130 Alevgul H. Sorman et al.
of competition increases, along with the risks of lack of independence of regulatory bodies due to the so- called ‘regulatory capture’ process. Such a practice
undermines the interests of consumers and also creates the implementation risk
of policies aimed at promoting public interest, such as those related to a boost
for a renewable energy transition.
Moreover, other factors aggregating to implementation risks arise from
different parties in the government having different positions about the role of
renewables and how they should be promoted and financed. The regulatory
rollercoaster ride, as aforementioned, results in RES developments being legally
and institutionally hindered and results in regulatory barriers continuously
changing throughout the years (Capellán-Perez, Campos- Celador, and TerésZubiaga, 2016).
Bridging risks to justice concerns: the energy justice framework
These illustrated risk factors can be brought together neatly within the field of
energy justice, which calls for ‘a global energy system that fairly disseminates both
the benefits and costs of energy services and one that has representative and
impartial energy decision- making’ (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Such an
approach is translated to the operationalisation of energy justice theory across four
primary axes: recognition, procedural, distributional, and restorative components.
It is accepted that recognition justice embraces the multitude of actors,
voices, and positions, while procedural justice assumes inclusive, transparent
decision- making mechanisms as well as dissolved power structures embedded in
energy governance (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Distributional justice implies
responsibility across nodes of production and modes of consumption (Walker,
2012) and assumes fair distribution among producers and consumers, while
restorative justice highlights the need for repairing the harm done to people
(and/or society/nature) and assisting in pinpointing where prevention needs to
occur (Heffron and McCauley, 2017).
Energy injustices play out through technological, social, political, institutional, or spatial ways (Bridge et al., 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015;
McCauley, 2018). Thus, with emerging consequential risk factors in the RES
sector and recent policy changes in Spain, it is seen that energy injustices have
been emerging along the four components, some of which are highlighted in the
following paragraphs. These are to serve as illustrative examples for providing a
series of ‘lessons learned’ from cases, for deriving alternative narratives for
change, and for ensuring energy justice application in policy and practice in the
future.
Initially, the oligopolistic structure of the electricity system in Spain can be
presented as a concern in terms of procedural injustices in relation to the European Commission Directive 2009/72/EC, regarding the functioning of the
internal market of electricity. The directive, aimed at ensuring an equal level
playing field in generation, has been contested in Spain by failing to ensure
effective separation between the companies involved in the generation,
of competition increases, along with the risks of lack of independence of regulatory bodies due to the so- called ‘regulatory capture’ process. Such a practice
undermines the interests of consumers and also creates the implementation risk
of policies aimed at promoting public interest, such as those related to a boost
for a renewable energy transition.
Moreover, other factors aggregating to implementation risks arise from
different parties in the government having different positions about the role of
renewables and how they should be promoted and financed. The regulatory
rollercoaster ride, as aforementioned, results in RES developments being legally
and institutionally hindered and results in regulatory barriers continuously
changing throughout the years (Capellán-Perez, Campos- Celador, and TerésZubiaga, 2016).
Bridging risks to justice concerns: the energy justice framework
These illustrated risk factors can be brought together neatly within the field of
energy justice, which calls for ‘a global energy system that fairly disseminates both
the benefits and costs of energy services and one that has representative and
impartial energy decision- making’ (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Such an
approach is translated to the operationalisation of energy justice theory across four
primary axes: recognition, procedural, distributional, and restorative components.
It is accepted that recognition justice embraces the multitude of actors,
voices, and positions, while procedural justice assumes inclusive, transparent
decision- making mechanisms as well as dissolved power structures embedded in
energy governance (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Distributional justice implies
responsibility across nodes of production and modes of consumption (Walker,
2012) and assumes fair distribution among producers and consumers, while
restorative justice highlights the need for repairing the harm done to people
(and/or society/nature) and assisting in pinpointing where prevention needs to
occur (Heffron and McCauley, 2017).
Energy injustices play out through technological, social, political, institutional, or spatial ways (Bridge et al., 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015;
McCauley, 2018). Thus, with emerging consequential risk factors in the RES
sector and recent policy changes in Spain, it is seen that energy injustices have
been emerging along the four components, some of which are highlighted in the
following paragraphs. These are to serve as illustrative examples for providing a
series of ‘lessons learned’ from cases, for deriving alternative narratives for
change, and for ensuring energy justice application in policy and practice in the
future.
Initially, the oligopolistic structure of the electricity system in Spain can be
presented as a concern in terms of procedural injustices in relation to the European Commission Directive 2009/72/EC, regarding the functioning of the
internal market of electricity. The directive, aimed at ensuring an equal level
playing field in generation, has been contested in Spain by failing to ensure
effective separation between the companies involved in the generation,