19.5 Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
239
Consider a city attacked with a nuclear weapon. In many cities, large portions
of the subway tunnels are beneath the local water table; in cities that are located on
rivers, lakes, or the ocean these tunnels might be lower than sea (or lake or river)
level. The tunnels are kept dry by de-watering, and if the dewatering pumps lose
their source of power then the tunnels will begin slowly filling with water. If not
reversed, this water will eventually rise to the level of the local water table, flooding
the tunnels. If members of the public sought shelter in the train stations, they might
be trapped by the rising waters.
Meanwhile, the Mayor and their deputies, the heads of the Police, Fire, Health,
and Emergency Management agencies are unable to call in because their telephones
and radios are not working, the Mayor and Health Commissioner are unable to
make public service announcement instructing the population to seek shelter, the
public is unable to check websites for information and instructions, the Police and
Fire Commissioners are unable to remind their personnel to shelter in their stations
until the plume can be mapped, and what response efforts that exist are likely to be
disjointed and uncoordinated.
As the city begins to recover from the EMP effects it will be possible to begin to
be possible to establish communications with emergency responders, transmit public
service announcements, establish the Incident Command and Emergency Operations
Center, and to restore electrical power. If communications and power are restored
relatively quickly the impact on emergency response activities and public health will
be minor; if they are not restored for several hours or longer then it will likely hinder
response efforts.
This being said, it is also possible that the impact of EMP will not be as severe
as imagined. Computers, radios, electronics, and electrical systems of today are
different from those that existed a half-century ago and, while many of them have
been tested, none have been exposed to the EMP from an actual nuclear weapon.
Thus, it is possible that EMP will have only a moderate impact on the emergency
response. The point is that we do not know; that being the case it makes sense to
assume that EMP will knock out or disable at least some systems and to plan on how
to maintain operations in spite of that.
19.6 Logistics
The author participated in a multi-day nuclear terrorism exercise that postulated an
attack near, but not in New York City. As the exercise progressed, only a small part of
Manhattan was affected by fallout and no part of the city was directly affected by the
blast. In spite of this, as the exercise played out, the entire city began to experience
what can only be called “logistical effects” resulting from the explosion. In particular,
the high radiation dose rates and contamination levels from the plume were sufficient
to shut down the major roads, bridges, and tunnels leading into Manhattan from New
Jersey and southern New York. Without truck traffic, food shipments into New York
City were forced to cross Staten Island and the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, then to
239
Consider a city attacked with a nuclear weapon. In many cities, large portions
of the subway tunnels are beneath the local water table; in cities that are located on
rivers, lakes, or the ocean these tunnels might be lower than sea (or lake or river)
level. The tunnels are kept dry by de-watering, and if the dewatering pumps lose
their source of power then the tunnels will begin slowly filling with water. If not
reversed, this water will eventually rise to the level of the local water table, flooding
the tunnels. If members of the public sought shelter in the train stations, they might
be trapped by the rising waters.
Meanwhile, the Mayor and their deputies, the heads of the Police, Fire, Health,
and Emergency Management agencies are unable to call in because their telephones
and radios are not working, the Mayor and Health Commissioner are unable to
make public service announcement instructing the population to seek shelter, the
public is unable to check websites for information and instructions, the Police and
Fire Commissioners are unable to remind their personnel to shelter in their stations
until the plume can be mapped, and what response efforts that exist are likely to be
disjointed and uncoordinated.
As the city begins to recover from the EMP effects it will be possible to begin to
be possible to establish communications with emergency responders, transmit public
service announcements, establish the Incident Command and Emergency Operations
Center, and to restore electrical power. If communications and power are restored
relatively quickly the impact on emergency response activities and public health will
be minor; if they are not restored for several hours or longer then it will likely hinder
response efforts.
This being said, it is also possible that the impact of EMP will not be as severe
as imagined. Computers, radios, electronics, and electrical systems of today are
different from those that existed a half-century ago and, while many of them have
been tested, none have been exposed to the EMP from an actual nuclear weapon.
Thus, it is possible that EMP will have only a moderate impact on the emergency
response. The point is that we do not know; that being the case it makes sense to
assume that EMP will knock out or disable at least some systems and to plan on how
to maintain operations in spite of that.
19.6 Logistics
The author participated in a multi-day nuclear terrorism exercise that postulated an
attack near, but not in New York City. As the exercise progressed, only a small part of
Manhattan was affected by fallout and no part of the city was directly affected by the
blast. In spite of this, as the exercise played out, the entire city began to experience
what can only be called “logistical effects” resulting from the explosion. In particular,
the high radiation dose rates and contamination levels from the plume were sufficient
to shut down the major roads, bridges, and tunnels leading into Manhattan from New
Jersey and southern New York. Without truck traffic, food shipments into New York
City were forced to cross Staten Island and the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, then to