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1 Information Weapon: Concepts, Means, Methods …
the power network. One year later there was an accident where Black Energy was
involved.
In April 2016 in the so-called “office” corporate network of German nuclear
power station Gundremmingen, there were discovered numerous malicious software
products, including W32.Ramnit and Conficker, although both of these malicious
worms had been known as of 2008 and inactivated virtually by any antivirus software.
The abovementioned accidents as well as other recent ones perfectly well reveal
vulnerability of energy facilities to targeted attacks (as in case with power system
of Ukraine or nuclear program of Iran), but to disturbances in operation caused by
random contamination with standard malicious software.
After emerging in 2010 the information on non-trivial capabilities of computer
viruses in terms of affecting the facilities of critical infrastructure through the example
of worn Stuxnet’s “performance,” acknowledging the danger of cyberthreats has
leaped from Hollywood blockbusters to real world and has been acquired recently
not only by limited circle of pros but also by global community in general.
In October 2015 there was published the Report prepared by Royal Institute
of International Relations Chatham House “Cybersecurity at the Facilities of civil
nuclear infrastructure: Risk awareness” dedicated to estimating the range of potential
vulnerabilities and studying the methods of security building in this sphere. The
Report contains some interesting observations, focused on the statement that while
information technologies and computerization of the technological processes at all
levels are rapidly developing, progress of cybersecurity procedures and culture are
significantly falling behind, particularly in traditionally more clandestine nuclear
industry, which never fails to create new risks and threats.
One of the conclusions ensued from the report is the statement that nowadays
nuclear industry is afflicted with “type” solutions. Thus if initially introduction
of automated processes at nuclear facilities has been if not exclusive then at least
different from similar offers from competitors, but later on there have emerged more
l routine systems for technological processes control.
Popularity of just few routine solutions has simplified the protocols of “malware”
intrusion into such systems. Here while developed country or countries in possession
of the entire kit of competencies in nuclear industry are able more or less to develop
and introduce unique exclusive advanced information systems, the third world countries importing the power nuclear technologies on turn-key basis are actually hooked
to those technological processes control systems which are delivered along with
equipment and therefore they are more susceptible.
For example, Stuxnet, while saving itself at any devices available was systematically searching for the computers with installed automated control system [1]
SCADA [38], by Siemens, applied in the systems to monitor and control industrial,
infrastructural and service processes at oil pipelines, power stations, large communication hubs, airports, courts, and even at military facilities all over the world. Experts
in Kaspersky Laboratory are of strong opinion that creators of Stuxnet possessed
profound knowledge in SCADA-technology [39]. For example, when identifying
the consequences of STUXNET’s attack Siemens declared that the company had not
delivered the software to Iran although confirmed its availability in Bushehr. The
1 Information Weapon: Concepts, Means, Methods …
the power network. One year later there was an accident where Black Energy was
involved.
In April 2016 in the so-called “office” corporate network of German nuclear
power station Gundremmingen, there were discovered numerous malicious software
products, including W32.Ramnit and Conficker, although both of these malicious
worms had been known as of 2008 and inactivated virtually by any antivirus software.
The abovementioned accidents as well as other recent ones perfectly well reveal
vulnerability of energy facilities to targeted attacks (as in case with power system
of Ukraine or nuclear program of Iran), but to disturbances in operation caused by
random contamination with standard malicious software.
After emerging in 2010 the information on non-trivial capabilities of computer
viruses in terms of affecting the facilities of critical infrastructure through the example
of worn Stuxnet’s “performance,” acknowledging the danger of cyberthreats has
leaped from Hollywood blockbusters to real world and has been acquired recently
not only by limited circle of pros but also by global community in general.
In October 2015 there was published the Report prepared by Royal Institute
of International Relations Chatham House “Cybersecurity at the Facilities of civil
nuclear infrastructure: Risk awareness” dedicated to estimating the range of potential
vulnerabilities and studying the methods of security building in this sphere. The
Report contains some interesting observations, focused on the statement that while
information technologies and computerization of the technological processes at all
levels are rapidly developing, progress of cybersecurity procedures and culture are
significantly falling behind, particularly in traditionally more clandestine nuclear
industry, which never fails to create new risks and threats.
One of the conclusions ensued from the report is the statement that nowadays
nuclear industry is afflicted with “type” solutions. Thus if initially introduction
of automated processes at nuclear facilities has been if not exclusive then at least
different from similar offers from competitors, but later on there have emerged more
l routine systems for technological processes control.
Popularity of just few routine solutions has simplified the protocols of “malware”
intrusion into such systems. Here while developed country or countries in possession
of the entire kit of competencies in nuclear industry are able more or less to develop
and introduce unique exclusive advanced information systems, the third world countries importing the power nuclear technologies on turn-key basis are actually hooked
to those technological processes control systems which are delivered along with
equipment and therefore they are more susceptible.
For example, Stuxnet, while saving itself at any devices available was systematically searching for the computers with installed automated control system [1]
SCADA [38], by Siemens, applied in the systems to monitor and control industrial,
infrastructural and service processes at oil pipelines, power stations, large communication hubs, airports, courts, and even at military facilities all over the world. Experts
in Kaspersky Laboratory are of strong opinion that creators of Stuxnet possessed
profound knowledge in SCADA-technology [39]. For example, when identifying
the consequences of STUXNET’s attack Siemens declared that the company had not
delivered the software to Iran although confirmed its availability in Bushehr. The