disagree about climate change’ (Hulme, 2009). There are hard and soft disagree -
ments. Hard disagreements come from the powerful vested interests who question
the existence and human causes of climate change (Newell and Paterson, 2010;
Blasberg and Kohlenberg, 2012). Trying to defend its assets, the fossil fuel lobby
has fought hard to discredit the scientific case for connecting climate change with
carbon emissions. Soft disagreements arise over concerns that the discourse on green
economy and growth depoliticizes the transformational change required (Wanner,
2014). These hard and soft disagreements are discussed in Chapter 2 by Melissa
Leach and in Chapter 5 by Peter Newell.
This chapter raises a different concern over the climate change debate: the
narrative of the earth and climate scientists does not connect with the experience
of ordinary citizens. The climate change paradigm is a result of research carried
out by many groups of scientists in different parts of world, using different
approaches, different data sets and often focused on different parts of the planet.
The collective confidence of these scientists in their analyses and predictions
comes from the convergence of their findings with regard to some key variables,
notably changes in land and ocean surface temperatures. Scientists have focused in
particular on the globally averaged temperatures and shown that small rises in these
global averages have huge consequences. The discourse of global warming has centred
on the need to limit the temperature rise to two degrees (over the 1990 level) and
to do this by bringing carbon emissions down. While scientifically robust, it has
been politically ineffective.
I would argue that language and discourse have a lot to do with it. Small rises
in average temperature are of little concern to ordinary citizens; in countries such
as the UK small temperature rises seem even desirable to most people. Shifting the
discourse from climate change to climate chaos (Sachs, 2007) would help to connect
the findings of scientists with the observations of citizens. Climate chaos is precisely
what they experience – extreme weather events have become more frequent in
most parts of the world.
My main argument in this chapter is that clarity is needed with regard to what
the problem is. While scientific clarity is necessary, it is not sufficient. Shifting the
focus from climate change to climate chaos would be more effective politically.
This is not to suggest that this in itself would accelerate action. An action-oriented
approach needs to concentrate on the transformation that is needed to tackle the
problem. This is precisely what we do this in this book. We call it the green
transformation. ‘Transformation’ signals structural change, ‘green’ gives the direction
of travel and the two together invite questions about the drivers of change. In this
chapter, I suggest a parsimonious definition: the green transformation is the process
of restructuring that brings the economy within the planetary boundaries.
Previous chapters of this book prefer the plural ‘green transformations’. I agree
that problem constellations and actor constellations can differ over time, between
sectors and between places, and ways forward may therefore differ. So as to
acknowledge this diversity, this chapter will henceforth also use the plural. Where
the singular appears it is not meant to deny diversity. There is a parallel in the term
Green transformation: is there a fast track? 171
ments. Hard disagreements come from the powerful vested interests who question
the existence and human causes of climate change (Newell and Paterson, 2010;
Blasberg and Kohlenberg, 2012). Trying to defend its assets, the fossil fuel lobby
has fought hard to discredit the scientific case for connecting climate change with
carbon emissions. Soft disagreements arise over concerns that the discourse on green
economy and growth depoliticizes the transformational change required (Wanner,
2014). These hard and soft disagreements are discussed in Chapter 2 by Melissa
Leach and in Chapter 5 by Peter Newell.
This chapter raises a different concern over the climate change debate: the
narrative of the earth and climate scientists does not connect with the experience
of ordinary citizens. The climate change paradigm is a result of research carried
out by many groups of scientists in different parts of world, using different
approaches, different data sets and often focused on different parts of the planet.
The collective confidence of these scientists in their analyses and predictions
comes from the convergence of their findings with regard to some key variables,
notably changes in land and ocean surface temperatures. Scientists have focused in
particular on the globally averaged temperatures and shown that small rises in these
global averages have huge consequences. The discourse of global warming has centred
on the need to limit the temperature rise to two degrees (over the 1990 level) and
to do this by bringing carbon emissions down. While scientifically robust, it has
been politically ineffective.
I would argue that language and discourse have a lot to do with it. Small rises
in average temperature are of little concern to ordinary citizens; in countries such
as the UK small temperature rises seem even desirable to most people. Shifting the
discourse from climate change to climate chaos (Sachs, 2007) would help to connect
the findings of scientists with the observations of citizens. Climate chaos is precisely
what they experience – extreme weather events have become more frequent in
most parts of the world.
My main argument in this chapter is that clarity is needed with regard to what
the problem is. While scientific clarity is necessary, it is not sufficient. Shifting the
focus from climate change to climate chaos would be more effective politically.
This is not to suggest that this in itself would accelerate action. An action-oriented
approach needs to concentrate on the transformation that is needed to tackle the
problem. This is precisely what we do this in this book. We call it the green
transformation. ‘Transformation’ signals structural change, ‘green’ gives the direction
of travel and the two together invite questions about the drivers of change. In this
chapter, I suggest a parsimonious definition: the green transformation is the process
of restructuring that brings the economy within the planetary boundaries.
Previous chapters of this book prefer the plural ‘green transformations’. I agree
that problem constellations and actor constellations can differ over time, between
sectors and between places, and ways forward may therefore differ. So as to
acknowledge this diversity, this chapter will henceforth also use the plural. Where
the singular appears it is not meant to deny diversity. There is a parallel in the term
Green transformation: is there a fast track? 171