That pattern has been especially pronounced in the USA, and while it may be
less prevalent in the UK and EU, it is far from absent (Hansard, 2014). Climate
sceptics can be found in the UK government as well as in corporations. A careful
reading of the four successive reports from the IPCC suggest that while it is not
possible to prove beyond all possible doubt that anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases are destabilizing the earth’s climate, the evidential base has
strengthened and the conclusions of the IPCC reports have become increasingly
robust, though also reported in increasingly cautious and qualified ways (IPCC,
undated).
The task of definitely proving that anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases
are responsible for observable changes to climate and weather would require having
access to a multiplicity of ‘earths’ upon which experiments could be performed,
but that is obviously absurd. Given that such ‘proof’ is unobtainable, and given
that the Earth is an open not a closed system, there will always be residual uncer -
tainties about the dynamics of global climates and the impacts of human activities.
The costs of failing to diminish anthropogenic climate change may nonetheless be
unsustainable. If we were to wait until the uncertainties had been substantially
diminished, very substantial harm may be a consequence, and by then adverse effects
might be irreversible.
Conclusions
The discussion has argued that while scientific knowledge about (un)sustainable
practices and technologies provides essential components for any adequate understanding of the need for green transformational changes, and of what will be required
to achieve such changes, scientific knowledge can never on its own be sufficient.
Moreover, selective portrayals, as well as downright misrepresentations, of what is
known and what is uncertain in our understandings are being deployed to delay
or prevent green transformational changes. If scientific knowledge and expertise
are constructively and legitimately to contribute to green transformational
changes, they can do so only if certain social, cultural and political conditions are
satisfied.
The claim that ‘knowledge is power’ has often been attributed to both Francis
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes (Bacon, 1597; Hobbes 1651). The assertion is,
however, slightly misleading. It is often the case that ignorance entails powerlessness,
and while knowledge might be necessary for power, it is certainly not sufficient.
If scientific knowledge and expertise are to contribute to green transformations,
or even just to enhance sustainability, the knowledge along with the attendant
uncertainties and the exercise of expertise, all need to be in the public domain.
Research has shown that power can often be exercised by controlling the creation,
diffusion and portrayals of scientific evidence. Moreover, power has often been
exercised in scientific-seeming deliberations in part by concealing the fact that power
was being exercised, which was possible only if those deliberations were conducted
secretively in closed meetings, with some or all of the evidence excluded from the
52 Erik Millstone
less prevalent in the UK and EU, it is far from absent (Hansard, 2014). Climate
sceptics can be found in the UK government as well as in corporations. A careful
reading of the four successive reports from the IPCC suggest that while it is not
possible to prove beyond all possible doubt that anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases are destabilizing the earth’s climate, the evidential base has
strengthened and the conclusions of the IPCC reports have become increasingly
robust, though also reported in increasingly cautious and qualified ways (IPCC,
undated).
The task of definitely proving that anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases
are responsible for observable changes to climate and weather would require having
access to a multiplicity of ‘earths’ upon which experiments could be performed,
but that is obviously absurd. Given that such ‘proof’ is unobtainable, and given
that the Earth is an open not a closed system, there will always be residual uncer -
tainties about the dynamics of global climates and the impacts of human activities.
The costs of failing to diminish anthropogenic climate change may nonetheless be
unsustainable. If we were to wait until the uncertainties had been substantially
diminished, very substantial harm may be a consequence, and by then adverse effects
might be irreversible.
Conclusions
The discussion has argued that while scientific knowledge about (un)sustainable
practices and technologies provides essential components for any adequate understanding of the need for green transformational changes, and of what will be required
to achieve such changes, scientific knowledge can never on its own be sufficient.
Moreover, selective portrayals, as well as downright misrepresentations, of what is
known and what is uncertain in our understandings are being deployed to delay
or prevent green transformational changes. If scientific knowledge and expertise
are constructively and legitimately to contribute to green transformational
changes, they can do so only if certain social, cultural and political conditions are
satisfied.
The claim that ‘knowledge is power’ has often been attributed to both Francis
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes (Bacon, 1597; Hobbes 1651). The assertion is,
however, slightly misleading. It is often the case that ignorance entails powerlessness,
and while knowledge might be necessary for power, it is certainly not sufficient.
If scientific knowledge and expertise are to contribute to green transformations,
or even just to enhance sustainability, the knowledge along with the attendant
uncertainties and the exercise of expertise, all need to be in the public domain.
Research has shown that power can often be exercised by controlling the creation,
diffusion and portrayals of scientific evidence. Moreover, power has often been
exercised in scientific-seeming deliberations in part by concealing the fact that power
was being exercised, which was possible only if those deliberations were conducted
secretively in closed meetings, with some or all of the evidence excluded from the
52 Erik Millstone