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15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
event. The “First 100 mins” plan is science-based, but was developed with input
from emergency responders from across the United States. The DHS anticipates that
the several tasks will need to be accomplished quickly:
1. Recognizing that a radiological attack has taken place
2. Informing appropriate agencies of the event and transmitting initial information
from the scene
3. Initiating life-saving operations and securing and managing the scene
4. Measuring and mapping radiation levels
5. Evacuating and monitoring members of the public.
Each of these tasks is, itself, comprised of one or more “tactics” used to help
accomplish the task. Some of these tasks will be described briefly here, others will
be discussed in greater depth in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
15.1.1 Recognizing that a Radiological Attack Has Taken
Place
It might not be immediately obvious that an attack has taken place. A covert attack,
for example, is not announced with an explosion and it might not be obvious that
an attack has even been launched; Alexander Litvenenko was administered Po-210,
but the fact that he had been poisoned with radioactivity was not recognized for
nearly a month, until the day before his death. But even an overt attack—a bomb—
might not be recognized as a “dirty bomb” unless some of the responders are using
radiation detectors. In some cities, police and fire vehicles carry radiation detectors
and elevated radiation levels would be noticed as soon as the first vehicle rolls up at
the scene; in other cities this is not the case.
No matter when the first radiation detector arrives on the scene, it still might
not be clear that a radiological attack has occurred. Consider, for example, a police
officer who rolls up at the scene of an explosion and his radiation detector alarms at a
radiation dose rate of, say, 0.50 µGy hr
−1 . Should the officer call away a radiological
emergency?
The answer is not as clear-cut as it might seem. For example:
• Is the radiation detector calibrated?
• What is the normal background radiation dose rate, not just in the city but in the
area of the explosion?
• Is there anything in the area that could cause the detector to read high (hospital,
veterinary clinic, granite structure(s), radio or radar transmitters, industrial
radiography, and so forth)?
One approach to “calling away” a radiological event is to require instrument readings to be a multiple of normal background readings (such a procedure, for example,
might call for an instrument reading of two or three times normal background radiation dose rates as indicating a radiological event has taken place). This is the standard
15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
event. The “First 100 mins” plan is science-based, but was developed with input
from emergency responders from across the United States. The DHS anticipates that
the several tasks will need to be accomplished quickly:
1. Recognizing that a radiological attack has taken place
2. Informing appropriate agencies of the event and transmitting initial information
from the scene
3. Initiating life-saving operations and securing and managing the scene
4. Measuring and mapping radiation levels
5. Evacuating and monitoring members of the public.
Each of these tasks is, itself, comprised of one or more “tactics” used to help
accomplish the task. Some of these tasks will be described briefly here, others will
be discussed in greater depth in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
15.1.1 Recognizing that a Radiological Attack Has Taken
Place
It might not be immediately obvious that an attack has taken place. A covert attack,
for example, is not announced with an explosion and it might not be obvious that
an attack has even been launched; Alexander Litvenenko was administered Po-210,
but the fact that he had been poisoned with radioactivity was not recognized for
nearly a month, until the day before his death. But even an overt attack—a bomb—
might not be recognized as a “dirty bomb” unless some of the responders are using
radiation detectors. In some cities, police and fire vehicles carry radiation detectors
and elevated radiation levels would be noticed as soon as the first vehicle rolls up at
the scene; in other cities this is not the case.
No matter when the first radiation detector arrives on the scene, it still might
not be clear that a radiological attack has occurred. Consider, for example, a police
officer who rolls up at the scene of an explosion and his radiation detector alarms at a
radiation dose rate of, say, 0.50 µGy hr
−1 . Should the officer call away a radiological
emergency?
The answer is not as clear-cut as it might seem. For example:
• Is the radiation detector calibrated?
• What is the normal background radiation dose rate, not just in the city but in the
area of the explosion?
• Is there anything in the area that could cause the detector to read high (hospital,
veterinary clinic, granite structure(s), radio or radar transmitters, industrial
radiography, and so forth)?
One approach to “calling away” a radiological event is to require instrument readings to be a multiple of normal background readings (such a procedure, for example,
might call for an instrument reading of two or three times normal background radiation dose rates as indicating a radiological event has taken place). This is the standard