The lack of practical experience of culturing mussels in exposed environments
precludes estimating effects of economic risks.
11.7 Ownership Issues
11.7.1 Modes of Cooperation
The relevant government policy as a central framing condition must be part of any
analysis of likely management scenarios for an integrated wind energy-mariculture
facility. In the North Sea area, the here presented concept is ahead of the current
institutionalized regulatory system. Indeed, a systematic regulation addressing this
multi-use concept in the context of industry support is yet lacking. While current
legislation may preclude concurrent economic activity within offshore wind farms,
that likely can be interpreted as a de facto law absent any regulatory consideration
on this multi-use issue. However, given the strong push for spatial efficiency and
multi-use concepts in the maritime waters in the EU and elsewhere (Krause et al.
2003; Lutges and Holzfuss 2006), it can be expected that more comprehensive
regulatory frameworks will develop in due time. Krause et al. (2011) identified
three likely avenues under which an integrated mariculture-wind energy facility
may be organized. These are not exhaustive, or mutually exclusive from each other,
but rather provide a straightforward method for categorizing potential outcomes. In
the following, a brief synopsis of these three different ownership scenarios of
multi-use in the offshore realm is provided.
11.7.1.1 Sole Owner
At the extreme end, a sole owner situation could be envisaged, in which a multiple
use business plan could be enacted by a sole company without any cooperation.
This set-up may accommodate especially the interests of the wind energy producers, who would have easier access to the financial resources needed. In view of
the current complexity of drafting and following a contract with an outside firm
makes this sole owner approach highly appealing. Indeed, from an economic point
of view, governance structures that have better transaction cost economizing
properties are preferable. Additionally, transaction cost economics suggests that full
vertical integration completely resolves issues related to hold-ups and misaligned
incentives (Williamson 1979, 1981; Johnson and Houston 2000).
Undeniably, the potential for further net revenue via mariculture may be alluring
to a wind energy firm, especially in the light that the area occupied by wind turbines
is roughly 1–3% of the total area of an offshore wind farm (Mee 2006). Economies
of scope may act thus as a financial catalyst, i.e. simultaneously producing two
products with a lower average cost than if undertaken separately.
336
B.H. Buck et al.
precludes estimating effects of economic risks.
11.7 Ownership Issues
11.7.1 Modes of Cooperation
The relevant government policy as a central framing condition must be part of any
analysis of likely management scenarios for an integrated wind energy-mariculture
facility. In the North Sea area, the here presented concept is ahead of the current
institutionalized regulatory system. Indeed, a systematic regulation addressing this
multi-use concept in the context of industry support is yet lacking. While current
legislation may preclude concurrent economic activity within offshore wind farms,
that likely can be interpreted as a de facto law absent any regulatory consideration
on this multi-use issue. However, given the strong push for spatial efficiency and
multi-use concepts in the maritime waters in the EU and elsewhere (Krause et al.
2003; Lutges and Holzfuss 2006), it can be expected that more comprehensive
regulatory frameworks will develop in due time. Krause et al. (2011) identified
three likely avenues under which an integrated mariculture-wind energy facility
may be organized. These are not exhaustive, or mutually exclusive from each other,
but rather provide a straightforward method for categorizing potential outcomes. In
the following, a brief synopsis of these three different ownership scenarios of
multi-use in the offshore realm is provided.
11.7.1.1 Sole Owner
At the extreme end, a sole owner situation could be envisaged, in which a multiple
use business plan could be enacted by a sole company without any cooperation.
This set-up may accommodate especially the interests of the wind energy producers, who would have easier access to the financial resources needed. In view of
the current complexity of drafting and following a contract with an outside firm
makes this sole owner approach highly appealing. Indeed, from an economic point
of view, governance structures that have better transaction cost economizing
properties are preferable. Additionally, transaction cost economics suggests that full
vertical integration completely resolves issues related to hold-ups and misaligned
incentives (Williamson 1979, 1981; Johnson and Houston 2000).
Undeniably, the potential for further net revenue via mariculture may be alluring
to a wind energy firm, especially in the light that the area occupied by wind turbines
is roughly 1–3% of the total area of an offshore wind farm (Mee 2006). Economies
of scope may act thus as a financial catalyst, i.e. simultaneously producing two
products with a lower average cost than if undertaken separately.
336
B.H. Buck et al.