between providers and consumers, UK policy reinforced those structural divisions.
A small and badly run grants programme supported a trickle of investment in solar
PV by households, but this was at a tiny level compared with Germany. Eventually,
in 2010, a feed-in tariff for small-scale renewables was introduced, but following
explosive growth in solar PV, tariff rates were quickly scaled back. Only in 2013
has the desire to reduce risk for larger investors led the UK to finally embrace a
version of feed-in tariffs more widely.
The policy design of the RO has created weak positive feedback effects, and
left the growth of renewables in the UK exposed to considerable negative feedback
effects. Large energy companies have made the largest investment in renewables,
but they also have existing high-carbon assets, and the companies have been halfhearted advocates for renewables at best. Their ambivalence has also affected interest
group formation, with one organization (RenewableUK) representing larger
companies and another (the Renewable Energy Association) the small-scale
renewables lobby. During the debate about the introduction of a feed-in tariff in
the UK, these two groups were unable to agree. The UK has also so far failed to
develop a strong industrial policy and supply chain for renewable energy, meaning
that employment effects are nowhere near as politically important as they have
been in Germany, and that a narrative about the importance of ‘green jobs’ is not
yet taken for granted.
At the same time, the dominance of large corporate interests in renewables has
produced stronger negative feedback effects. One issue is planning. Whereas in
Germany around half of onshore wind turbines were owned by farmers or local
cooperatives in the late 1990s, in the UK 98 per cent were owned by large energy
companies or developers, which have no link to or stake in the local society and
economy (Pollitt, 2010, p36). Szarka (2006, p3046) argues that ‘It is clear from
fieldwork contacts with anti-wind protesters in Britain . . . that one cause of rejection
is the feeling of injustice engendered by outside firms who exploit a local resource
and impose burdens, but offer no community benefit or compensation’. Moreover,
and again in contrast with Germany where tariffs were adjusted to help investors
in less windy sites, the RO has incentivized developers to seek out the windiest
sites, which often tend to be in ecologically and visually sensitive areas.
The fact that much of the financial benefit from renewables policy has been
captured by large energy firms, which have become extremely unpopular since
the mid-2000s due to price rises, suspected profiteering and high executive salaries,
also leaves UK policy particularly exposed to the negative feedback effects of cost.
Germany’s renewable electricity support programme has so far cost about four times
what the UK has spent, as a share of national income (OECD, 2013, p48). Despite
this, rifts on the future of renewable power in the political elite and the media are
stronger in the UK – with, for example, proposals to halt and even reverse onshore wind expansion – creating considerable political uncertainty and a chilling
effect on investment.
Overall, in Germany, renewables policy appears to have maintained a dominance
of positive over negative feedback effects through spreading the benefits of the
Political dynamics of green transformations 93
A small and badly run grants programme supported a trickle of investment in solar
PV by households, but this was at a tiny level compared with Germany. Eventually,
in 2010, a feed-in tariff for small-scale renewables was introduced, but following
explosive growth in solar PV, tariff rates were quickly scaled back. Only in 2013
has the desire to reduce risk for larger investors led the UK to finally embrace a
version of feed-in tariffs more widely.
The policy design of the RO has created weak positive feedback effects, and
left the growth of renewables in the UK exposed to considerable negative feedback
effects. Large energy companies have made the largest investment in renewables,
but they also have existing high-carbon assets, and the companies have been halfhearted advocates for renewables at best. Their ambivalence has also affected interest
group formation, with one organization (RenewableUK) representing larger
companies and another (the Renewable Energy Association) the small-scale
renewables lobby. During the debate about the introduction of a feed-in tariff in
the UK, these two groups were unable to agree. The UK has also so far failed to
develop a strong industrial policy and supply chain for renewable energy, meaning
that employment effects are nowhere near as politically important as they have
been in Germany, and that a narrative about the importance of ‘green jobs’ is not
yet taken for granted.
At the same time, the dominance of large corporate interests in renewables has
produced stronger negative feedback effects. One issue is planning. Whereas in
Germany around half of onshore wind turbines were owned by farmers or local
cooperatives in the late 1990s, in the UK 98 per cent were owned by large energy
companies or developers, which have no link to or stake in the local society and
economy (Pollitt, 2010, p36). Szarka (2006, p3046) argues that ‘It is clear from
fieldwork contacts with anti-wind protesters in Britain . . . that one cause of rejection
is the feeling of injustice engendered by outside firms who exploit a local resource
and impose burdens, but offer no community benefit or compensation’. Moreover,
and again in contrast with Germany where tariffs were adjusted to help investors
in less windy sites, the RO has incentivized developers to seek out the windiest
sites, which often tend to be in ecologically and visually sensitive areas.
The fact that much of the financial benefit from renewables policy has been
captured by large energy firms, which have become extremely unpopular since
the mid-2000s due to price rises, suspected profiteering and high executive salaries,
also leaves UK policy particularly exposed to the negative feedback effects of cost.
Germany’s renewable electricity support programme has so far cost about four times
what the UK has spent, as a share of national income (OECD, 2013, p48). Despite
this, rifts on the future of renewable power in the political elite and the media are
stronger in the UK – with, for example, proposals to halt and even reverse onshore wind expansion – creating considerable political uncertainty and a chilling
effect on investment.
Overall, in Germany, renewables policy appears to have maintained a dominance
of positive over negative feedback effects through spreading the benefits of the
Political dynamics of green transformations 93