8.8 Safety Control Technologies in Microelectronics
809
United States). In the process of conducting joint research with Raytheon, the largest
corporation in this area, the Johns Hopkins University and a number of other organizations, DARPA tried to find effective preventive solutions to protect critical microcircuit chips from implants and ensure early detection of various vulnerabilities in
case of their occurrence. Nevertheless, everyone understands the complexity of the
task. According to one of the participants of the project: “Even if you find something
significant, you can never be sure that you have found everything. This is the terrible
nature of this business.”
The problem of possible hardware implants has been discovered in special services
for a long time—perhaps, since the emergence of the first integrated microcircuits.
It is also well known that all intelligence structures of the leading industrial powers
(USA, China, Russia) have been successfully experimenting with such technologies
of information theft, manipulation, and sabotage (diversions) for a long time.
By developing the same idea using slightly different author’s expressions, we can
formulate the following provision: any spy fishing and counterintelligence activities in general imply reliance on internal agents. So-called preventive capture of
hardware Trojan functions will inevitably require other secret functions known to
and implemented by special services exclusively. That is, unfortunately for technical
experts, the same classic spies are taking the stage again, but this is the topic for a
completely different study (“spies and traitors”).
Here, we should just say that one of the most important results of studies obtained
during implementation of the above program Trust in ICs was the governmental
decision to develop a special strategy of the US Department of Defense to ensure
safety of all possible channels of supply of critical microcircuits, the main provisions
of which will be detailed below.
Specialists of the US Department of Defence and the DARPA federal agency often
use the term “microelectronics security control technology.” This term first appeared
in the technical literature after 2005, following the release of the aforementioned court
report by the US Department of Justice.
Let us take a very brief look at what it is. The appearance of this term is due to
a change in the standard paradigm of microcircuit design that took place more than
15 years ago; since then, microcircuits have been manufactured in factories located
outside the United States.
Before that, microcircuit customers used to formulate standard and clear technical requirements related to functionality, power, reliability, performance and radiation resistance of the microcircuits ordered from the supplier and presented these
requirements to developers. Now, the requirement of ensuring information security
has become one of the most important ones for developers of critical microcircuits. If
such concepts as reliability, quality, fail-safety, and mean times between failures, as
well as methods, ways and technical solution to provide them, used to be well-known
to developers, now a microcircuit is considered actually safe if it contains no Trojans
at all.
As the analysis of the growth dynamics of the cost of development of microcircuits
shows, with a decrease in design standards, this cost for a single microcircuit with
standards of 45–28 nm, for example, is already several tens of millions of US dollars.
809
United States). In the process of conducting joint research with Raytheon, the largest
corporation in this area, the Johns Hopkins University and a number of other organizations, DARPA tried to find effective preventive solutions to protect critical microcircuit chips from implants and ensure early detection of various vulnerabilities in
case of their occurrence. Nevertheless, everyone understands the complexity of the
task. According to one of the participants of the project: “Even if you find something
significant, you can never be sure that you have found everything. This is the terrible
nature of this business.”
The problem of possible hardware implants has been discovered in special services
for a long time—perhaps, since the emergence of the first integrated microcircuits.
It is also well known that all intelligence structures of the leading industrial powers
(USA, China, Russia) have been successfully experimenting with such technologies
of information theft, manipulation, and sabotage (diversions) for a long time.
By developing the same idea using slightly different author’s expressions, we can
formulate the following provision: any spy fishing and counterintelligence activities in general imply reliance on internal agents. So-called preventive capture of
hardware Trojan functions will inevitably require other secret functions known to
and implemented by special services exclusively. That is, unfortunately for technical
experts, the same classic spies are taking the stage again, but this is the topic for a
completely different study (“spies and traitors”).
Here, we should just say that one of the most important results of studies obtained
during implementation of the above program Trust in ICs was the governmental
decision to develop a special strategy of the US Department of Defense to ensure
safety of all possible channels of supply of critical microcircuits, the main provisions
of which will be detailed below.
Specialists of the US Department of Defence and the DARPA federal agency often
use the term “microelectronics security control technology.” This term first appeared
in the technical literature after 2005, following the release of the aforementioned court
report by the US Department of Justice.
Let us take a very brief look at what it is. The appearance of this term is due to
a change in the standard paradigm of microcircuit design that took place more than
15 years ago; since then, microcircuits have been manufactured in factories located
outside the United States.
Before that, microcircuit customers used to formulate standard and clear technical requirements related to functionality, power, reliability, performance and radiation resistance of the microcircuits ordered from the supplier and presented these
requirements to developers. Now, the requirement of ensuring information security
has become one of the most important ones for developers of critical microcircuits. If
such concepts as reliability, quality, fail-safety, and mean times between failures, as
well as methods, ways and technical solution to provide them, used to be well-known
to developers, now a microcircuit is considered actually safe if it contains no Trojans
at all.
As the analysis of the growth dynamics of the cost of development of microcircuits
shows, with a decrease in design standards, this cost for a single microcircuit with
standards of 45–28 nm, for example, is already several tens of millions of US dollars.