12.1 Public Health
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12.1.4 Food, Water, Shelter, Security
In an April 2017 exercise in which the author was a participant, a (simulated) nuclear
weapon was detonated near New York City. Over the course of a three-day multiagency exercise that included personnel from a number of major NYC agencies and
representatives from multiple local, state, and national agencies the participants spent
the time in discussion, working through the major issues that would be posed by such
an attack and how each of the participants would work to resolve them. Among the
surprises noted by many participants were the difficulty of attending to so many
issues that had little to do with radiation exposure—specifically, providing for food,
water, shelter, and security for those in even those parts of the city not affected by
the blast or the fallout plume [6]. In addition, given the likely need to evacuate large
parts of the city, a great deal of time was spent in discussing the optimum time to
evacuate areas within the fallout plume as well as which other parts of the city might
require evacuation.
Among the problems discussed was that the blast itself and the accompanying
EMP might knock out water supplies to much of the city; the crater and underground
shock wave are likely to rupture a large number of water mains and the EMP can also
damage the city’s electrical grid as well as directly affecting the pumps needed to
raise water to the top floors of high-rise buildings and to de-water subway tunnels. In
addition, the loss of utilities can also interfere with the operation of airport and port
facilities, leading to loss of ability to bring in supplies. This would be exacerbated
by the possible loss (in the case of New York City) of major bridges and tunnels;
even if they are not destroyed or collapsed by the blast itself, it would be unwise to
use them until inspected and their structural integrity assured. Temporarily lacking
the ability to bring in food and water (as well as medical and other supplies) by air,
sea, or land would pose a grave short-term public health concern until access via one
or more of these avenues is restored. Not only that, but the same possible loss of
structural integrity that might limit the movement of supplies into the city could also
limit the ability to evacuate the public. The George Washington Bridge, for example,
has a main span that is 110 m in length and is about 36 m in width for a usable area
of about 6600 m
2 for the bridge’s two levels. If the bridge is packed with people
standing about ½ m apart (four people per square meter) with people weighing an
average of 90 kg apiece then the weight of people on the bridge’s main span will be
about 2.4 million kg or 2400 tons, the weight of about 1000 cars. The other major
bridges from Manhattan to Brooklyn would suffer from similar loading it would
be unwise to permit so many people—and so much weight—onto a bridge whose
structural integrity was not certain; loading would not be a concern in any of the
four major tunnels (Hudson, Lincoln, Battery, and Midtown), but we would not want
them to develop leaks when filled with evacuees.
Those who cannot evacuate must shelter, preferably in their homes. Unfortunately,
in many major cities (of which NYC is, perhaps, an extreme example), many residents
do not necessarily maintain large stocks of food and drink in their homes, relying
instead on food and grocery deliveries, food stands, restaurants, and frequent small
115
12.1.4 Food, Water, Shelter, Security
In an April 2017 exercise in which the author was a participant, a (simulated) nuclear
weapon was detonated near New York City. Over the course of a three-day multiagency exercise that included personnel from a number of major NYC agencies and
representatives from multiple local, state, and national agencies the participants spent
the time in discussion, working through the major issues that would be posed by such
an attack and how each of the participants would work to resolve them. Among the
surprises noted by many participants were the difficulty of attending to so many
issues that had little to do with radiation exposure—specifically, providing for food,
water, shelter, and security for those in even those parts of the city not affected by
the blast or the fallout plume [6]. In addition, given the likely need to evacuate large
parts of the city, a great deal of time was spent in discussing the optimum time to
evacuate areas within the fallout plume as well as which other parts of the city might
require evacuation.
Among the problems discussed was that the blast itself and the accompanying
EMP might knock out water supplies to much of the city; the crater and underground
shock wave are likely to rupture a large number of water mains and the EMP can also
damage the city’s electrical grid as well as directly affecting the pumps needed to
raise water to the top floors of high-rise buildings and to de-water subway tunnels. In
addition, the loss of utilities can also interfere with the operation of airport and port
facilities, leading to loss of ability to bring in supplies. This would be exacerbated
by the possible loss (in the case of New York City) of major bridges and tunnels;
even if they are not destroyed or collapsed by the blast itself, it would be unwise to
use them until inspected and their structural integrity assured. Temporarily lacking
the ability to bring in food and water (as well as medical and other supplies) by air,
sea, or land would pose a grave short-term public health concern until access via one
or more of these avenues is restored. Not only that, but the same possible loss of
structural integrity that might limit the movement of supplies into the city could also
limit the ability to evacuate the public. The George Washington Bridge, for example,
has a main span that is 110 m in length and is about 36 m in width for a usable area
of about 6600 m
2 for the bridge’s two levels. If the bridge is packed with people
standing about ½ m apart (four people per square meter) with people weighing an
average of 90 kg apiece then the weight of people on the bridge’s main span will be
about 2.4 million kg or 2400 tons, the weight of about 1000 cars. The other major
bridges from Manhattan to Brooklyn would suffer from similar loading it would
be unwise to permit so many people—and so much weight—onto a bridge whose
structural integrity was not certain; loading would not be a concern in any of the
four major tunnels (Hudson, Lincoln, Battery, and Midtown), but we would not want
them to develop leaks when filled with evacuees.
Those who cannot evacuate must shelter, preferably in their homes. Unfortunately,
in many major cities (of which NYC is, perhaps, an extreme example), many residents
do not necessarily maintain large stocks of food and drink in their homes, relying
instead on food and grocery deliveries, food stands, restaurants, and frequent small