152 Oscar Van Vliet
nature compensation adds to the cost. Delays in permitting and constructing all
of the necessary power plants and transmission lines are also very likely. This is
not necessarily a problem to either pathway in the long run, as the Swiss nuclear
plants are scheduled to remain in service for as long as they are deemed safe to
operate. As the two youngest and largest plants (built in 1979 and 1984, with a
combined capacity of 2.2 GW) have recently received extensive safety upgrades
in the wake of Fukushima, we can expect their lifespan to be extended to 60
years (World Nuclear Association, 2018). If these nuclear plants remain in
service until 2039 and 2044, the Swiss have some 25 years to construct their
replacements.
Some uncertainties remain in the Swiss transition to renewable electricity,
although they are not threatening: For example, the political winds may shift
over the next 25 years to be more or less open to international co- operation.
However, the structure of the Swiss Confederation’s executive makes dramatic
shifts in policy – like in countries with two- party systems (e.g. the USA) –
unlikely. Overall, we may expect Switzerland to remain rhetorically independent and autarkic, but practically integrated in Europe. Likewise, the Swiss
economy has been relatively stable, with a largest annual drop of 3.4% of GDP
in the last financial crisis, despite being known for international banking. The
effects of climate change are also uncertain but the effects on hydropower are
expected to be small over most of this century (SGH and CHy, 2011). Finally,
it is unclear how far the costs of PV and wind will decrease in the future, but
grid parity has now effectively been achieved and any further drops can only be
in favour of the wider adoption of renewable electricity sources.
Conclusions
Overall, the Swiss prefer domestic production of renewable electricity, but a
majority share of imported renewable electricity will likely be cheaper overall
and cause fewer issues with intermittency. However, the renewable imports
pathway would face more problems with acceptance of new infrastructure, especially long- distance transmission lines. (See Figures 9.2 and 9.3.)
The most recommended option would be to combine the domestic renewable
pathway with the imported renewable pathway. The most favourable combination seems to be Swiss rooftop PV, offshore wind from the North Sea, and Swiss
hydropower. Such a mix would also be acceptable to the Swiss public. This is
especially important given the Swiss political system in which policies and projects can be challenged in local, cantonal, or national referenda.
However, depending on the demand for renewables in EU countries, this
may require expansion of transmission capacity in the Dutch, Belgian, Danish,
and German grids. Both the needs for grid expansion, and ways that this could
be done in a manner acceptable to residents around the new transmission lines,
should be researched further.
This narrative has two major implications for the Swiss energy strategy. First,
the ES2050 can be broadened to include imports of wind and/or CSP, but Swiss
nature compensation adds to the cost. Delays in permitting and constructing all
of the necessary power plants and transmission lines are also very likely. This is
not necessarily a problem to either pathway in the long run, as the Swiss nuclear
plants are scheduled to remain in service for as long as they are deemed safe to
operate. As the two youngest and largest plants (built in 1979 and 1984, with a
combined capacity of 2.2 GW) have recently received extensive safety upgrades
in the wake of Fukushima, we can expect their lifespan to be extended to 60
years (World Nuclear Association, 2018). If these nuclear plants remain in
service until 2039 and 2044, the Swiss have some 25 years to construct their
replacements.
Some uncertainties remain in the Swiss transition to renewable electricity,
although they are not threatening: For example, the political winds may shift
over the next 25 years to be more or less open to international co- operation.
However, the structure of the Swiss Confederation’s executive makes dramatic
shifts in policy – like in countries with two- party systems (e.g. the USA) –
unlikely. Overall, we may expect Switzerland to remain rhetorically independent and autarkic, but practically integrated in Europe. Likewise, the Swiss
economy has been relatively stable, with a largest annual drop of 3.4% of GDP
in the last financial crisis, despite being known for international banking. The
effects of climate change are also uncertain but the effects on hydropower are
expected to be small over most of this century (SGH and CHy, 2011). Finally,
it is unclear how far the costs of PV and wind will decrease in the future, but
grid parity has now effectively been achieved and any further drops can only be
in favour of the wider adoption of renewable electricity sources.
Conclusions
Overall, the Swiss prefer domestic production of renewable electricity, but a
majority share of imported renewable electricity will likely be cheaper overall
and cause fewer issues with intermittency. However, the renewable imports
pathway would face more problems with acceptance of new infrastructure, especially long- distance transmission lines. (See Figures 9.2 and 9.3.)
The most recommended option would be to combine the domestic renewable
pathway with the imported renewable pathway. The most favourable combination seems to be Swiss rooftop PV, offshore wind from the North Sea, and Swiss
hydropower. Such a mix would also be acceptable to the Swiss public. This is
especially important given the Swiss political system in which policies and projects can be challenged in local, cantonal, or national referenda.
However, depending on the demand for renewables in EU countries, this
may require expansion of transmission capacity in the Dutch, Belgian, Danish,
and German grids. Both the needs for grid expansion, and ways that this could
be done in a manner acceptable to residents around the new transmission lines,
should be researched further.
This narrative has two major implications for the Swiss energy strategy. First,
the ES2050 can be broadened to include imports of wind and/or CSP, but Swiss