13.7 Conducting Interdiction Surveys
145
Cities that have taken the time to perform comprehensive background radiation
surveys will identify some locations and/or facilities that tend to set off radiation
alarms; cities that have not had the opportunity to do so will have to adjudicate these
alarms as they occur. It is important that those performing interdiction surveys not be
distracted or fooled by innocent alarms, and that they be able to distinguish between
innocent alarms and events that require investigation.
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