74 Rocío Alvarez-Tinoco et al.
feasibility of commercial SMRs is yet to be established. Global instability also
reinforces the idea that a strong civil nuclear industry as helpful in maintaining
the UK’s capacity to possess credible nuclear weapons (Johnstone and Stirling,
2015).
Political support appears to be maintained by recent government decisions
and documents, such as the announcement of the follow- up to Hinkley Point C
nuclear project (15 September 2016); the 2017 Clean Growth Strategy (HM
Government, 2017); and the consultation for a new National Policy Statement
(NPS) for future nuclear generation (2026–2035), announced by BEIS in early
December 2017 (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS),
2017b). Support for research and innovation appears strong, with BEIS’s Energy
Innovation Programme planning to invest around £180 million in nuclear
innovation (HM Government, 2017, p. 50). While a change in UK governing
parties may affect such political support, traditional cross- party commitment to
nuclear generation persists. Based upon the requirement for similar technologies
and skills, interrelationships between civil and military use of nuclear technology further appear to suggest durable political support for nuclear generation.
Yet while steady political support for nuclear research and innovation appears
robust, other potential negative consequences may become significant barriers
for the implementation of the described pathway. Based on our stakeholder consultations, we identified those that appear to be the most significant among
these risks (Third stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2017) with respect their
causes/drivers, likelihood, magnitude, and possible effects (see Figure 5.3).
Risks associated with the ‘new nuclear’ pathway
Conflicting policies and regulations
The nuclear power sector is embedded in a wide- ranging, trans- sectoral institutional framework, which brings significant complexity in the development and
application of regulations for new nuclear. The UK nuclear sector is subject to
significant national safety and security legislation and to (national and international) laws on the military use of nuclear. This interaction between different
policies and regulations can affect nuclear as a source for domestic generation of
electricity in several ways. First, the imposition of strict safety and security regulations may lead to increases in the costs of production and maintenance of
nuclear plants. Second, potential conflicts with international regulations may
lead to long- term international disputes, which could significantly slow down
the development of new plants (as these are traditionally developed through
international co- operation systems). Brexit may further increase the risk of conflicts between the UK and international legislation on nuclear. Stakeholders
considered conflicting policies and regulation, and in particular international
legal clashes, as a significant risk both in terms of their likelihood and magnitude, with effects that could in the worst- case scenario lead to a paralysis of UK
civil nuclear development.
feasibility of commercial SMRs is yet to be established. Global instability also
reinforces the idea that a strong civil nuclear industry as helpful in maintaining
the UK’s capacity to possess credible nuclear weapons (Johnstone and Stirling,
2015).
Political support appears to be maintained by recent government decisions
and documents, such as the announcement of the follow- up to Hinkley Point C
nuclear project (15 September 2016); the 2017 Clean Growth Strategy (HM
Government, 2017); and the consultation for a new National Policy Statement
(NPS) for future nuclear generation (2026–2035), announced by BEIS in early
December 2017 (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS),
2017b). Support for research and innovation appears strong, with BEIS’s Energy
Innovation Programme planning to invest around £180 million in nuclear
innovation (HM Government, 2017, p. 50). While a change in UK governing
parties may affect such political support, traditional cross- party commitment to
nuclear generation persists. Based upon the requirement for similar technologies
and skills, interrelationships between civil and military use of nuclear technology further appear to suggest durable political support for nuclear generation.
Yet while steady political support for nuclear research and innovation appears
robust, other potential negative consequences may become significant barriers
for the implementation of the described pathway. Based on our stakeholder consultations, we identified those that appear to be the most significant among
these risks (Third stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2017) with respect their
causes/drivers, likelihood, magnitude, and possible effects (see Figure 5.3).
Risks associated with the ‘new nuclear’ pathway
Conflicting policies and regulations
The nuclear power sector is embedded in a wide- ranging, trans- sectoral institutional framework, which brings significant complexity in the development and
application of regulations for new nuclear. The UK nuclear sector is subject to
significant national safety and security legislation and to (national and international) laws on the military use of nuclear. This interaction between different
policies and regulations can affect nuclear as a source for domestic generation of
electricity in several ways. First, the imposition of strict safety and security regulations may lead to increases in the costs of production and maintenance of
nuclear plants. Second, potential conflicts with international regulations may
lead to long- term international disputes, which could significantly slow down
the development of new plants (as these are traditionally developed through
international co- operation systems). Brexit may further increase the risk of conflicts between the UK and international legislation on nuclear. Stakeholders
considered conflicting policies and regulation, and in particular international
legal clashes, as a significant risk both in terms of their likelihood and magnitude, with effects that could in the worst- case scenario lead to a paralysis of UK
civil nuclear development.