore an
area to unrestricted use) is less than 20 nSv hr
−1 , which is only a small increase
over normal background radiation levels. Nevertheless, this level of contamination
is easily detected using handheld instruments and it is not unreasonable to think that
members of the public might refuse to return to areas contaminated to these levels to
work or to live. The fears of the public might well exacerbate the economic impact
of such an attack.
Additional economic impacts can be the result of peoples’ preferences and habits.
Becker and Rubinstein [23] address one aspect of this when they note the behavioral
impact of a terrorist attack, in particular the manner in which a person’s behavior can
change. For example, consider a person who becomes habituated to, say, stopping
for coffee and pastries at a particular coffee shop every morning, and then the coffee
shop is unavailable because it is within the Hot Zone. The person will find a new
coffee shop to visit each morning; if this continues long enough then the person will
develop a new habit that they are likely to continue even after access to their former
coffee shop is restored and it reopens; to this can be added places to which the person
went for lunch, coffee, dinner, and daytime shopping. The same amount of money