34
di fisico-chimica). Neither Ėtienne Dumouchel (1773–1840), who taught astronomy
until 1831, nor his pupil Francesco De Vico (1805–48) produced an astronomy
manual, but the latter’s writings demonstrate his scope as a researcher and lecturer.
All these treatises consistently deal with science on an empirical basis, excluding
any speculative digression into ontology or philosophical cosmology. In all, a distinction is drawn between the latter and a scientific cosmology obtained by the
generalization of data. For example, Pianciani (1864) writes:
These two properties, extension and resistance, are therefore (at least to us) the first and
essential properties of matter. At least I say to us: because if anyone would say that matter
itself is anything but what it appears to be to us, I would not waste my time with them. The
physicist is content to study the material substance, such as God makes known to us by
means of our organs of sense; it is not science if it is not supported by experience. And if
anyone does not feel obliged to prove the existence of these bodies, he has moved into the
realm of transcendental research and the essences of things not subject to the senses. For the
same reason, we will refrain from any investigation of the nature of space—pure extension,
necessarily unique, necessarily threefold in its dimensions … that ocean in which the ingenious speculations of so many have been wrecked.
Statements such as this not only expressed the need to conform to the established
models for scientific discourse, to maintain credibility in “secular” science, and to
allow the use of these works in schools other than those of the Society or other religious orders. In essence they were an interior intellectual garb. Pianciani is a notable
example of the fact that the teachers of the Roman College adopted it also in strongly
traditionalist circles: for many years he was a member of the Academy of Catholic
Religion, an unofficial organ of the Papal States and seat of a traditionalism that was
more typically contrary to the philosophical implications of modern science. He
spoke only on historical-antiquarian themes, not taking a position toward the
repeated attacks in the Academy on atomism (in which he believed) and “mechanistic” physiology, even when it was separated from the question of the existence of
spiritual substances. (His silence was too systematic to be merely by chance; see
Baldini 2000.)
This separation of scientific theories from those of the speculative tradition of
scholastic cosmology underlies the entire development of scientific research in the
Roman College in the early and middle nineteenth centuries. The most obvious
example is, of course, Secchi’s L’unità delle forze fisichi (The Unity of Physical
Forces), which does not treat “unity” in a metaphysical sense but as the reducibility
of physical forces to the mechanical theory of heat, an internal hypothesis within the
scope of sensory experience, in line with falsifiable principles (and which was, in
fact, eventually falsified). Even more emblematic examples can be found in several
works by Pianciani. His Saggi filosofici (Philosophical Essays, 1855) and the Nuovi
saggi filosofici (New Philosophical Essays, 1856) dealt with classical themes such
as first principles, the general notion of truth, or the existence of the soul and its
relationship with the body. He gave orthodox solutions to these questions, but using
scientific arguments, not scholastic ones. In Cosmogonia naturale comparata col
Genesi (Natural Cosmogony Compared with Genesis, 1862), the exegetical part
often refers to the world of experience following a cosmology substantially different from “philosophical” cosmology, based instead on astrophysics and historical
U. Baldini
di fisico-chimica). Neither Ėtienne Dumouchel (1773–1840), who taught astronomy
until 1831, nor his pupil Francesco De Vico (1805–48) produced an astronomy
manual, but the latter’s writings demonstrate his scope as a researcher and lecturer.
All these treatises consistently deal with science on an empirical basis, excluding
any speculative digression into ontology or philosophical cosmology. In all, a distinction is drawn between the latter and a scientific cosmology obtained by the
generalization of data. For example, Pianciani (1864) writes:
These two properties, extension and resistance, are therefore (at least to us) the first and
essential properties of matter. At least I say to us: because if anyone would say that matter
itself is anything but what it appears to be to us, I would not waste my time with them. The
physicist is content to study the material substance, such as God makes known to us by
means of our organs of sense; it is not science if it is not supported by experience. And if
anyone does not feel obliged to prove the existence of these bodies, he has moved into the
realm of transcendental research and the essences of things not subject to the senses. For the
same reason, we will refrain from any investigation of the nature of space—pure extension,
necessarily unique, necessarily threefold in its dimensions … that ocean in which the ingenious speculations of so many have been wrecked.
Statements such as this not only expressed the need to conform to the established
models for scientific discourse, to maintain credibility in “secular” science, and to
allow the use of these works in schools other than those of the Society or other religious orders. In essence they were an interior intellectual garb. Pianciani is a notable
example of the fact that the teachers of the Roman College adopted it also in strongly
traditionalist circles: for many years he was a member of the Academy of Catholic
Religion, an unofficial organ of the Papal States and seat of a traditionalism that was
more typically contrary to the philosophical implications of modern science. He
spoke only on historical-antiquarian themes, not taking a position toward the
repeated attacks in the Academy on atomism (in which he believed) and “mechanistic” physiology, even when it was separated from the question of the existence of
spiritual substances. (His silence was too systematic to be merely by chance; see
Baldini 2000.)
This separation of scientific theories from those of the speculative tradition of
scholastic cosmology underlies the entire development of scientific research in the
Roman College in the early and middle nineteenth centuries. The most obvious
example is, of course, Secchi’s L’unità delle forze fisichi (The Unity of Physical
Forces), which does not treat “unity” in a metaphysical sense but as the reducibility
of physical forces to the mechanical theory of heat, an internal hypothesis within the
scope of sensory experience, in line with falsifiable principles (and which was, in
fact, eventually falsified). Even more emblematic examples can be found in several
works by Pianciani. His Saggi filosofici (Philosophical Essays, 1855) and the Nuovi
saggi filosofici (New Philosophical Essays, 1856) dealt with classical themes such
as first principles, the general notion of truth, or the existence of the soul and its
relationship with the body. He gave orthodox solutions to these questions, but using
scientific arguments, not scholastic ones. In Cosmogonia naturale comparata col
Genesi (Natural Cosmogony Compared with Genesis, 1862), the exegetical part
often refers to the world of experience following a cosmology substantially different from “philosophical” cosmology, based instead on astrophysics and historical
U. Baldini