analysis allows us to move beyond glib statements about ‘green growth’ and ‘win–
win solutions’ to reveal the conflicts, trade-offs and compromises that are implied
by a fundamental restructuring of an economy and the relations of power which
will determine which pathway is chosen. The ‘incumbent’ regime of existing actors
and interests that benefit from ongoing reliance on a fossil fuel economy and that
have played such a decisive role in the development of capitalism over the last
century and beyond will not give up their position easily. Nor in all likelihood
will states that depend indirectly on the revenues generated by these actors and
that have, so far, shown little appetite for initiating structural change. Since energy
use, in particular, is closely correlated with growth, there is tremendous political
sensitivity around proposals to transform its provision and distribution. So what
will it take politically to create powerful coalitions of the ‘winning’ and the ‘willing’
that are able to shift the balance of political and economic power in favour of those
that stand to benefit from a low-carbon economy? What historical precedents are
there for such reorganizations in production and political power, and what can we
learn from them? Which historical, political and economic conditions appear to
be necessary for such change to occur and, more importantly, can they be replicated
given the current alignments of power in the global economy?
Lessons from history?
History teaches us how quickly industrial transformations occur through waves of technological
development, such as the introduction of electricity, based on innovation and discovery.
(Stern, 2014)
In order to inform the discussion below about the contemporary politics of green
transformation, I briefly refer to a series of pertinent historical examples so as to
reveal the confluence of forces that appear to be critical to enabling large-scale
deliberate sociotechnical, economic and political change. This builds on previous
histories of transitions (Correlje and Verbong, 2004; Geels, 2005b, 2006; Fouquet
and Pearson, 2012; Grubler, 2012; Pearson and Foxon, 2012), which emphasize
factors such as the role of prices, science and human capital (Allen, 2012), or, as
in the quote above from Nicolas Stern, ‘innovation and discovery’. However, rather
than view the technological and the social context which supported a particular
sociotechnical transition in isolation, the emphasis here is on identifying the under -
lying political, historical and material factors that enable large-scale transformations
to take place which will inform our understanding of contemporary developments.
This means being attentive to prevailing systemic conditions and alignments of
power given, for example, that ‘The transition to coal was punctuated by the Atlantic
social revolutions and the Napoleonic wars; the transition to oil by two great wars
and a mighty world depression’ (Moore, 2009, p6), underscoring the links between
energy, production and world order (Rupert, 1995). As well as reading politically
the significance of these types of examples in terms of the actors and interests that
propelled them, the analysis will also reflect on the extent to which they have
contemporary resonance and application.
Green transformations in capitalism 71
win solutions’ to reveal the conflicts, trade-offs and compromises that are implied
by a fundamental restructuring of an economy and the relations of power which
will determine which pathway is chosen. The ‘incumbent’ regime of existing actors
and interests that benefit from ongoing reliance on a fossil fuel economy and that
have played such a decisive role in the development of capitalism over the last
century and beyond will not give up their position easily. Nor in all likelihood
will states that depend indirectly on the revenues generated by these actors and
that have, so far, shown little appetite for initiating structural change. Since energy
use, in particular, is closely correlated with growth, there is tremendous political
sensitivity around proposals to transform its provision and distribution. So what
will it take politically to create powerful coalitions of the ‘winning’ and the ‘willing’
that are able to shift the balance of political and economic power in favour of those
that stand to benefit from a low-carbon economy? What historical precedents are
there for such reorganizations in production and political power, and what can we
learn from them? Which historical, political and economic conditions appear to
be necessary for such change to occur and, more importantly, can they be replicated
given the current alignments of power in the global economy?
Lessons from history?
History teaches us how quickly industrial transformations occur through waves of technological
development, such as the introduction of electricity, based on innovation and discovery.
(Stern, 2014)
In order to inform the discussion below about the contemporary politics of green
transformation, I briefly refer to a series of pertinent historical examples so as to
reveal the confluence of forces that appear to be critical to enabling large-scale
deliberate sociotechnical, economic and political change. This builds on previous
histories of transitions (Correlje and Verbong, 2004; Geels, 2005b, 2006; Fouquet
and Pearson, 2012; Grubler, 2012; Pearson and Foxon, 2012), which emphasize
factors such as the role of prices, science and human capital (Allen, 2012), or, as
in the quote above from Nicolas Stern, ‘innovation and discovery’. However, rather
than view the technological and the social context which supported a particular
sociotechnical transition in isolation, the emphasis here is on identifying the under -
lying political, historical and material factors that enable large-scale transformations
to take place which will inform our understanding of contemporary developments.
This means being attentive to prevailing systemic conditions and alignments of
power given, for example, that ‘The transition to coal was punctuated by the Atlantic
social revolutions and the Napoleonic wars; the transition to oil by two great wars
and a mighty world depression’ (Moore, 2009, p6), underscoring the links between
energy, production and world order (Rupert, 1995). As well as reading politically
the significance of these types of examples in terms of the actors and interests that
propelled them, the analysis will also reflect on the extent to which they have
contemporary resonance and application.
Green transformations in capitalism 71