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5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
The authors present a concrete example of a method to organize such an attack in
which the secret key of hardware AES algorithm execution is transmitted based on
the microcircuit power source circuit.
The authors suggest a certain link between the developer and the operator of
cryptographic hardware. The developer introduces a malicious element (Trojan) in
the microcircuit, which is later installed in the protective cryptographic hardware.
After the microcircuit (hardware) production cycle is completed, the operator is able
to read the secret key. It is shown that illegal cooperation between these two parties is
necessary, because otherwise the enemy operator, who is not familiar with the attack
technology used, will not be able to read the key. It is clear that such operations
can be carried out only by efforts and methods of the relevant special services using
technical specialists.
5.2 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans
in Microcircuits Based on the Analysis
of Electromagnetic Radiation Spectrum
5.2.1 Retrospective Review of Alternative Techniques
for Detection of Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
Production of fake components in military and civilian equipment during the last
few years has reached an enormous scale, in which the percentage of counterfeit
(fake) products is estimated within 5–20%. At the same time, globalization of the
IP market and the increasing need to reduce costs of electronic devices force IP
manufacturers to compromise on ensuring security of IP production and supply
channels. Large manufacturers of semiconductor devices transfer production of chips
to various offshore plants and are forced to use third-party IP blocks in their System
on Chip (SoC) project. It clearly leads to loss of security control not only over the
process of microcircuit design itself, but over the process of industrial microcircuit
production as well.
In this context, such episodes as falsification of products, remarked components,
and maliciously modified parts become one of the most serious threats for security of modern microcircuits [3–6]. As demonstrated above, the term “Hardware
Trojan” (HT) refers to deliberate (and usually malicious) aimed at altering its initial
functionality. Scenarios most sensitive to these HTs are those that use microcircuits
in applications related to the fields of national security, such as spacecraft and military applications, healthcare, aviation, government communications, power industry
control, and other critical infrastructures.
The purpose of the introduced HT can be different: changing functions of the
device, undermining its reliability and/or availability in the system, providing backdoor for the intruder, or creating a critical data leakage channel. Various classifications can be found in literature (e.g., [6–8]). HT can be divided into various particular
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
The authors present a concrete example of a method to organize such an attack in
which the secret key of hardware AES algorithm execution is transmitted based on
the microcircuit power source circuit.
The authors suggest a certain link between the developer and the operator of
cryptographic hardware. The developer introduces a malicious element (Trojan) in
the microcircuit, which is later installed in the protective cryptographic hardware.
After the microcircuit (hardware) production cycle is completed, the operator is able
to read the secret key. It is shown that illegal cooperation between these two parties is
necessary, because otherwise the enemy operator, who is not familiar with the attack
technology used, will not be able to read the key. It is clear that such operations
can be carried out only by efforts and methods of the relevant special services using
technical specialists.
5.2 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans
in Microcircuits Based on the Analysis
of Electromagnetic Radiation Spectrum
5.2.1 Retrospective Review of Alternative Techniques
for Detection of Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
Production of fake components in military and civilian equipment during the last
few years has reached an enormous scale, in which the percentage of counterfeit
(fake) products is estimated within 5–20%. At the same time, globalization of the
IP market and the increasing need to reduce costs of electronic devices force IP
manufacturers to compromise on ensuring security of IP production and supply
channels. Large manufacturers of semiconductor devices transfer production of chips
to various offshore plants and are forced to use third-party IP blocks in their System
on Chip (SoC) project. It clearly leads to loss of security control not only over the
process of microcircuit design itself, but over the process of industrial microcircuit
production as well.
In this context, such episodes as falsification of products, remarked components,
and maliciously modified parts become one of the most serious threats for security of modern microcircuits [3–6]. As demonstrated above, the term “Hardware
Trojan” (HT) refers to deliberate (and usually malicious) aimed at altering its initial
functionality. Scenarios most sensitive to these HTs are those that use microcircuits
in applications related to the fields of national security, such as spacecraft and military applications, healthcare, aviation, government communications, power industry
control, and other critical infrastructures.
The purpose of the introduced HT can be different: changing functions of the
device, undermining its reliability and/or availability in the system, providing backdoor for the intruder, or creating a critical data leakage channel. Various classifications can be found in literature (e.g., [6–8]). HT can be divided into various particular