viii
Foreword
amounts of material entered into illicit commerce for the first time. What will happen
as governments in control of nuclear materials fall or become unstable in future?
Radiological materials are a separate problem—less threatening than nuclear
materials, but with a much lower bar for acquisition. Radioactive materials are
used widely in industrial and medical applications around the world—in all countries. Sometimes radioactive materials are used in quantities and forms that could be
transformed into a significant radiological dispersal device—a so-called dirty bomb.
Prior to 9/11, controls on these materials were weak. Since then, several countries,
in particular the USA, have engaged in a coherent effort to help secure or replace
these sources with non-radioactive alternatives, but the job is far from done.
As illustrated above, both the risk of nuclear or radiological terrorism as well as
the technology to address this risk have changed substantially over the past seven
decades since Oppenheimer made his screwdriver remark. However, one thing has not
changed. And that is the need for practitioners and policy-makers to make decisions
with a thorough understanding of the science that underlies nuclear science and
technology.
That is why this book by Dr. Karam is so important. Along with a well-crafted
curriculum, it can help to prepare the next generation of nuclear specialists in key
areas related to nuclear terrorism. Scientists, technicians, politicians and policymakers need a clear-eyed understanding of the science and the tools we must deploy
to deal with these risks. Our ability to prevent a nuclear catastrophe will be based on
the skills and knowledge of key decision-makers and implementers. This excellent
book will help to facilitate that. It addresses a range of essential topics in the field.
Dr. Karam’s work as a scientist and as scientific advisor for the Counterterrorism
Division of the NYPD expanding and operating our rad/nuke interdiction system
provides an excellent background for this book. He is a respected health physicist
with experience in radiological and nuclear emergency preparedness and response.
He has extensive teaching experience at all levels of education and has published
widely for both technical and popular audiences. His professional skills have also
been recognized by his colleagues; he was asked to participate on committees for
the National Academy of Science, the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, and participated in several overseas missions on behalf of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Health Physics Society.
Seventy years into the nuclear era, no terrorist has successfully exploited the
potential of nuclear power. Why is this? Is it because we have developed strong
enough protections to prevent terrorists from succeeding? Is it because we have been
successful in convincing terrorists that they will not succeed and thus they do not
try? Is it because terrorists just are not interested or capable? We just do not know.
We do know that the threat will likely grow. And we know that technology alone
cannot prevent nuclear terrorism. It must be integrated into an overall strategy, and the
strategy must be adequately resourced. Preventing nuclear terrorism clearly requires
a multi-prong effort. The first is to minimize the use of the most threatening materials.
The second is to ensure that nuclear and radiological materials are secured at their
source. The third is to ensure that we have in place the necessary technology and
agreements to support recovery of nuclear or radiological material that may be stolen.
Foreword
amounts of material entered into illicit commerce for the first time. What will happen
as governments in control of nuclear materials fall or become unstable in future?
Radiological materials are a separate problem—less threatening than nuclear
materials, but with a much lower bar for acquisition. Radioactive materials are
used widely in industrial and medical applications around the world—in all countries. Sometimes radioactive materials are used in quantities and forms that could be
transformed into a significant radiological dispersal device—a so-called dirty bomb.
Prior to 9/11, controls on these materials were weak. Since then, several countries,
in particular the USA, have engaged in a coherent effort to help secure or replace
these sources with non-radioactive alternatives, but the job is far from done.
As illustrated above, both the risk of nuclear or radiological terrorism as well as
the technology to address this risk have changed substantially over the past seven
decades since Oppenheimer made his screwdriver remark. However, one thing has not
changed. And that is the need for practitioners and policy-makers to make decisions
with a thorough understanding of the science that underlies nuclear science and
technology.
That is why this book by Dr. Karam is so important. Along with a well-crafted
curriculum, it can help to prepare the next generation of nuclear specialists in key
areas related to nuclear terrorism. Scientists, technicians, politicians and policymakers need a clear-eyed understanding of the science and the tools we must deploy
to deal with these risks. Our ability to prevent a nuclear catastrophe will be based on
the skills and knowledge of key decision-makers and implementers. This excellent
book will help to facilitate that. It addresses a range of essential topics in the field.
Dr. Karam’s work as a scientist and as scientific advisor for the Counterterrorism
Division of the NYPD expanding and operating our rad/nuke interdiction system
provides an excellent background for this book. He is a respected health physicist
with experience in radiological and nuclear emergency preparedness and response.
He has extensive teaching experience at all levels of education and has published
widely for both technical and popular audiences. His professional skills have also
been recognized by his colleagues; he was asked to participate on committees for
the National Academy of Science, the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, and participated in several overseas missions on behalf of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Health Physics Society.
Seventy years into the nuclear era, no terrorist has successfully exploited the
potential of nuclear power. Why is this? Is it because we have developed strong
enough protections to prevent terrorists from succeeding? Is it because we have been
successful in convincing terrorists that they will not succeed and thus they do not
try? Is it because terrorists just are not interested or capable? We just do not know.
We do know that the threat will likely grow. And we know that technology alone
cannot prevent nuclear terrorism. It must be integrated into an overall strategy, and the
strategy must be adequately resourced. Preventing nuclear terrorism clearly requires
a multi-prong effort. The first is to minimize the use of the most threatening materials.
The second is to ensure that nuclear and radiological materials are secured at their
source. The third is to ensure that we have in place the necessary technology and
agreements to support recovery of nuclear or radiological material that may be stolen.