12.3 Psycho-Social
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The last aspect to be discussed here involves evacuations, both those ordered by
the government and those undertaken by worried citizens who lack the ability to asses
the risks they face on their own. In the aftermath of the 1979 accident at Three Mile
Island over 40,000 persons evacuated the area (although the evacuation order should
have affected only a few thousand); over 300,000 were required to evacuate following
the Chernobyl accident and a similar number evacuated from the areas affected by
the Fukushima fallout plume in the weeks after that accident. These evacuations can
pose a risk in and of themselves, and the risk increases as the number of evacuees
increases.
Another consideration is that, in the event of a nuclear attack, the fallout plume
will begin settling to the ground fairly quickly and it will be dangerously radioactive,
unlike the plume from a nuclear reactor accident. People trying to flee as their immediate reaction to witnessing an attack do not know where the plume will settle to the
ground; in the absence of good information they might well end up fleeing into the
plume or along the axis of the plume. Thus, it is possible that those following their
instinctive inclination to self-evacuate rather than sheltering might end up increasing
their radiation exposure.
12.4 Government
Government is never so badly needed as in the aftermath of a terrible event. Emergency responders look to government for direction and to help them to prioritize a
multitude of tasks that need to be accomplished; the public looks to government to
tell them what has happened and to advise them as to how to stay safe; governmental
agencies look to their elected officials to (hopefully) weld them together into an
effective force to restore order to the city and to protect the citizens as best they can.
“The public will respond to strong, effective leadership. People need to believe that
decisions made are rational….” [2]. But in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion,
government might not be able to act at all, let alone effectively, for some time.
During one meeting this author attended a representative from the Mayor’s office
indicated the expectation that the government would begin to function coherently in
less than an hour after a nuclear attack, including issuing public service announcements instructing the population to seek shelter. In fact, it might take several hours
to even have a good understanding of which government officials are even alive,
let alone able to convene to begin leading the response efforts or informing the public
as to what has taken place. Once government has assembled, it will be necessary for
the various agencies—and the various levels—of government to attempt to work in
concert with one another rather than competing for resources and responsibilities.
The fact is that a rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of a
nuclear attack is both essential, and likely to be nearly impossible to carry out. For
this reason, it is equally essential that government at all levels develop emergency
response plans and to conduct table top and field exercises to practice these plans with
the relevant agencies at all levels of government. This process will help to identify
121
The last aspect to be discussed here involves evacuations, both those ordered by
the government and those undertaken by worried citizens who lack the ability to asses
the risks they face on their own. In the aftermath of the 1979 accident at Three Mile
Island over 40,000 persons evacuated the area (although the evacuation order should
have affected only a few thousand); over 300,000 were required to evacuate following
the Chernobyl accident and a similar number evacuated from the areas affected by
the Fukushima fallout plume in the weeks after that accident. These evacuations can
pose a risk in and of themselves, and the risk increases as the number of evacuees
increases.
Another consideration is that, in the event of a nuclear attack, the fallout plume
will begin settling to the ground fairly quickly and it will be dangerously radioactive,
unlike the plume from a nuclear reactor accident. People trying to flee as their immediate reaction to witnessing an attack do not know where the plume will settle to the
ground; in the absence of good information they might well end up fleeing into the
plume or along the axis of the plume. Thus, it is possible that those following their
instinctive inclination to self-evacuate rather than sheltering might end up increasing
their radiation exposure.
12.4 Government
Government is never so badly needed as in the aftermath of a terrible event. Emergency responders look to government for direction and to help them to prioritize a
multitude of tasks that need to be accomplished; the public looks to government to
tell them what has happened and to advise them as to how to stay safe; governmental
agencies look to their elected officials to (hopefully) weld them together into an
effective force to restore order to the city and to protect the citizens as best they can.
“The public will respond to strong, effective leadership. People need to believe that
decisions made are rational….” [2]. But in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion,
government might not be able to act at all, let alone effectively, for some time.
During one meeting this author attended a representative from the Mayor’s office
indicated the expectation that the government would begin to function coherently in
less than an hour after a nuclear attack, including issuing public service announcements instructing the population to seek shelter. In fact, it might take several hours
to even have a good understanding of which government officials are even alive,
let alone able to convene to begin leading the response efforts or informing the public
as to what has taken place. Once government has assembled, it will be necessary for
the various agencies—and the various levels—of government to attempt to work in
concert with one another rather than competing for resources and responsibilities.
The fact is that a rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of a
nuclear attack is both essential, and likely to be nearly impossible to carry out. For
this reason, it is equally essential that government at all levels develop emergency
response plans and to conduct table top and field exercises to practice these plans with
the relevant agencies at all levels of government. This process will help to identify