462
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
for analyzing large microcircuits, Wei and Potcognac [48] expanded the capabilities
of this method by adding a preliminary segmentation step that allows breaking down
a large circuit into many smaller elements.
In this case, segmentation criteria are chosen in such a way as to ensure maximum
accuracy of the results of subsequent characterization. The segmentation process
itself is achieved by changing the number of initial input vectors and simultaneously freezing other input vectors. The part of a circuit obtained by segmentation
in this case is considered as an independent element of this circuit (i.e., a segment).
The characterization of logical elements in combination with thermal conditioning
applied to a specific segment provides information on the presence of a Trojan.
The subsequent identification mechanism, based on the principle of assumption and
confirmation, provides information on the type and input communication lines of all
existing Trojans.
5.1.13 Methods of Preventing Data Leakage Through
Hidden Channels
Jean and Macris [23] developed and demonstrated an attack method, the task of
which is to organize the leakage of a key of an advanced encryption standard (AES).
This goal is achieved by manipulating the transmission signal of the wireless link
within its acceptable level. This work, in our opinion, is the first type of attacks in
the analog domain presented in literature.
With the help of a special external protective core, Das et al. [18] propose a
new approach to preventing possible data leakages through the data bus caused by
hardware Trojans. The special control device here monitors the behavior of all bytes
the main memory access buses by comparing the results of each access operation
with its simulated (calculated) version. If the results of implementation of the access
operations are the same in this case, the access will be automatically approved by the
security device; otherwise, access will be denied. The emulation of memory access
operations is performed in software applications and specially designed systems.
5.1.14 Using Combined Methods of Side-Channel Analysis
The first approach to combining the capabilities of simultaneously used various
methods of analysis via third-party channels was presented by Kushanfar and
Mirhoseyni [28] in continuation of [29].
The proposed infrastructure of the research complex allows carrying out simultaneous analysis of various third-party channels, simultaneously using various
assessment methods, such as consumption current, current leakage, and delay.
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
for analyzing large microcircuits, Wei and Potcognac [48] expanded the capabilities
of this method by adding a preliminary segmentation step that allows breaking down
a large circuit into many smaller elements.
In this case, segmentation criteria are chosen in such a way as to ensure maximum
accuracy of the results of subsequent characterization. The segmentation process
itself is achieved by changing the number of initial input vectors and simultaneously freezing other input vectors. The part of a circuit obtained by segmentation
in this case is considered as an independent element of this circuit (i.e., a segment).
The characterization of logical elements in combination with thermal conditioning
applied to a specific segment provides information on the presence of a Trojan.
The subsequent identification mechanism, based on the principle of assumption and
confirmation, provides information on the type and input communication lines of all
existing Trojans.
5.1.13 Methods of Preventing Data Leakage Through
Hidden Channels
Jean and Macris [23] developed and demonstrated an attack method, the task of
which is to organize the leakage of a key of an advanced encryption standard (AES).
This goal is achieved by manipulating the transmission signal of the wireless link
within its acceptable level. This work, in our opinion, is the first type of attacks in
the analog domain presented in literature.
With the help of a special external protective core, Das et al. [18] propose a
new approach to preventing possible data leakages through the data bus caused by
hardware Trojans. The special control device here monitors the behavior of all bytes
the main memory access buses by comparing the results of each access operation
with its simulated (calculated) version. If the results of implementation of the access
operations are the same in this case, the access will be automatically approved by the
security device; otherwise, access will be denied. The emulation of memory access
operations is performed in software applications and specially designed systems.
5.1.14 Using Combined Methods of Side-Channel Analysis
The first approach to combining the capabilities of simultaneously used various
methods of analysis via third-party channels was presented by Kushanfar and
Mirhoseyni [28] in continuation of [29].
The proposed infrastructure of the research complex allows carrying out simultaneous analysis of various third-party channels, simultaneously using various
assessment methods, such as consumption current, current leakage, and delay.