compete with incumbent ones: through picking winners, appropriately designed
R&D and intellectual property policies, supportive industrial and tax policy, and
heroic entrepreneurs – what Elkington (2012) calls the ‘zeronauts’. This is a reformist
perspective on green transformations, which offers a relatively limited account of
politics. Politics is essentially understood as policy, providing policy fixes in support
of sustainable technologies. Such proposals are in many ways radical in terms of
the ambition and are, of course, deeply political, as in calls for decoupling and
some arguments for a ‘green industrial revolution’ noted above. Likewise, for some,
an advocacy of geoengineering, as a technical solution to climate mitigation, is
informed by an assessment that other options are unlikely any time soon due to
the power of vested interests (Lomborg, 2013).
In some versions of a ‘green economy’ position, a dominant emphasis is on
technological innovation and investment – mostly by the private sector – in lowcarbon and other environmental technologies. In this narrative, ideas of green and
new technology are firmly interlocked, and often coupled with assumptions of
business-led growth. For some, green technoscience is on the brink of creating a
‘new industrial revolution’ (Stern and Rydge, 2012) set to transform economies.
Such techno-optimistic visions are echoed in applications to developing countries,
where groups such as the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN,
2014), as well as a host of private companies, suggest that a combination of bio-,
info-, nano- and engineering technologies, and markets to enable their spread, will
transform economies in green directions. Both the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) also emphasize technoscientific innovation, highlighting the
need for international cooperation in facilitating trade and technology transfer, to
allow for ‘leapfrogging’, if developing countries are to go green (Levidow, 2014).
In such discourses, ‘greenness’ is often presented as if it were an attribute of a
technology itself, and as if the technology had agency in economic transformation.
Yet this is, of course, to ignore the vast array of political–economic and social
arrangements associated with both technological innovation and application in
particular settings that shape whether and how technologies work, and towards
what ends (Bryne et al. 2011). While there are exceptions, such as the more recent
emphases of the SDSN, the focus on technological solutions generally downplays
the governance contexts of technologies and the ways they become part of diverse
pathways. Arguments about imminent technological revolutions similarly downplay
the embedded political and institutional regimes that have shaped such ‘long
waves’ of technology-related growth in the past (Perez, 2013).
Technocentric narratives often imply that innovation originates in the hi-tech
laboratories of firms and technology start-ups, largely in the global North, or in
the emerging economies of China, India or Brazil. Notions of green technology
transfer, leapfrogging and catch-up reinforce this view. Yet such versions of green
technology marginalize or devalue technoscientific innovation that emerges from
the global South (Ely et al., 2013), while also concealing the North–South
inequalities of access and capacity that shape innovation capabilities (Levidow, 2014).
The politics of green transformations 11
R&D and intellectual property policies, supportive industrial and tax policy, and
heroic entrepreneurs – what Elkington (2012) calls the ‘zeronauts’. This is a reformist
perspective on green transformations, which offers a relatively limited account of
politics. Politics is essentially understood as policy, providing policy fixes in support
of sustainable technologies. Such proposals are in many ways radical in terms of
the ambition and are, of course, deeply political, as in calls for decoupling and
some arguments for a ‘green industrial revolution’ noted above. Likewise, for some,
an advocacy of geoengineering, as a technical solution to climate mitigation, is
informed by an assessment that other options are unlikely any time soon due to
the power of vested interests (Lomborg, 2013).
In some versions of a ‘green economy’ position, a dominant emphasis is on
technological innovation and investment – mostly by the private sector – in lowcarbon and other environmental technologies. In this narrative, ideas of green and
new technology are firmly interlocked, and often coupled with assumptions of
business-led growth. For some, green technoscience is on the brink of creating a
‘new industrial revolution’ (Stern and Rydge, 2012) set to transform economies.
Such techno-optimistic visions are echoed in applications to developing countries,
where groups such as the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN,
2014), as well as a host of private companies, suggest that a combination of bio-,
info-, nano- and engineering technologies, and markets to enable their spread, will
transform economies in green directions. Both the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) also emphasize technoscientific innovation, highlighting the
need for international cooperation in facilitating trade and technology transfer, to
allow for ‘leapfrogging’, if developing countries are to go green (Levidow, 2014).
In such discourses, ‘greenness’ is often presented as if it were an attribute of a
technology itself, and as if the technology had agency in economic transformation.
Yet this is, of course, to ignore the vast array of political–economic and social
arrangements associated with both technological innovation and application in
particular settings that shape whether and how technologies work, and towards
what ends (Bryne et al. 2011). While there are exceptions, such as the more recent
emphases of the SDSN, the focus on technological solutions generally downplays
the governance contexts of technologies and the ways they become part of diverse
pathways. Arguments about imminent technological revolutions similarly downplay
the embedded political and institutional regimes that have shaped such ‘long
waves’ of technology-related growth in the past (Perez, 2013).
Technocentric narratives often imply that innovation originates in the hi-tech
laboratories of firms and technology start-ups, largely in the global North, or in
the emerging economies of China, India or Brazil. Notions of green technology
transfer, leapfrogging and catch-up reinforce this view. Yet such versions of green
technology marginalize or devalue technoscientific innovation that emerges from
the global South (Ely et al., 2013), while also concealing the North–South
inequalities of access and capacity that shape innovation capabilities (Levidow, 2014).
The politics of green transformations 11