15.3 Health and Safety at the Scene
175
In the initial moments after an RDD explodes it might not be possible to try to
issue dosimeters or radiation detectors to those entering the area, and waiting for
dosimeters to arrive might delay rescue operations, costing lives among the critically
injured. In such cases it makes sense to send rescuers into save the lives of the
badly injured, rather than to let people suffer or die needlessly. If this happens, the
Incident Commander and/or Health and Safety Officer should keep track of each
person who enters during this phase of operations and the length of time they were
inside the Hot Zone so that a rudimentary dose reconstruction can be performed later.
If possible, video recordings can also be used to help to constrain the work locations
and the amount of time that passed during each entry. If staffing permits, the Incident
Commander should also consider removing from radiological work all of those who
made entries without wearing dosimetry until their dose can be estimated; these
people can be moved to other duties such as driving, logistics, air sampling, and
similar necessary duties outside of the Hot Zone.
15.4 Force Protection
It is not uncommon for terrorist groups to launch secondary attacks against emergency responders. These attacks can include setting explosives or placing snipers in
areas in which responders are expected to congregate or placing teams tasked with
further mayhem near the area attacked. Responding to an explosion is challenging;
responding to a radiological attack is even more so. Adding secondary explosions
and gunfire to the mix can make things even more difficult, especially if the primary
attack took place in a crowded location and the secondary attacks panic the public.
Not only that, but secondary attacks can deplete the number of emergency responders capable of assisting at the scene as well as disrupting all emergency response
activities. For this reason, force protection is an important aspect of response to any
terrorist attack.
Every military unit and law enforcement agency will have its own force protection
plan and it is not the intent here to recommend details of force protection plans; rather,
this will serve as a brief overview of some of the concerns that must be addressed by
those specializing in force protection.
An explosion in a restricted location with limited exits will cause members of the
public to rush towards those exits; these same exits also serve as choke points for
arriving emergency responders. These exits, then, are logical places for a secondary
attack to take place. A terrorist group can set secondary explosives and/or suicide
bombers at these locations, to be triggered remotely at an appropriate time, it can
station snipers and/or gunmen to target these locations, it can block these locations
to trap people where they are relatively easy targets, or a combination of these.
Multiple teams were involved in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai India; between
November 26 and 29 teams of terrorists carried out a dozen attacks against multiple
targets using guns, explosives, and setting fires [2]. But the concept of conducting
multiple simultaneous attacks pre-dates 2008; al Qaeda conducted simultaneous
175
In the initial moments after an RDD explodes it might not be possible to try to
issue dosimeters or radiation detectors to those entering the area, and waiting for
dosimeters to arrive might delay rescue operations, costing lives among the critically
injured. In such cases it makes sense to send rescuers into save the lives of the
badly injured, rather than to let people suffer or die needlessly. If this happens, the
Incident Commander and/or Health and Safety Officer should keep track of each
person who enters during this phase of operations and the length of time they were
inside the Hot Zone so that a rudimentary dose reconstruction can be performed later.
If possible, video recordings can also be used to help to constrain the work locations
and the amount of time that passed during each entry. If staffing permits, the Incident
Commander should also consider removing from radiological work all of those who
made entries without wearing dosimetry until their dose can be estimated; these
people can be moved to other duties such as driving, logistics, air sampling, and
similar necessary duties outside of the Hot Zone.
15.4 Force Protection
It is not uncommon for terrorist groups to launch secondary attacks against emergency responders. These attacks can include setting explosives or placing snipers in
areas in which responders are expected to congregate or placing teams tasked with
further mayhem near the area attacked. Responding to an explosion is challenging;
responding to a radiological attack is even more so. Adding secondary explosions
and gunfire to the mix can make things even more difficult, especially if the primary
attack took place in a crowded location and the secondary attacks panic the public.
Not only that, but secondary attacks can deplete the number of emergency responders capable of assisting at the scene as well as disrupting all emergency response
activities. For this reason, force protection is an important aspect of response to any
terrorist attack.
Every military unit and law enforcement agency will have its own force protection
plan and it is not the intent here to recommend details of force protection plans; rather,
this will serve as a brief overview of some of the concerns that must be addressed by
those specializing in force protection.
An explosion in a restricted location with limited exits will cause members of the
public to rush towards those exits; these same exits also serve as choke points for
arriving emergency responders. These exits, then, are logical places for a secondary
attack to take place. A terrorist group can set secondary explosives and/or suicide
bombers at these locations, to be triggered remotely at an appropriate time, it can
station snipers and/or gunmen to target these locations, it can block these locations
to trap people where they are relatively easy targets, or a combination of these.
Multiple teams were involved in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai India; between
November 26 and 29 teams of terrorists carried out a dozen attacks against multiple
targets using guns, explosives, and setting fires [2]. But the concept of conducting
multiple simultaneous attacks pre-dates 2008; al Qaeda conducted simultaneous