19.3 Lack of Public Preparation for Civil Defense
237
might die simply because they have never been told how to save their lives in the
immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack.
Part of the reason for the recent lack of civil defense training in the US is a
reluctance to risk frightening the public. The author participated in multiple telephone
conference calls involving local, state, and Federal government officials in which
some of these officials stated that, while they understand that the public could not
expect to receive civil defense instructions in time to be helpful following a nuclear
attack, they nevertheless advised against providing such information before an attack
occured for fear of frightening the public, under the assumption that the public will
assume any such instructions might indicate secret governmental knowledge that a
nuclear attack was imminent. Because of this, the American government has been, as
of this writing, unwilling to provide advance information on how to survive a nuclear
attack. Instead, the plan is to provide a public service announcement immediately
following an attack, assuming that government can be assembled and that radios and
transmission equipment are operational. For reasons outlined below, these might not
be good assumptions.
19.4 Continuity of Government
In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack it might not be evident which elected
and appointed officials are able to communicate, or are even alive. It might well
require several hours to determine if various officials have survived the attack, if they
are trapped by high levels of fallout, are injured, or have otherwise been rendered
incapable of participating meaningfully in governmental decision-making. Not only
that, but those officials who have not been killed by the attack might be unable
to travel because of debris and/or high radiation levels and might be unable to even
communicate due to EMP-inflicted damage. Thus, it might not be possible to quickly
assemble a working government capable of making decisions and managing the
emergency response.
Assembling the government might take attention away from the initial response
efforts, especially if communications and travel are difficult (or impossible). But
doing so is vitally important as those who head the major agencies and senior elected
officials are the ones with the broad view of the city as a whole and who are familiar
with attending to the needs of the city as a whole; these are the people who can
help knit together the efforts of the disparate agencies into a coherent response. In
addition, working at a slight remove from the scene, it is these people who are able
to keep in mind the longer-term goals and to help coordinate the various agencies’
response efforts to remain on a path towards those goals. For this reason, it is essential
to establish some form of government as quickly as possible after the attack takes
place.
This means that the city should develop multiple plans for contacting the core
governmental officials to determine who has survived, their location, and to bring
them together in person or by some other means (telephone, radio, etc.) so that they
237
might die simply because they have never been told how to save their lives in the
immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack.
Part of the reason for the recent lack of civil defense training in the US is a
reluctance to risk frightening the public. The author participated in multiple telephone
conference calls involving local, state, and Federal government officials in which
some of these officials stated that, while they understand that the public could not
expect to receive civil defense instructions in time to be helpful following a nuclear
attack, they nevertheless advised against providing such information before an attack
occured for fear of frightening the public, under the assumption that the public will
assume any such instructions might indicate secret governmental knowledge that a
nuclear attack was imminent. Because of this, the American government has been, as
of this writing, unwilling to provide advance information on how to survive a nuclear
attack. Instead, the plan is to provide a public service announcement immediately
following an attack, assuming that government can be assembled and that radios and
transmission equipment are operational. For reasons outlined below, these might not
be good assumptions.
19.4 Continuity of Government
In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack it might not be evident which elected
and appointed officials are able to communicate, or are even alive. It might well
require several hours to determine if various officials have survived the attack, if they
are trapped by high levels of fallout, are injured, or have otherwise been rendered
incapable of participating meaningfully in governmental decision-making. Not only
that, but those officials who have not been killed by the attack might be unable
to travel because of debris and/or high radiation levels and might be unable to even
communicate due to EMP-inflicted damage. Thus, it might not be possible to quickly
assemble a working government capable of making decisions and managing the
emergency response.
Assembling the government might take attention away from the initial response
efforts, especially if communications and travel are difficult (or impossible). But
doing so is vitally important as those who head the major agencies and senior elected
officials are the ones with the broad view of the city as a whole and who are familiar
with attending to the needs of the city as a whole; these are the people who can
help knit together the efforts of the disparate agencies into a coherent response. In
addition, working at a slight remove from the scene, it is these people who are able
to keep in mind the longer-term goals and to help coordinate the various agencies’
response efforts to remain on a path towards those goals. For this reason, it is essential
to establish some form of government as quickly as possible after the attack takes
place.
This means that the city should develop multiple plans for contacting the core
governmental officials to determine who has survived, their location, and to bring
them together in person or by some other means (telephone, radio, etc.) so that they