far too reliant on assumptions that were unacknowledged, ideologically driven and
empirically unsubstantiated. Moreover, the data available as inputs to the model
were a minute fraction of what the model required for reliability and precision.
The authors of Limits subsequently acknowledged that they had only about ‘0.1
per cent of the data on the variables required to construct a satisfactory world model’
(Freeman, 1973, p8), yet the modellers failed to explore the sensitivity of their
forecasts to changes in the data or their assumptions or the equations and coefficients
with which those assumptions were modelled. Instead of highlighting ranges of
possibilities and uncertainties, they published relatively precise forecasts, and were
shocked when their predictions were first contested and subsequently refuted.
Institutionalized policy responses
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, policy-makers responded to the growing recog -
nition that some industrial practices were unsustainable by establishing regulatory
institutions and regimes to control those practices, although there were often
conflicts over whether regulations were necessary and what form they should
take. A range of instruments were used such as technology standards (e.g. catalytic
converters in vehicle exhaust systems and flue-gas desulphurization in coalfired power stations) and quantitative emissions limits to, or concentrations in, for
example, soil, air, water and food. More recently, economic ‘market-based’ instru -
ments such as tradable emissions permits and ‘carbon-pricing’ have been favoured
by corporations and governments. The selection of particular technologies, emis -
sions or pollution levels has typically been justified by reference to expert scientific
advice. Expert panels have often been willing to recommend, for example,
maximum concentrations or doses, even in the absence of evidence of clear thres -
holds. A few toxicological and eco-toxicological thresholds have been measured,
in respect of some identified effects, but more frequently thresholds have been
presumed rather than discovered (Howard, 2003; US EPA, undated). This is
important because concepts such as ecological ‘boundaries’ or environmental
‘limits’ presume that there are specific thresholds, and that they can be, and often
have been, located, although they are often hard to locate and may be even be
chimerical.
Policy-makers, powerful stakeholders and their chosen expert advisers developed
a vocabulary of scientific-seeming concepts to refer to those standards (Gillespie
et al., 1979; Jasanoff, 1990; Majone, 1996). Concepts such as ‘an acceptable daily
intake’, ‘a recommended daily allowance’, ‘a maximum residue level’, ‘a maximum
tolerated dose’ and ‘a threshold limit value’ were coined and regularly invoked,
initially in the USA, but subsequently in Europe and elsewhere. More recently,
quantitative targets have been seen as not just attractive to, but essential for,
managerialist and audit cultures.
Often particular standards were portrayed as justified by scientific evidence and
analysis and as being sufficient to deliver sustainability, or at least significantly to
Invoking ‘science’ in green transformations 41
empirically unsubstantiated. Moreover, the data available as inputs to the model
were a minute fraction of what the model required for reliability and precision.
The authors of Limits subsequently acknowledged that they had only about ‘0.1
per cent of the data on the variables required to construct a satisfactory world model’
(Freeman, 1973, p8), yet the modellers failed to explore the sensitivity of their
forecasts to changes in the data or their assumptions or the equations and coefficients
with which those assumptions were modelled. Instead of highlighting ranges of
possibilities and uncertainties, they published relatively precise forecasts, and were
shocked when their predictions were first contested and subsequently refuted.
Institutionalized policy responses
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, policy-makers responded to the growing recog -
nition that some industrial practices were unsustainable by establishing regulatory
institutions and regimes to control those practices, although there were often
conflicts over whether regulations were necessary and what form they should
take. A range of instruments were used such as technology standards (e.g. catalytic
converters in vehicle exhaust systems and flue-gas desulphurization in coalfired power stations) and quantitative emissions limits to, or concentrations in, for
example, soil, air, water and food. More recently, economic ‘market-based’ instru -
ments such as tradable emissions permits and ‘carbon-pricing’ have been favoured
by corporations and governments. The selection of particular technologies, emis -
sions or pollution levels has typically been justified by reference to expert scientific
advice. Expert panels have often been willing to recommend, for example,
maximum concentrations or doses, even in the absence of evidence of clear thres -
holds. A few toxicological and eco-toxicological thresholds have been measured,
in respect of some identified effects, but more frequently thresholds have been
presumed rather than discovered (Howard, 2003; US EPA, undated). This is
important because concepts such as ecological ‘boundaries’ or environmental
‘limits’ presume that there are specific thresholds, and that they can be, and often
have been, located, although they are often hard to locate and may be even be
chimerical.
Policy-makers, powerful stakeholders and their chosen expert advisers developed
a vocabulary of scientific-seeming concepts to refer to those standards (Gillespie
et al., 1979; Jasanoff, 1990; Majone, 1996). Concepts such as ‘an acceptable daily
intake’, ‘a recommended daily allowance’, ‘a maximum residue level’, ‘a maximum
tolerated dose’ and ‘a threshold limit value’ were coined and regularly invoked,
initially in the USA, but subsequently in Europe and elsewhere. More recently,
quantitative targets have been seen as not just attractive to, but essential for,
managerialist and audit cultures.
Often particular standards were portrayed as justified by scientific evidence and
analysis and as being sufficient to deliver sustainability, or at least significantly to
Invoking ‘science’ in green transformations 41