This is not to suggest that there are only winners. Far from it. Some stand to
lose from the transformation. In the early stages of green transformations, the losers
might even outnumber the winners. Whatever the numbers, they are agents of
resistance and they need to be analysed in the same way as the agents of change.
The opponents also seek alliances. The opposing forces are not necessarily against
decarbonization as such but they are fighting for their jobs and/or protecting their
assets which are tied to fossil fuel and related sectors.
To return to our overall argument, focusing on alliances is essential for understanding and fostering green transformations. Such alliances are best seen as vehicles
for bundling diverse interests for a particular purpose, such as influencing legislation,
policies or projects. In order to be effective, analytical and political work needs
to deal with both agents of change (prospective winners) and agents of resistance
(prospective losers).
Putting such alliances centre stage is a critical step for addressing the central
question of this chapter: is there a fast track? It is not sufficient, however. Two
further steps are needed: first, we need to be able to distinguish between alliances
of different types. At one end there is the strategic alliance based on joint action. At
the other end there is the mere alignment of interest without coordination between
the parties. Both can be transitional (short term) or enduring (long term). All types
can be instrumental in bringing about collective action or blocking it.
Second, we need to ask where these alliances come from. They are not given
but are in themselves a product of history. Here we go back to the previous section
which suggested that we conceive of transformations as a process in which countries
swing or scramble forward – and sometimes drop back – but in which each
stage provides a political and economic platform for the next stage. As shown in
Chapter 6, the policies adopted in one stage have knock-on effects for subsequent
stages and influence the momentum of green transformations. Depending on how
these policies are designed and implemented, they give rise to new stakeholders
such as business and workers who invested their money or careers in the
deployment of green technologies, or create a backlash from those who pay for
the subsidized investments.
When?
The understanding of these political processes (drivers, policies, knock-on effects)
remains limited. While the researchers draw boundaries around their analyses so
as to not drown in complexity, actors in the real world do not have this privilege;
they need to keep an eye on the whole picture. In most countries of Europe and
North America, this picture was darkened by the financial crisis. This issue needs
to be raised here because it seems to have major repercussions for our central
question: is there a fast track? The answer is more likely to be negative when a
financial crisis affects public and private investment decisions – at least this is what
the contrast between renewable energy investment before and after the financial
crisis suggests (BNEF, 2012 and Stephen Spratt, this book).
Green transformation: is there a fast track? 179
lose from the transformation. In the early stages of green transformations, the losers
might even outnumber the winners. Whatever the numbers, they are agents of
resistance and they need to be analysed in the same way as the agents of change.
The opponents also seek alliances. The opposing forces are not necessarily against
decarbonization as such but they are fighting for their jobs and/or protecting their
assets which are tied to fossil fuel and related sectors.
To return to our overall argument, focusing on alliances is essential for understanding and fostering green transformations. Such alliances are best seen as vehicles
for bundling diverse interests for a particular purpose, such as influencing legislation,
policies or projects. In order to be effective, analytical and political work needs
to deal with both agents of change (prospective winners) and agents of resistance
(prospective losers).
Putting such alliances centre stage is a critical step for addressing the central
question of this chapter: is there a fast track? It is not sufficient, however. Two
further steps are needed: first, we need to be able to distinguish between alliances
of different types. At one end there is the strategic alliance based on joint action. At
the other end there is the mere alignment of interest without coordination between
the parties. Both can be transitional (short term) or enduring (long term). All types
can be instrumental in bringing about collective action or blocking it.
Second, we need to ask where these alliances come from. They are not given
but are in themselves a product of history. Here we go back to the previous section
which suggested that we conceive of transformations as a process in which countries
swing or scramble forward – and sometimes drop back – but in which each
stage provides a political and economic platform for the next stage. As shown in
Chapter 6, the policies adopted in one stage have knock-on effects for subsequent
stages and influence the momentum of green transformations. Depending on how
these policies are designed and implemented, they give rise to new stakeholders
such as business and workers who invested their money or careers in the
deployment of green technologies, or create a backlash from those who pay for
the subsidized investments.
When?
The understanding of these political processes (drivers, policies, knock-on effects)
remains limited. While the researchers draw boundaries around their analyses so
as to not drown in complexity, actors in the real world do not have this privilege;
they need to keep an eye on the whole picture. In most countries of Europe and
North America, this picture was darkened by the financial crisis. This issue needs
to be raised here because it seems to have major repercussions for our central
question: is there a fast track? The answer is more likely to be negative when a
financial crisis affects public and private investment decisions – at least this is what
the contrast between renewable energy investment before and after the financial
crisis suggests (BNEF, 2012 and Stephen Spratt, this book).
Green transformation: is there a fast track? 179