72 Rocío Alvarez-Tinoco et al.
with the new nuclear power scenario on the one hand and the renewable electricity scenario on the other.
The first stakeholders’ consultation workshop aimed at co- designing a system
map of the UK nuclear sector following the Technology Innovation System structure (i.e. actors/stakeholders, networks, and institutions) using a specific tool
created for this purpose (Nikas et al., 2017). This identified the main interactions
among the system elements (Cox et al., 2016) and then elicited the preferences
and opinions of the stakeholders for the UK’s future electricity system mix for
2030 and 2050, bearing in mind the UK commitment to an 80% emission reduction. From this first stakeholders’ consultation emerged multiple future electricity
mixes, in which nuclear power has a share. However, stakeholders agreed on the
broad shape of two scenarios, which are the subject of this chapter. Based on the
literature and stakeholder engagement, we developed a list of potential risks and
uncertainties associated with the two pathways (Hanger et al., 2016).
In the second stakeholders’ consultation workshop, we assessed the identified
risks for nuclear power expansion along different dimensions, such as likelihood
and severity of impact. For the no new nuclear mitigation pathway, we assessed
the identified risks by using an online survey.
Finally, the third stakeholders’ consultation workshop was used to discuss the
economic feasibility of the two scenarios and to build a complete and detailed narrative of the corresponding mitigation pathways.
Note that due to the need to guarantee stakeholder anonymity it has generally
not been possible to attribute particular stakeholder views to specific categories of
stakeholder.
Decarbonisation pathways
Based on the critical roles nuclear and renewables may have in the decarbonisation of UK electricity, we introduce two opposing decarbonisation pathways. The
first is based on major nuclear expansion and the second is a regime with no new
nuclear investment and dominated by renewable resources. These decarbonisation
pathways are similar to those known as the ‘clockwork’ and ‘patchwork’ scenarios
which have been proposed by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) (2015).
The ‘new nuclear’ pathway includes 40 GW of new nuclear capacity. This is
highly salient because the UK government relies heavily on new nuclear power
in its decarbonisation efforts. Stakeholders at our first workshop, including those
with a strong commitment to nuclear power, considered that a level of 75 GW
of new capacity by 2050 was not technologically and financially feasible (e.g.
delays on building new facilities and the high cost of electricity generation).
However, 40 GW of new nuclear capacity might realistically and credibly be
achieved according to stakeholders, particularly considering that France had
achieved an even higher rate of nuclear construction in the 1970s and 1980s.
Despite the inherently controversial and politicised character of decisions on
nuclear technology, public opposition to nuclear power (and questions of its
legitimacy) have always been muted in the UK.
with the new nuclear power scenario on the one hand and the renewable electricity scenario on the other.
The first stakeholders’ consultation workshop aimed at co- designing a system
map of the UK nuclear sector following the Technology Innovation System structure (i.e. actors/stakeholders, networks, and institutions) using a specific tool
created for this purpose (Nikas et al., 2017). This identified the main interactions
among the system elements (Cox et al., 2016) and then elicited the preferences
and opinions of the stakeholders for the UK’s future electricity system mix for
2030 and 2050, bearing in mind the UK commitment to an 80% emission reduction. From this first stakeholders’ consultation emerged multiple future electricity
mixes, in which nuclear power has a share. However, stakeholders agreed on the
broad shape of two scenarios, which are the subject of this chapter. Based on the
literature and stakeholder engagement, we developed a list of potential risks and
uncertainties associated with the two pathways (Hanger et al., 2016).
In the second stakeholders’ consultation workshop, we assessed the identified
risks for nuclear power expansion along different dimensions, such as likelihood
and severity of impact. For the no new nuclear mitigation pathway, we assessed
the identified risks by using an online survey.
Finally, the third stakeholders’ consultation workshop was used to discuss the
economic feasibility of the two scenarios and to build a complete and detailed narrative of the corresponding mitigation pathways.
Note that due to the need to guarantee stakeholder anonymity it has generally
not been possible to attribute particular stakeholder views to specific categories of
stakeholder.
Decarbonisation pathways
Based on the critical roles nuclear and renewables may have in the decarbonisation of UK electricity, we introduce two opposing decarbonisation pathways. The
first is based on major nuclear expansion and the second is a regime with no new
nuclear investment and dominated by renewable resources. These decarbonisation
pathways are similar to those known as the ‘clockwork’ and ‘patchwork’ scenarios
which have been proposed by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) (2015).
The ‘new nuclear’ pathway includes 40 GW of new nuclear capacity. This is
highly salient because the UK government relies heavily on new nuclear power
in its decarbonisation efforts. Stakeholders at our first workshop, including those
with a strong commitment to nuclear power, considered that a level of 75 GW
of new capacity by 2050 was not technologically and financially feasible (e.g.
delays on building new facilities and the high cost of electricity generation).
However, 40 GW of new nuclear capacity might realistically and credibly be
achieved according to stakeholders, particularly considering that France had
achieved an even higher rate of nuclear construction in the 1970s and 1980s.
Despite the inherently controversial and politicised character of decisions on
nuclear technology, public opposition to nuclear power (and questions of its
legitimacy) have always been muted in the UK.