21.1 Preparing for Reoccupancy
265
General hazards will always exist; the goal should not be to eliminate general
hazards altogether but, rather, to attend to the most dangerous (so that nobody need
worry about death) and the most common (to minimize those who are injured) so
that the public can enter the area(s) safely.
21.1.2 Hazardous Materials (Non-radiological) Safety
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 a number of governmental agencies began sampling the air and the debris. Contrary to initial expectations, it was found that both of these media were contaminated with a large
number of hazardous materials, including asbestos, jet fuel, cleaning chemicals,
depleted uranium (used as counterweights for elevators), lead, chromium, nickel,
PCBs, dioxins, furans, silica dust, volatile organic compounds, and many others;
there were also combustion products from mostof these in the air and that settled out
on the ground and on the debris pile [2, 5]. The aftermath of a radiological attack is
likely to pose similar non-radiological health risks.
Awareness of and the ability to sample for similar risks was much lower at the
time of the nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; in addition, many of the
hazardous materials found in the World Trade Center buildings in 2001 were not
present in Hiroshima in 1945, so we have little direct information about hazardous
material risks in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. It seems reasonable to assume
that the mass fires will incinerate many (if not most) organic compounds, and that
the high temperatures of the fireball will vaporize the great majority of harmful
materials within a radius of a few to several hundred meters from the scene of the
detonation. At greater distances, however, the aftermath of a nuclear attack should be
assumed to pose similar non-radiological hazards as those following a radiological
attack. However, the wider radius of destruction (including broken glass) means that
many more buildings are likely to be affected by a nuclear attack with a concomitant
increase in the total volume of potentially hazardous materials to clean up.
Before reoccupancy can take place, it will be necessary to perform extensive
sampling to confirm that all of these hazardous materials have been cleared from
the remaining buildings. This will involve sampling for asbestos, chemical residues,
and other contaminants as well as looking for physical hazards (e.g. broken glass,
damaged structures, and the like).
21.1.3 Radiological Safety
Radiation dose rate and contamination levels will depend on many factors, including
the amount of radioactivity involved, the amount of time that has gone by and the halflife of the isotope(s) used, the amount of area contaminated, the types and energies
265
General hazards will always exist; the goal should not be to eliminate general
hazards altogether but, rather, to attend to the most dangerous (so that nobody need
worry about death) and the most common (to minimize those who are injured) so
that the public can enter the area(s) safely.
21.1.2 Hazardous Materials (Non-radiological) Safety
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 a number of governmental agencies began sampling the air and the debris. Contrary to initial expectations, it was found that both of these media were contaminated with a large
number of hazardous materials, including asbestos, jet fuel, cleaning chemicals,
depleted uranium (used as counterweights for elevators), lead, chromium, nickel,
PCBs, dioxins, furans, silica dust, volatile organic compounds, and many others;
there were also combustion products from mostof these in the air and that settled out
on the ground and on the debris pile [2, 5]. The aftermath of a radiological attack is
likely to pose similar non-radiological health risks.
Awareness of and the ability to sample for similar risks was much lower at the
time of the nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; in addition, many of the
hazardous materials found in the World Trade Center buildings in 2001 were not
present in Hiroshima in 1945, so we have little direct information about hazardous
material risks in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. It seems reasonable to assume
that the mass fires will incinerate many (if not most) organic compounds, and that
the high temperatures of the fireball will vaporize the great majority of harmful
materials within a radius of a few to several hundred meters from the scene of the
detonation. At greater distances, however, the aftermath of a nuclear attack should be
assumed to pose similar non-radiological hazards as those following a radiological
attack. However, the wider radius of destruction (including broken glass) means that
many more buildings are likely to be affected by a nuclear attack with a concomitant
increase in the total volume of potentially hazardous materials to clean up.
Before reoccupancy can take place, it will be necessary to perform extensive
sampling to confirm that all of these hazardous materials have been cleared from
the remaining buildings. This will involve sampling for asbestos, chemical residues,
and other contaminants as well as looking for physical hazards (e.g. broken glass,
damaged structures, and the like).
21.1.3 Radiological Safety
Radiation dose rate and contamination levels will depend on many factors, including
the amount of radioactivity involved, the amount of time that has gone by and the halflife of the isotope(s) used, the amount of area contaminated, the types and energies