138
13 Developing a Radiological and Nuclear Interdiction Network
should be released shortly after this book is published. These costs are conservatively
estimated to be at least 10% of the initial purchase cost each year (assuming an average
instrument lifespan of about 10 years), and likely more, so an initial investment of,
say, $5 million will require an annual expenditure of about $500,000 to pay for
maintenance, calibration, replacement, training, and other incidental costs [1]. As a
corollary, without budgeting for these regular—and continuing—expenditures, even
a robust radiological detection capability will dwindle to the point of being ineffectual
over a period of a decade or less. Interestingly, some large police departments have
elected to establish their own in-house calibration capabilities to help defray these
costs; the New York City Police Department, for example, spent about $250,000 to
set up a calibration laboratory, saving about $200,000–$300,000 in annual calibration
and repair costs [5].
13.6 Other Factors to Consider During
an Interdiction/Investigation
Consider a police officer walking or driving along a street when their radiation
detector alarms. They are able to determine that the radiation is coming from a
dumpster or trash bin and call for a Tier 2 responder with a RIID; upon arrival the
radionuclide is identified as Cs-137. What does this mean, and how should the police
respond to this discovery?
There is only one completely innocent explanation that readily comes to mind—
that a professional radiation worker disposed of an exempt Cs-137 source (perhaps
an instrument check source) into the trash, although this odds of this being the correct
explanation are small as so low-activity a source would be hard to detect at more
than a meter or so distance. Other explanations include:
• Illegal disposal of radioactive materials
• Theft and disposal of a soil density or other relatively low-activity source
• Theft and disposal of an industrial radiography or other relatively high-activity
source
• Worker who became contaminated in an accident
• Contamination from the construction of an RDD.
Most of the possibilities require a degree of follow-up investigation by either
regulatory or law enforcement agencies.
There is also the possibility that personnel working with radioactive sources might
develop radiation injuries or radiation sickness and might report to a local hospital to
seek medical care as was observed following the inadvertent theft of a high-activity
Co-60 source in Mexico in December 2013 [8]. Thus, if law enforcement and/or
counterterrorism agencies have intelligence of a possible pending radiological attack
they should consider asking local physicians, hospitals, and medical clinics to report
patients with suspicious injuries or illnesses that could be due to radiation exposure.
(Note: nuclear weapons materials are only weakly radioactive and are unlikely to
cause radiation burns or radiation sickness).
13 Developing a Radiological and Nuclear Interdiction Network
should be released shortly after this book is published. These costs are conservatively
estimated to be at least 10% of the initial purchase cost each year (assuming an average
instrument lifespan of about 10 years), and likely more, so an initial investment of,
say, $5 million will require an annual expenditure of about $500,000 to pay for
maintenance, calibration, replacement, training, and other incidental costs [1]. As a
corollary, without budgeting for these regular—and continuing—expenditures, even
a robust radiological detection capability will dwindle to the point of being ineffectual
over a period of a decade or less. Interestingly, some large police departments have
elected to establish their own in-house calibration capabilities to help defray these
costs; the New York City Police Department, for example, spent about $250,000 to
set up a calibration laboratory, saving about $200,000–$300,000 in annual calibration
and repair costs [5].
13.6 Other Factors to Consider During
an Interdiction/Investigation
Consider a police officer walking or driving along a street when their radiation
detector alarms. They are able to determine that the radiation is coming from a
dumpster or trash bin and call for a Tier 2 responder with a RIID; upon arrival the
radionuclide is identified as Cs-137. What does this mean, and how should the police
respond to this discovery?
There is only one completely innocent explanation that readily comes to mind—
that a professional radiation worker disposed of an exempt Cs-137 source (perhaps
an instrument check source) into the trash, although this odds of this being the correct
explanation are small as so low-activity a source would be hard to detect at more
than a meter or so distance. Other explanations include:
• Illegal disposal of radioactive materials
• Theft and disposal of a soil density or other relatively low-activity source
• Theft and disposal of an industrial radiography or other relatively high-activity
source
• Worker who became contaminated in an accident
• Contamination from the construction of an RDD.
Most of the possibilities require a degree of follow-up investigation by either
regulatory or law enforcement agencies.
There is also the possibility that personnel working with radioactive sources might
develop radiation injuries or radiation sickness and might report to a local hospital to
seek medical care as was observed following the inadvertent theft of a high-activity
Co-60 source in Mexico in December 2013 [8]. Thus, if law enforcement and/or
counterterrorism agencies have intelligence of a possible pending radiological attack
they should consider asking local physicians, hospitals, and medical clinics to report
patients with suspicious injuries or illnesses that could be due to radiation exposure.
(Note: nuclear weapons materials are only weakly radioactive and are unlikely to
cause radiation burns or radiation sickness).