of piercing through the prevailing sociotechnical regime by promoting specific
niches (Schot and Geels, 2008; Smith and Raven, 2012). The niche concept
presumes that green technologies are often disadvantaged and require strategic
support to protect them against premature rejection by investors and users. In evolu -
tionary terms, novel environmentally friendly varieties struggle to develop under
unfavourable selection pressures (Nill and Kemp, 2009).
Smith and Raven (2012) suggest a framework conceptualizing the construction
of protective space as consisting of three processes: shielding, nurturing and
empowering. Screening the literature, they find that innovation scholars have a
lot to say on shielding and nurturing but little on empowering. Of particular
relevance for this book is their notion of ‘stretch-and-transform empowerment’,
which seeks to reframe the rules of the game and reform institutions that influence
prevailing performance criteria. In their most recent work (Raven et al., 2014, p26),
they highlight ‘the importance of narratives as key devices in undertaking this sociopolitical work’. They argue that ‘to successfully secure resources for niche
development, advocates need to link socio-technical narratives to socio-political
agendas, and enrol powerful actors into their networks’ (Raven et al., 2014, p8).
Significantly, their conclusion stresses the need for ‘analysis of the wider political
economy beyond those directly involved in and targeted by sustainable technology
advocacy, i.e. to fully include analysis of the political economy of fossil fuel energy
systems as well’ (Raven et al., 2014, p27). This is also the conclusion of Geels (2014)
who suggests that the destabilization of existing regimes requires equal attention.
Referring to Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ he stresses the need to
better understand the ‘destruction’ part. To conclude, innovation scholars are making
big contributions to the ‘How?’ debate. What is missing are insights on accelerating
the pace of the transformation – given the central question of this chapter: is there
a fast track?
Perhaps a more promising way of throwing new light on to the speed question
is to ask what can be learnt from experiences where rapid transformations occurred.
Both China and Vietnam have undergone transformations which were managed
and very rapid, involving major economic reforms, big sectoral shifts, build-up of
new production capabilities and massive job creation. The speed and depth of
changes were unprecedented in economic history. Assessments and explanations
of this experience are contested, not least because the environmental consequences
are horrendous. However, for our concern – is there a fast track? – there are useful
insights. Both China and Vietnam progressed by using transitional institutions and
transitional arrangements (Qian, 2003). Note that ‘transitional’ here means temporary,
appropriate for the next stage in a longer process. Experimentation was also a key
feature, sometimes organized purposefully from above, sometimes pushed on the
agenda from below – called ‘fence breaking’ in Vietnam (Malesky, 2008; Heilmann,
2008).
Such insights seem highly relevant for this book and are therefore worth
elaborating. The key feature of China’s development strategy and that of other
East Asian countries is that they did not follow models from elsewhere. Mike
174 Hubert Schmitz
niches (Schot and Geels, 2008; Smith and Raven, 2012). The niche concept
presumes that green technologies are often disadvantaged and require strategic
support to protect them against premature rejection by investors and users. In evolu -
tionary terms, novel environmentally friendly varieties struggle to develop under
unfavourable selection pressures (Nill and Kemp, 2009).
Smith and Raven (2012) suggest a framework conceptualizing the construction
of protective space as consisting of three processes: shielding, nurturing and
empowering. Screening the literature, they find that innovation scholars have a
lot to say on shielding and nurturing but little on empowering. Of particular
relevance for this book is their notion of ‘stretch-and-transform empowerment’,
which seeks to reframe the rules of the game and reform institutions that influence
prevailing performance criteria. In their most recent work (Raven et al., 2014, p26),
they highlight ‘the importance of narratives as key devices in undertaking this sociopolitical work’. They argue that ‘to successfully secure resources for niche
development, advocates need to link socio-technical narratives to socio-political
agendas, and enrol powerful actors into their networks’ (Raven et al., 2014, p8).
Significantly, their conclusion stresses the need for ‘analysis of the wider political
economy beyond those directly involved in and targeted by sustainable technology
advocacy, i.e. to fully include analysis of the political economy of fossil fuel energy
systems as well’ (Raven et al., 2014, p27). This is also the conclusion of Geels (2014)
who suggests that the destabilization of existing regimes requires equal attention.
Referring to Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ he stresses the need to
better understand the ‘destruction’ part. To conclude, innovation scholars are making
big contributions to the ‘How?’ debate. What is missing are insights on accelerating
the pace of the transformation – given the central question of this chapter: is there
a fast track?
Perhaps a more promising way of throwing new light on to the speed question
is to ask what can be learnt from experiences where rapid transformations occurred.
Both China and Vietnam have undergone transformations which were managed
and very rapid, involving major economic reforms, big sectoral shifts, build-up of
new production capabilities and massive job creation. The speed and depth of
changes were unprecedented in economic history. Assessments and explanations
of this experience are contested, not least because the environmental consequences
are horrendous. However, for our concern – is there a fast track? – there are useful
insights. Both China and Vietnam progressed by using transitional institutions and
transitional arrangements (Qian, 2003). Note that ‘transitional’ here means temporary,
appropriate for the next stage in a longer process. Experimentation was also a key
feature, sometimes organized purposefully from above, sometimes pushed on the
agenda from below – called ‘fence breaking’ in Vietnam (Malesky, 2008; Heilmann,
2008).
Such insights seem highly relevant for this book and are therefore worth
elaborating. The key feature of China’s development strategy and that of other
East Asian countries is that they did not follow models from elsewhere. Mike
174 Hubert Schmitz