In some renditions we can see traces of ‘technocratic global control’, either
through centralization of authority globally or via polycentric or multilevel
governance or through faith in technological magic bullets that bypass the need
for political change and compromise. A fallacy of control is often demonstrated,
and such calls for planetary management have provoked powerful critiques (Sachs,
1993), particularly in relation to the growing role of corporations in framing and
financing global responses to environmental threats (Hildyard, 1993). By enrolling
ever more areas of the global commons in circuits of global economic and political
power, and subject to global institutional oversight, such a technocratic turn can
undermine democratic responses.
In the case of technocratic governance, power lies with benign elites who seek
to globalize the benefits of technologies, act upon the insights of planetary science,
marshal a ‘global consensus’ and then allocate resources for the protection of global
public goods. The Green Climate Fund of the World Bank is perhaps a good
example. This perspective draws on an essentially liberal view of power where trust
in (global) institutions, and states/policy elites derives from their assumed autonomy
from particular interests and classes, and their respect for the rule of law. They are
able to align the comparative advantages of public and private (and philanthropic)
interests though a variety of public private partnerships (Bäckstrand, 2006). Citizens,
in this view, benefit from protection by such elites acting on their behalf, without
much requirement for their direct input. Rather, public participation comes
through interest-group representation in national democratic processes.
Likewise, accounts of marketized transformations present themselves as apolitical,
devolving power to the market to seek out optimally efficient outcomes by setting
the right prices and creating new markets with minimal institutional oversight.
Market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading, tradable fishing quotas and
carbon-offset projects are all examples. States oversee exchanges in the market and
provide appropriate regulation and, most importantly, allocate and enforce property
rights. Citizens are relevant as passive consumers of products and services produced
through the market, but not as shapers of markets or the rules by which they are
governed. Such accounts also overlook the deeply politicized nature of market
creation, the scope for capture by capital and the lack of attention to social justice
issues in such projects (Brand, 2012a). In their favour, such approaches reflect the
new global distribution of power – including the rise of political–economic power
in countries like China, India and Brazil – and a realpolitik of who owns the
technology, production and finance that, for many, will be critical to the prospects
of most green transformations. In this reading, green transformations will inevitably
be market led, and markets, corporations and finance capital need to be enlisted,
including from other parts of the world.
For those who place more faith in state-led transformations, as Mazzucato argues
(this book), many things that get attributed to entrepreneurs and markets are, in
fact, shaped and financed by states. Markets have to be made and brought into
being (Çalıs ¸kan and Callon, 2009); nowhere are there markets independent of
the societies that create and shape them; they are always socially embedded
18 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach
through centralization of authority globally or via polycentric or multilevel
governance or through faith in technological magic bullets that bypass the need
for political change and compromise. A fallacy of control is often demonstrated,
and such calls for planetary management have provoked powerful critiques (Sachs,
1993), particularly in relation to the growing role of corporations in framing and
financing global responses to environmental threats (Hildyard, 1993). By enrolling
ever more areas of the global commons in circuits of global economic and political
power, and subject to global institutional oversight, such a technocratic turn can
undermine democratic responses.
In the case of technocratic governance, power lies with benign elites who seek
to globalize the benefits of technologies, act upon the insights of planetary science,
marshal a ‘global consensus’ and then allocate resources for the protection of global
public goods. The Green Climate Fund of the World Bank is perhaps a good
example. This perspective draws on an essentially liberal view of power where trust
in (global) institutions, and states/policy elites derives from their assumed autonomy
from particular interests and classes, and their respect for the rule of law. They are
able to align the comparative advantages of public and private (and philanthropic)
interests though a variety of public private partnerships (Bäckstrand, 2006). Citizens,
in this view, benefit from protection by such elites acting on their behalf, without
much requirement for their direct input. Rather, public participation comes
through interest-group representation in national democratic processes.
Likewise, accounts of marketized transformations present themselves as apolitical,
devolving power to the market to seek out optimally efficient outcomes by setting
the right prices and creating new markets with minimal institutional oversight.
Market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading, tradable fishing quotas and
carbon-offset projects are all examples. States oversee exchanges in the market and
provide appropriate regulation and, most importantly, allocate and enforce property
rights. Citizens are relevant as passive consumers of products and services produced
through the market, but not as shapers of markets or the rules by which they are
governed. Such accounts also overlook the deeply politicized nature of market
creation, the scope for capture by capital and the lack of attention to social justice
issues in such projects (Brand, 2012a). In their favour, such approaches reflect the
new global distribution of power – including the rise of political–economic power
in countries like China, India and Brazil – and a realpolitik of who owns the
technology, production and finance that, for many, will be critical to the prospects
of most green transformations. In this reading, green transformations will inevitably
be market led, and markets, corporations and finance capital need to be enlisted,
including from other parts of the world.
For those who place more faith in state-led transformations, as Mazzucato argues
(this book), many things that get attributed to entrepreneurs and markets are, in
fact, shaped and financed by states. Markets have to be made and brought into
being (Çalıs ¸kan and Callon, 2009); nowhere are there markets independent of
the societies that create and shape them; they are always socially embedded
18 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach